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INTRODUCTION
International law seems to generate as much scholarship as case
law. This is certainly true for the international law of banking, at least
since 1980.1 So why another article in international banking law?
This Article is foundational. It is not grounded in international law,
but rather in the foundation of banking law: the law of money. The
commentary of the last fifteen years has sought to answer the ques-
tion, "Where is money?" before tackling the prior question, "What is
money?" The first question is intractable without answering the sec-
ond, and there has been very little recent scholarship on the legal
nature of money. This Article seeks to bridge the gap between the law
of money and the law of international banking.
1. Appendix A contains an extensive bibliography of the United States law review
literature. The most compendious reviews of the recent law are in Richard Herring &
Friedrich Kfibler, The Allocation of Risk in Cross-Border Deposit Transactions, 89 Nw. U. L. REv.
942 (1995), and in EDMUND M.A. KwAw, GREY AREAS IN EUROCURRENCy DEPOSITS AND
PLACEMENTS: THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME (1994). The historical devel-
opment of this field of law can be found in Jefferson B. Fordham, Branch Banks as Separate
Entities, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 975 (1931), and in Patrick Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for
Deposits Placed in Their Foreign Branches, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 903 (1979). Two other
law review articles are particularly noteworthy: Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, Multinational Banks, and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733
(1989), and Margaret E. Tahyar, Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confu-
sion, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 594 (1986).
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Before discussing the foundational problems of money, a few
words about the case law are in order. The international banking
cases focus on two primary areas: attachment and expropriation.
Courts have long understood attachment and have treated the cases
predictably. A litigant would go to a United States court, seeking to
attach a foreign bank account. The defendant bank would argue-
successfully-that a United States court had no business attaching a
foreign account.2 Courts and lawyers generally understood the ration-
ale for this result. If United States courts started attaching foreign
bank accounts, the court of the foreign country in which the account
was located might ignore the attachment and force the foreign bank
to pay the original depositor anyway. This is double liability, which is
generally understood to be poor policy.'
The expropriation cases are inherently more episodic and far
more poorly understood. In the aftermath of war, revolution, or do-
mestic crisis, a government would expropriate or freeze a bank de-
posit in a foreign bank, often a branch of a United States bank.
Aggrieved depositors would sue the bank in the United States, often
in the court located in the domicile of the head office of the bank.
The bank would argue that the United States court had no business
enforcing repayment of foreign deposits. In the old days, the plaintiff
would lose.4 These old foreign expropriation cases differed from the
attachment cases in only one respect: Nobody could justify the
result.5
Since around 1970, courts have noticed this lack of rationale in
expropriation cases.' Although plaintiffs continue to lose in attach-
ment cases, the expropriation cases have changed. Since 1975, many
foreign depositors in expropriation cases have won, although some
have lost on nearly identical facts.7 The prospect ofjudicial relief has
brought on more plaintiffs and more cases. These cases, in turn, have
engendered an extraordinary volume of both statutory activity8 and
2. See infra note 250.
3. See infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the problems associated with double
liability.
4. See Herring & Kfibler, supra note 1, at 957-68.
5. See Tahyar, supra note 1, at 614-15.
6. See, e.g., Digitrex, Inc. v. Johnson, 491 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (mem.).
7. Compare Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 651 (2d Cir. 1984)
with Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5, 11 (N.Y. 1984). In both cases,
Cuban nationals brought suit against the American bank after the Cuban government had
purported to expropriate their deposits. These factually indistinguishable cases were de-
cided the same week-the bank won in the New York Court of Appeals but lost in the
Second Circuit.
8. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 633 (1994) (limiting banks' liability on foreign accounts).
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scholarly commentary.9 The commentary has tried to explain the case
law; the statutes have tried to reverse the judicial trend toward provid-
ing relief. Neither effort has been successful. The courts have ig-
nored the statutes,' ° and the commentary has been too profuse for an
obscure corner of commercial law." The result: complex statutes,
complex case law, and complex commentary. In these foreign branch
expropriation cases, courts and commentators have had a hard time
understanding where the money is, or who should get it.
Where is the money? This is a hard question. Bank money is ethe-
real-an electronic blip. Legally, bank money is an intangible chose
of action. "The situs of intangible property is about as intangible a
concept as is known to the law."' 2 It is difficult enough to understand
precisely what bank money is, much less where it is. And even if we
understand where bank money is located, why should its location de-
cide cases? Where is the money and why should we care? A coherent
answer to these questions will resolve many of the problems of inter-
national banking law.
Being foundational, this Article gets back to basics. Part I is as
basic as possible: What is money, and where is it? These very basic
questions require a triple analysis: doctrinal, economic, and social.
Legal doctrine sets the basic ground rules that transform various kinds
of communications into bank liabilities-the legal stuff of bank
money. This Part explains these legal ground rules through both in-
strumental and social analyses. The social analysis of business law set
forth in this Article is unconventional, but necessary. Nothing can be
a medium of exchange without an underlying social consensus that
the medium of exchange is acceptable. (If this statement seems eso-
teric, try passing foreign currency at a newsstand.) The law of money
must maintain this social consensus, as well as further the usual instru-
mental goals of business law. To understand the appropriate legal
doctrine for money, we must understand the need for social coher-
ence, as well as the instrumental goals benefitting the counterparties
alone.
Part I concludes that money calls for an unusual kind of law: un-
usually precise and clear. Bank money is based on communications
that both create and draw from a shared social consensus. Because
there are no external referents for bank communications, almost all
9. See supra note 1 and Appendix A.
10. See, e.g., infra note 150 and accompanying text.
11. See Appendix A.
12. Tabacalera SeverianoJorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714 (5th Cir.
1968).
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possible outcomes must flow from the communications themselves.
The social consensus that we call money is delicate, and it will unravel
without tremendous clarity and predictability. This need for clarity
applies just as much to the rules for localizing bank liabilities as it
applies to the other ground rules of payment law. Part I does not
provide a rule for locating bank money (this comes later). However,
Part I argues that the location of bank money has no meaning but as
the outcome of a conflict-of-law analysis.
Part II discusses the need for locating bank money-that is, the
need for a conflicts law of international banking. This Part is inserted
for logical completeness; it contains nothing new and may be skipped
by readers who do not need persuading. The flow of the argument
resumes in Part III, which builds on the theoretical treatment of Part
I. Part III discusses what may be the key problem in international
banking case law: the contrast between the highly formalistic (even
nominalistic1") substantive law of money and the conflicts law of
money. Although modern United States conflicts law is steeped in
legal realism, Part III shows, through analysis of two cases, that a realis-
tic conflicts law simply cannot coexist with a nominalistic substantive
payment law. Part III concludes with a discussion of nominalistic law,
but does not itself develop any nominalistic conflicts rules.
Part IV contains the surprise. These nominalistic conflicts rules
need not be developed. They already exist, independent of the case
law and ignored by the commentary. The recent revisions to the Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.) now contain a detailed and satisfac-
tory treatment of the commercial law of international banking. The
"bankers"' sections of the U.C.C.-Articles 4, 4A, 5, and 8-all contain
very similar rules precisely locating bank liabilities.' 4 Most of these
rules were not consciously generated as "nominalistic conflicts rules";
13. Although it is a significant term of art in the law of money, the word "nominalism"
is not used here in its technical legal sense. Instead, this term is used in its philosophical
sense-ascribing reality to symbols. See A.D. Woozley, Universals, in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 194, 203-04 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) ("On a realist view certain objects are
called 'tables' because they are tables .... On an extreme nominalist view they are tables
only because they are called 'tables,' and no answer at all can be given to the question why
certain objects are (or are to be) called 'tables' and others not.").
In the law of money, "nominalism" refers to courts' insistence on awarding judgment
in nominal money terms. See F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY 271-310 (5th ed.
1992) (discussing "nominalism" in the law of money). Monetary nominalism ignores the
changes in purchasing power of a currency that occur between the time of agreement and
the time ofjudgment. If a currency has collapsed completely, a nominalistic judgment is
worthless.
14. See U.C.C. art. 4 (1995) (Bank Deposits and Collections); id. art. 4A (Funds Trans-
fers); id. art. 5 (Letters of Credit); id. art. 8 (Investment Securities).
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they were the practical responses of banking lawyers to the recent in-
determinacy of the case law.
These new U.C.C. rules satisfy a felt need. They do not, however,
satisfy an articulated need. The U.C.C. conflicts rules do not articu-
late their own rationale, and previous scholarly commentary has not
yet provided one. Parts I-IV will not only clarify the content of the
U.C.C. rules, but more importantly, will provide a clear idea of why the
conflicts laws of international banking are what they are. Interna-
tional banking law has been littered with the bleached bones of stat-
utes and doctrines without widely understood rationales. Statutes are
too often ignored or distinguished away by judges, especially when
they are discontinuous with preexisting law.15 This Article seeks to
spare the new U.C.C. sections the same fate as past statutes.
I. THE MEANING OF LOCALIZED LIABILrrIES
This Part establishes the analytic framework developed through-
out the rest of this Article. Subpart A discusses the legal meaning of a
bank liability, regardless of its location. This discussion is a formalistic
recapitulation of accepted law and contains no surprises for banking
specialists.
The fun begins with subpart B, which asserts that these bank lia-
bilities are money. Although this assertion seems innocent to most of
us who have successfully written a check, it is inconsistent with the
U.C.C. The U.C.C. views only currency as money, and bank liabilities
as a mere right to currency. In other words, payment law does not
recognize our payment system! The U.C.C., however, is not an os-
trich, pretending that a real problem does not exist. Instead, it is try-
ing to prevent a very real problem: an infinite regress. If bank
liabilities-debts-are money, then the monetary payment of a debt is
satisfied by the monetary payment of a debt.
Fortunately, this infinite regress can be broken by what amounts
to a leap of faith: an epistemological emphasis on the social construc-
tion of money. To phrase these words more succinctly, money is what
payment systems do. The legitimacy of money, therefore, arises from
our acceptance of the underlying payment system rules. These rules
are nothing more than the homely law of bank liabilities and the law
governing the transfer of these liabilities. As long as we collectively
accept these rules, the infinite regress is not a real problem. If we do
not collectively accept these rules, even currency is worthless.
15. See infra note 150.
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The rules governing bank money operate on nothing but com-
munications: Money is (carefully regulated) talk. Subpart C shows
that the location of electronic bank monies can have no existence
outside these communications. Bank money exists when we say it ex-
ists, and it exists where we say it exists. Therefore, the location of
bank money can only have significance as a conflict-of-law rule.
A. What Are Liabilities?
First things first: What is a bank liability, putting problems of lo-
cation aside? This question has a hornbook answer: A bank liability is
a license to sue and collect. If I have a deposit with a bank, I have a
right to judgment against the bank for the value of the deposit, if the
appropriate conditions are met. If I am the beneficiary of a letter of
credit, I have a right to judgment if I can timely present conforming
documents. 6 If I possess a bank's certified check, I have a right to
judgment if I present the check, and it is dishonored. 7 In other
words, a bank liability is nothing more than the right to go to court
and obtain ajudgment against the bank for damages. It is not a prop-
erty right to specific bank assets; rather, it is a contract right to ajudg-
ment for money."8
An especially important kind of bank liability is a liability for a
"predeterminate1 9 sum created by a communication. This is not the
only kind of bank liability. For example, a bank may commit a tort: a
noncommunicative event that does not lead to predeterminate dam-
ages. But the liabilities of interest in this Article result from communi-
cations and are denominated precisely, in terms of a monetary unit of
account. A checking account liability is a good example.
16. See U.C.C. §§ 5-108, 5-111 (1995).
17. See id. § 3-411.
18. See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 116 S. Ct. 286, 290 (1995) (holding that a bank's
temporary refusal to pay its debt to a debtor upon demand was not an exercise of a set-off
right and that such "administrative hold" did not violate stay provisions); Libyan Arab For-
eign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 271 (Q.B. 1987) (LAFB) ("It is
elementary, or hornbook law to use an American expression, that the customer does not
own any money in a bank."). The hornbooks concur with the cases. See, e.g., 1 ANN
GRAHAM, BANKING LAW § 9.03 (1997) (describing the contract between banks and deposi-
tors); KwAw, supra note 1, at 86 (outlining the mechanics of eurocurrency deposits); 5A
MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING 1-22 (1994) (discussing the relationship between banks and
depositors).
19. This Article must coin the word "predeterminate" to capture the idea that the dam-
ages a court would award in the event of breach are precisely known by both parties in
advance of a judgment. A sum can be predeterminate without being predetermined, as
with a variable interest rate note.
1998]
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The communication creating this license to sue could be that of a
depositor, tendering a check over the window and receiving a pass-
book entry. The communication need not be tangible, like a pass-
book or check, for even keystrokes on an automated telleri machine
(ATM) count as communications. Nor is a direct communication be-
tween the customer and the bank necessary. For example, a cus-
tomer's employer may wire the customer's pay to her bank. The
bank's resulting liability to the customer is the same, although the
communicative event did not directly involve the customer. Similarly,
a communicative event creating (or at least transferring) a bank liabil-
ity need not involve any bank action. Transfer of a bank-issued negoti-
able instrument creates a bank liability to the transferee without any
intervention by the bank.
Predeterminate liabilities may be denominated in any accepted
units of account: dollars, drachmas, or the like. The only constraints
are that the unit of account be recognized as some kind of money,
and that the liability be for a predeterminate quantity. These prede-
terminate liabilities represent a license to execute a judgment against
the bank's general assets, perhaps triggered by some formal require-
ment such as dishonor and protest. Only the details of the licenses
differ. The licenses to sue and collect on time deposits, demand de-
posits, letters of credit, and foreign currency obligations are all trig-
gered by somewhat different circumstances and convey somewhat
different consequences. But their basic formal legal structure is the
same.
20
20. U.C.C. Revised Article 8 securities entitlements must be excluded from this list of
liabilities. See U.C.C. §§ 8-501 to -511 (1995). Although similar to conventional bank liabil-
ities, they differ in two key ways. First, the Article 8 customer has the right to compel
delivery of certificated securities, id. § 8-508, with execution as a backstop remedy. Second,
the bank (or other securities intermediary) is obligated to keep a fungible bulk of specific
securities on its books, rather than general assets. Id. § 8-504; accord Charles W. Mooney,
Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Modelfor Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by
Intermediaries, 12 CARozo L. REv. 305, 403-05 (1990) (examining issues concerning prop-
erty rights in modem securities markets and suggesting reforms of current legal regimes);
James Steven Rogers, Negotiability, Property, and Identity, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 471, 484-501
(1990) (exploring the implications of fungibility by examining the rules of property ap-
plied to fungible non-negotiable property such as goods). These different legal character-
istics do not prevent Article 8 securities entitlements (or even securities) from being used
as money, and such "warehouse receipt" money (i.e., commodity money, with the com-
modity evidenced by title documents) has been used in the past. See BLACK'S LAw DicrioN-
ARY 1584 (6th ed. 1990). However, it is a less effective form of money. Different issues are,
in effect, different monies. The fungible bulk requirement prevents liquidity transforma-
tion and bank creation of money, and the unit of account is limited to a single issue of
securities.
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Of course, this legal formalism is not the living law. Indeed, it
appears almost devoid of business reality. Nobody would ever deal
with a bank if bank liabilities were only extinguished by formal execu-
tion of judgment. Instead, when a bank is confronted with a valid
license to sue and collect on this kind of liability (e.g., one of its certi-
fied checks), it almost invariably "settles" the claim at one hundred
percent, as soon as the claim is made. But it is only these payment
liabilities-communicative and predeterminate-that are special. 21
Banks are as litigious about their ordinary liabilities as anybody else.
In other words, a bank confronted with a payment liability does
not resist: It "pays." A bank that does not pay its liabilities when pay-
ment is expected will soon be out of the business of banking. Banks
will even pay liabilities that are not formally due, if their customers
expect them to do so. A check drawn on a NOW account, for exam-
ple, is technically a time draft that does not obligate a bank to pay on
demand. However, this time-draft characteristic exists only because of
regulatory constraints, 22 and banks pay these instruments on demand,
because banks and their customers view a NOW draft as a payment
instrument.
"Payment" is the connection between the extremely formalistic
law of predeterminate, communicative bank liabilities and banking
practice. The connection between bank liabilities and payment re-
quires close examination.
21. Before the recent revisions, the U.C.C. assumed that banks' reputational incentives
were enough to preserve the reliability of the payment system. Generally, this is true, but a
bank may occasionally insist on its formal right to legal process, without regard to the
reputational consequences. Before the revisions, the U.C.C. merely assessed damages-
ordered payment-for banks that refused to pay voluntarily. (Checks were an exception.
Banks that refused to pay checks without good reason could be assessed consequential
damages. See U.C.C. § 4-402 (Pre-Amendment (1990)).) The new U.C.C. has considerably
expanded the additional liability of banks who do not fulfill their clear obligations. See
U.C.C. § 3-411 (1995) (allowing consequential damages for a failure to pay on certified or
cashier's checks); id. § 4A-305 (allowing consequential damages and fee-shifting under
some circumstances); id. § 5-111 (e) (imposing mandatory fee-shifting).
22. As a matter of law, demand deposits cannot pay interest. 12 C.F.R. § 217.3 (1997).
This could be construed as a prohibition on interest-bearing transaction accounts. After
all, demand deposits are the only legally enforceable way to run a reliable payment system.
However, demand deposits are not necessary, if the paying bank is willing-as a matter of
business course-to waive its right to insist on advance notice of withdrawal. Thus the
NOW account, an interest-bearing time deposit that banks choose to pay on demand. Cf
12 C.F.R. § 204.2(e) (2) (adding NOW accounts to the definition of "transaction accounts"
subject to reserve requirements).
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B. Liabilities, Payments, and Money
1. Liabilities and Payments.-Although this Article's definition of
bank liabilities is standard, its definition of payment is not. "Payment"
is clearly-and wrongly-treated in law as something requiring the
tender of currency, or at least the satisfaction of a right to receive
currency.2" This law is clearly inconsistent with market practice. The
honor of a check seldom involves dollar bills; commercial wire trans-
fers almost never do.
This Article takes a different approach, one more consistent with
practice. For our purpose, "payment" is the result of extinguishing a
bank liability. 4 Because the bank liabilities are seldom extinguished
by the execution of a judgment, a payment is best viewed as a settle-
ment of the customer's right to collect a judgment from the bank on
the liability. This definition is not strained: It is what banks do. It
concentrates more on the mechanism than the purpose of a payment
system, but it is the mechanism of payment that involves the law of
bank liabilities.
Consider a payment by check. X pays Y by delivering Y a check
drawn on X's bank. Y deposits the check in Ys bank. After a collec-
tion process, Y is paid. The collection process uses credit transfers
among several banks to transform X's bank's liability to X into Ys
bank's liability to Y. A wire transfer leads to the same result, although
X initiates the payment order with its bank, rather than delivers the
payment order to Y. Such a wire transfer is illustrated in Figure 1. X
discharges its debt to Y by ordering its bank to transform X's bank's
debt to X into X's bank's debt to Ys bank. X's bank complies. Ys
bank is in turn instructed to credit Ys account, based on the debt
owed by X's bank to Ys bank. This discharges the original obligation
between X and Y, replacing it with Ys bank's debt to Y Xs license to
judgment against its bank is therefore novated by the payment mecha-
nism into Ys license to judgment against its bank. In the process of
novation, the initial liability of X's bank to X is extinguished.25 The
banks' net balance sheets are unaffected by this process, but in the
end, a bank debt to X has been transformed into a bank debt to Y
23. See infra note 28. The one notable exception to this rule in American law is U.C.C.
§ 4A406(b) (1995), discussed below. See infra notes 26, 44 and accompanying text.
24. Currency is a special case. See infra text accompanying notes 28-30.
25. X and Y can share the same bank, in which case the process consists of a single
bank's book-entry, in a so-called "on-us" transaction
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FIGURE 1
$100
X Bank X Bank X Bank Y Banki
$500 $500 $100 $400 $
1. X has a $500 2. X contracts a $100 3. X pays Y through bank
account with its bank. debt to Y. credits, leaving X with a
$400 account and Y with
$100 payment.
A bank payment, therefore, is a shifting of bank liabilities
through a highly stereotyped communications process. Indeed, we
can view most of the commercial law of checks or wire transfers as
regulation of the speed, reliability, and integrity of this process.
The purpose of the payment system is admittedly not the shifting
and extinction of bank liabilities, but rather discharging money-de-
nominated obligations among end-parties. But the payment system
functions by the extinction and novation of bank liabilities. Most pay-
ment law takes the purpose of payment systems for granted, concen-
trating instead on the communications that extinguish and novate
bank liabilities. For example, Article 4A of the U.C.C.-governing
wire transfers-has many sections dealing with data security, obliga-
tions among intermediaries, and the like. It contains only one section
defining when and how a wire transfer discharges the underlying obli-
gation among the parties.2 6
Payment is therefore a circular process. Payments function by
shifting liabilities-novating the payor's license to judgment against
its bank to a payee's license to judgment against its bank for a prede-
terminate measure of damages. The business of banking is a constant
trade of licenses to judgment, licenses almost never exercised in court.
We call these traded licenses to judgment against banks "money." It is
time to examine the connection between the bank-intermediated pay-
ment system and money.
2. Payments and Money: Breaking the Circle.-This Article has de-
fined a payment as the result of extinguishing a bank liability. This
definition has led to a complementary relationship between payments
and money. Payments are the mechanics of money; money is the pur-
pose of payments. Money is what payments do. Understanding money
26. See U.C.C. § 4A-406(b).
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requires understanding the corresponding payment system. But the
converse is also true: Payment systems cannot be understood without
understanding money.
This statement should be surprising. The discussion to this point
has established a hierarchy, with the technical act of payment
subordinated to its higher-order purpose: money. Generally, lower-
level conceptualizations do not refer to the upper level, and can be
explained without them. For example, physics can be understood
without reference to chemistry; economics can be understood without
reference to social theory. It is only the upper-level conceptualization
that needs the lower level. However, the mechanics of the payment
system cannot be understood without reference to money, which is, in
turn, the product of the payment system. The mechanics of payment,
without reference to its monetary purpose, involves an infinite regress,
which can only be broken with the concept of money.
This is apparent in bank-intermediated payments. As discussed
above, a bank payment is a novation of a right to sue a bank and col-
lect a judgment. If this right is exercised (as opposed to being trans-
ferred to someone else), a suit is brought, a judgment is obtained
against a bank, and the judgment is subsequently executed. In execu-
tion, the sheriff seizes and sells bank assets for a payment large
enough to satisfy the judgment. Because the goods are sold for
money, the payee is in precisely the same position as where the pro-
cess began-the holder of a right to sue another bank for judgment.
The payee can never get anything real. Bank money is a right to sue
for the value of assets measured by a unit of account that is operation-
ally the right to sue for the value of assets measured by a unit of ac-
count that is operationally .... If we examine the mechanics of the
payment system too closely, it evanesces.2 7
To break this circle, we could treat bank money as a claim to
"real" money-gold or currency money such as dollar bills. This ap-
proach, which can be called "currency fundamentalism," seems better
than an endless chain of licenses to collect money judgments-
licenses that can never result in ultimate satisfaction. It is also the
27. Perhaps only Hayek has taken note of this issue. See F.A. HAYE., DENATIONALISA-
TION OF MONEY. THE ARGUMENT REFINED 43 (2d ed. 1978). In his free-banking proposal,
Hayek argues that execution, although brought against general assets, should be translated
into the quantity of some other bank's money that would buy a specified commodity bas-
ket. Id. at 19. He does not explore the circularity of this argument, but he makes it to
avoid the problems of currency fundamentalism that are particularly salient in commodity-
based monies. (With the exception of gold, few commodities are used as money, and a
tender of the commodities backing money would not be a tender of money.)
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approach of the U.C.C. and the leading legal commentators. 28 But
this approach also fails. Currency is itself ineffable. There are two
approaches to paper currency; both are circular.
With the first approach, currency is viewed as a liability of the
government to the holder, with the liability transferred upon change
in possession. In such a case, currency is no more than a state-issued
bank note. It remains an extinction and novation of an intermedi-
ary's liability, just like bank money.29 But by invoking bank money as
a right to currency, we have the same problem, once more removed.
At law, a redemption of currency cannot even compel the sheriffs
auction underpinning a bank liability. Redemption of currency can
only compel more currency."0
It is also possible to view currency as a repository of intrinsic
value: the intrinsic value supplied by government fiat and social con-
vention. This neatly breaks the circularity of money. A transfer of
intrinsic value does not involve an infinite regress. The transfer is
over when it is made. However, this answer raises another question:
What makes the value of currency intrinsic? The beginning of this
paragraph answered this question: government fiat and social con-
vention. However, the answer, although correct, is unsatisfactory on
28. See U.C.C. § 1-201(24) ("'Money' means a medium of exchange authorized or
adopted by a domestic or foreign government .... "); id. § 3-104(a) ("'[N]egotiable instru-
ment' means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money."); id.
§ 4A-103(a)(1) ("'Payment order' means an instruction... to pay... money."). The two
most influential English-language legal treatises on money both support this approach,
although Nussbaum does so reluctantly. See MANN, supra note 13, at 3-30 (exploring the
abstract concept of money, including requirements under the law, monetary theories, and
the intrinsic nature of money, from a fundamentalistic perspective); ARTmUR NUSSBAUM,
MONEY IN THE LAw: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 11 (rev. ed. 1950) (defining the con-
cept of money by examining fundamental functions of money). Kwaw opposes this view
and develops an alternative for wire transfers. See KwAw, supra note 1, at 181-216 (finding
fundamentalism to be outdated and arguing for a redefinition of the concept of payment
and place of repayment); accord Herman Oliphant, The Theory of Money in the Law of Commer-
cial Instruments, 29 YALE L.J. 606, 608-19 (1920) (expressing dissatisfaction with
fundamentalism).
The U.C.C. is ambivalently fundamentalist, because it defines money as including "a
monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental organization or by agree-
ment between two or more nations." U.C.C. § 1-201(24). This clause was intended to
accommodate special drawing rights (SDRs) and European Currency Units (ECUs),
neither of which was represented by a currency at the time U.C.C. section 1-201 (24) was
drafted. Each was merely a unit of account on the banks' books. However, the ambiva-
lence only exists in the international arena. Currency fundamentalism is the national
dogma.
29. See Rogers, supra note 20, at 507-08.
30. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 411 (1994) (mandating that Federal Reserve notes "shall be
redeemed in lawful money on demand") with 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (making Federal Reserve
notes legal tender).
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both prongs. As discussed below, governmental fiat does not supply
much intrinsic value to money. Social convention-although a potent
source of intrinsic value 3t-is itself a circular concept.
Social convention can be an extremely strong source of intrinsic
value. Money can cohere strongly through shared consensus that a
particular medium of exchange is a "real" medium of exchange.
However, this consensus cannot be limited to the two parties to the
exchange; it must be shared by society, or at least a large group within
society:
The abstraction of the process of [money] exchange from
specific real exchanges, and its embodiment in a distinctive
form, can happen only if exchange has become something
other than a private process between two individuals which is
confined to individual actions. This new and broader char-
acter of exchange is established when the value of exchange
given by one party has no direct value for the other party,
but is merely a claim upon other definite values; a claim
whose realization depends upon the economic community as
a whole or upon the government as its representative. When
barter is replaced by money transactions a third factor is in-
troduced between the two parties: the community as a
whole, which provides a real value corresponding to
money.... This is the core of truth in the theory that money
is only a claim upon society. Money appears, so to speak, as a
bill of exchange from which the name of the drawee is lack-
ing, or alternatively, which is guaranteed rather than ac-
cepted. It has been argued against this theory that metallic
money involves credit, that credit creates a liability, whereas
metallic money payment liquidates any liability; but this ar-
gument overlooks the fact that the liquidation of the individ-
ual's liability may still involve an obligation for the
community. 3
2
In other words, the social consensus underpinning money is circular.
A value is shared by society only because a value is shared by society.
To be sure, the shared social consensus underpinning money is not
infinitely plastic. Snowflakes will never serve as money in any society.
But even technologically satisfactory media are not money unless we
31. If the intrinsic value of money is created by social consensus, money must have a
social utility separate from individuals' utilities. See Benjamin Klein, The Competitive Supply
of Money, 6 MONEY, CREDIT & BANING 423, 446 & n.33 (1974). The utility of a medium of
exchange must be interpersonal, to anyone but a numismatist. Money is therefore like
love: ill-suited to methodological individualism.
32. GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 177 (Tom Bottomore & David Frisby
trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1978) (2d ed. 1907).
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undergo the difficult social process that makes them so.s Simmel has
correctly observed that even gold is constructed as money through
social convention alone. 4 And social convention is nothing if not
circular.
Can we escape this circularity? If money is not an endless string
of sheriff's auctions or redemptions of currency at a central bank,
money must have intrinsic value to be an acceptable medium of ex-
change. A shared social consensus works, to be sure, but such a con-
sensus is just as endless as the auctions or redemptions. Little wonder
that many lawyers-and some economists-have turned to legal
tender law,3 5 which they frequently, and perhaps unfairly, identify
with Knapp's "chartalism."36 Legal tender advocates seek to avoid
33. VIVANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 24 (1994); cf id. at 13-18 (dis-
cussing the difficulties of the creation of the United States money supply from a monetary,
not commercial law, perspective); JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970, at 30-73 (1973) (offering a technical and detailed historical
treatment of the functions of law and money).
34. See SIMMEL, supra note 32, at 178 ("Viewed from the sociological perspective, there
is no doubt that metallic money is also a promise and that it differs from the cheque only
with respect to the size of the group which vouches for its being accepted."); see also S.
HERBERT FRANKEL, MONEY. Two PHILOSOPHIES 35 n.21 (1977) (examining a credit theory
of money).
35. See infra notes 38-46, 190-195 and accompanying text.
36. It is easy to identify the primacy of legal tender with Knapp:
The matter stands thus: all obligations expressed simply in money refer in
the last resort to valuta [i.e., money accepted by the State in payments] because
judicial decision is final and the State as fountain of law only compels obligations
to be performed in the money in which it itself (by its Treasury) makes payments.
GEORG FRIEDRICH KNAPP, THE STATE THEORY OF MONEY 158 (H.M. Lucas & James Bonar
trans., reprint Augustus M. Kelley 1973) (4th ed. 1924). Although this statement is clear
enough, Knapp's chartalism was probably not founded in legal tender. He explicitly re-
jected legal tender law as the essence of state money, id. at 95, and instead viewed "valuta"
as his touchstone. Id. at 105. (As we can see from the above quotation, his deduction of
legal tender from valuta was obscure.) Knapp's definition of "Chartality" was that of
money as a physical symbol, enforced by law. Id. at 32. He was quite willing to generalize
the definition to any communicative event; he called this "Giro payment" in honor of the
giro system of book-entry funds transfer. Id at 153. Knapp, however, thought that the giro
system-although a payment system-did not involve money unless the state treated it as
valuta. Id. at 147-57.
Knapp's position on the necessary involvement of the state is logically suspect- (he
never distinguished giralism from chartalism), but is not without empirical merit. Today,
few things will pass as money unless they bear the imprimatur of the state, either directly
(e.g., state bank notes or central bank credit) or indirectly (i.e., through state supervision
of banks). But this is not inherent in the nature of money. Only two hundred years ago,
Alexander Hamilton viewed the First Bank of the United States as a more trustworthy
source of money than a government, because it was private. See Bank of the United States:
Proceedings on the Grant of the First Charter, in 1791, Comm. of the Whole House, H.R., 1st
Cong., 3d Sess. (1790) (letter of Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton), reprinted
in M. ST. CLAIR CLARKE & D.A_ HALL, LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK
OF THE UNITED STATES 15, 27 (reprint Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1832). Even today, the
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money's circularity by pointing to the positive command of the state
as a unique and discrete source for money.3 7
This position may or may not be logically coherent. We need not
resolve this question; it is empirically untenable. Legal tender "is
neither necessary nor sufficient for the supply of monetary confidence
and may not even be important."38 A currency can thrive without a
legal tender rule, if the social consensus exists. For example, Federal
Reserve and national bank notes did not become legal tender until
1933, a9 although they had been the premier United States currency
since the Civil War era.4 ° Conversely, legal tender laws have been his-
torically unsuccessful in assuring the acceptability of money. The ex-
pression "not worth a continental" derives from the old currency
issued by the United States under the Articles of Confederation. This
currency was backed by a legal tender law as oppressive as it was inef-
fective. The legal tender law protecting greenbacks did not prevent
them from diverging against gold.4 1
Finally, courts do not take legal tender laws very seriously in the
rare cases they are confronted with them. They refuse to enforce
legal tender rules when enforcement is impractical, view bad-faith
dollar is often preferred to the local currency abroad, despite the complete lack of legal
sanction.
37. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A Treatise on Money, in 5 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 6 (1971). Keynes advocated chartalist money because he believed
that "it is of the essence of a debt to be enforceable in terms of something other than
itself." Id. at 6. Knapp himself seemed to view the circularity of payments as a kind of
vulgar superstition, curable by a correct chartalist understanding. See KNAPP, supra note 36,
at 46-55. (Knapp's chartalism oscillated between legal tender and the ideas expressed in
this Article. See generally KNAPP, supra note 36.) Nussbaum, a lawyer, was more aware of the
problem, and explicitly embraced chartalism to break the logical circle inherent in a pay-
ment-based definition. See NuSSBAUM, supra note 28, at 12. However, Nussbaum also in-
consistently believed that money is a social construct. See id. at 5-10. Mann's embrace of
chartalism seems less sophisticated than Nussbaum's, as it was rooted in the "undeniable
monopoly of the modem State over currency." MANN, supra note 13, at 23. This argument
fails both analytically and empirically, however. The monopoly of the modem state over
currency is due to the state's power in forging social consensus, rather than to the force of
its law. (The two are admittedly related, as is discussed below. See infra notes 38-41 and
accompanying text.) On the empirical side, the state's monopoly of currency is being
threatened with various forms of e-money. See Appendix B.
38. Klein, supra note 31, at 448 (footnote omitted).
39. See H.R.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong. (1933).
40. Federal Reserve notes supplanted national bank notes as premier currency at the
end of World War I. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNAJACOBSON ScHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1867-1960, at 190, 210, 217 (1963).
41. See HuRsT, supra note 33, at 40-45; see also NuSsBAUM, supra note 28, at 55 ("[W]here
gold (or silver) coins . . .have definitely disappeared from circulation, they should no
longer be considered as money."); Oliphant, supra note 28, at 609-10 (expressing a similar
attitude toward legal tender).
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legal tenders as void, and deem good-faith non-legal tenders to be
binding.42 Courts do not use legal tender rules to promote the ac-
ceptability of money; they use them to resolve disputes concerning
whether an underlying debt obligation is discharged by payment.4" In
the course of doing so, they view almost any commercially accepted
medium of exchange as discharging the debt obligation."
42. Compare Nemser v. New York City Transit Auth., 530 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (Sup. Ct.
1988) (holding that a bus company's refusal to take dollar bills, despite their legal tender
status, does not violate federal legal tender law) with Suffolk Bank v. Lincoln Bank, 23 F.
Cas. 346, 348 (C.C.D. Me. 1821) (No. 13,590) (holding that a bank's attempt to pay $3000
in small coins was in bad faith and subject to punitive damages) and U.C.C. § 4A-406(b)
(1995) (making a wire transfer an effective legal tender, unless the beneficiary notifies the
originator of its refusal of the payment within a reasonable time, does not touch the
money, and would have suffered an avoidable loss if the originator had complied with the
contract). See infra notes 190-195 and accompanying text for other examples of such phe-
nomena. See alsoJoslin v. United States, 666 F.2d 1306, 1307 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(stating that the legal tender status of silver dollars is irrelevant to tax computation when
the taxpayer receives fee income in silver dollars of high numismatic value); U.C.C. § 2-
511(2) (stating that tender of a check is sufficient when made in the course of ordinary
business unless the seller demands legal tender and gives reasonable time for the buyer to
procure it); HuRST, supra note 33, at 41 & n.41 (stating that payment in currency that is not
legal tender is performance unless the person to whom performance is due specifically
objects); NUSSBAUM, supra note 28, at 51 ("Courts have therefore shown an inclination to
hold tender of refusable money good 'unless specifically objected to' and such objection is
required to be very explicit." (footnote omitted)). Nussbaum discusses an English legal
tender case, Moss v. Hancock, [1899] 2 Q.B, 111, whose "sound result" was reached by "a
tortuous and questionable argument" because of legal tender status. NUSSBAUM, supra note
28, at 55. A good doctrinal attempt to reconcile the English case law of tender may be
found in Michael Brindle & Raymond Cox, Introduction to LAW OF BANK PAYMENTS 1, 1-6
(Michael Brindle & Raymond Cox eds., 1996).
43. Compare Oliphant, supra note 28, at 609:
The effects of this (legal tender] attribute are that, if such money is tendered by a
debtor in strict compliance with all the numerous and exacting requirements of a
proper tender and the tender is refused, interest as an element of damages ceases
to accumulate, the creditor may not thereafter in an action to collect the debt
recover his costs, parties secondarily liable are discharged and securities on prop-
erty are lost.
Id.
44. See Huis'r, supra note 33, at 43. Such cases have frequently arisen in English law, in
a very standard pattern, as discussed by Kwaw. See KwAw, supra note 1, at 193-201. Ship-
owners often sought to evade their charter obligations by claiming that wire transfers, not
being cash, were not timely payments when the transfers were accepted by the shipowners'
banks. The cases have arrived at the correct result: A wire transfer is a currency-
equivalent, when available to the shipowner at the shipowner's bank. See Mardorf Peach &
Co. v. Attica Sea Carriers Corp. of Liberia, The Laconia, [1976] 2 W.L.RI 668, 678 (C.A.),
appeal allowed, [1977] App. Cas. 850; Afovos Shipping Corp. S.A. v. R. Pagnan & F. LLI, The
Afovos, [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 469, 476 (Q.B.); Tenax S.S. Co. v. The Brimnes (Owners), The
Brimnes, [1973] 1 All E.R. 769, 796 (Q.B. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Tenax S.S. Co. v. Owners of
the Motor Vessel Brimnes, [1974] 3 All E.R. 88 (CA); Zim Israel Navigation Co. v. Effy
Shipping Corp., The Effy, [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 18, 34 (Q.B. 1971); cf U.C.C. § 4A-406(b)
(codifying the same).
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Payment systems remain circular, notwithstanding legal tender.
This is technologically inherent to most payment systems, because
they refer to rights that never quite involve a transfer of something
with intrinsic value. But even without this technological limitation,
payment systems are circular because money-the purpose of all pay-
ment systems-is a social, not a technological phenomenon. There is
nothing that grants intrinsic value to money, except others' percep-
tions of that intrinsic value. A legal tender rule may be able to con-
tribute to that perception, but it cannot compel it.
This Article is not a philosophical essay on money; it is an attempt
by a working bank lawyer to cope with recent case law. It discusses
social construction only because the law of money cannot be under-
stood without appreciating that money is a social construct aided, but
not established, by law. This subpart has raised two basic points,
which will be further developed in the next subpart.
First, money and payment systems are inextricably interrelated:
social teleology and instrumental functionality. Neither makes sense
without the other. Because money cannot be viewed independently of
the payment system that implements it, each payment system is its own
money. This implies that checks are different money than coins,
although one employing the same unit of account. If this statement
strains intuition, try buying a house with coins, or finding a soda
machine that accepts checks. In other words, money is what a pay-
ment system does.
The second point is a corollary of the first. State-issued currency
is not fundamental to money, notwithstanding any legal tender law.45
Furthermore, legal tender law is slighted by courts whenever it is in-
convenient, which is most of the time it is an issue in litigation.46
Bank money-electronic communications-is no less or more "real"
than dollar bills or gold coin. Although bank money and currency
may be substitutable over a certain range of value, neither is concep-
45. A reader might spot a syllogism here. Major premise: state-issued paper currency
is not fundamental to money. Minor premise: banks deposits are money. Conclusion:
paper currency need not be issued by the state. This is not a true syllogism. Not only is the
conclusion unjustified by the premises, it is probably false as well. See Appendix B (arguing
that only paper currency, of all forms of money, must be state-issued). However, there is
no reason why we must necessarily use paper money, and there is no reason it should be
the only "true" money in the contemplation of the law.
46. See infra notes 190-195 and accompanying text.
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tually nor legally reducible to the other. They are different payment
systems with different legal rules.
4 7
3. Money and the Law of Bank Liabilities. -We return to the law of
bank liabilities. Now we understand the following: (1) Money is what
a payment medium does; (2) money must be understood in part as a
shared social convention; and (3) our money supply consists mostly of
predeterminate bank liabilities that are created by communications
and not necessarily referable to currency. We are now in a better posi-
tion to understand why the law of bank liabilities insists on determi-
nate and transparent rules.
The social nature of money is one powerful reason for the deter-
minacy and transparency of payment law. As discussed above, money
is an act of social consensus, with no deeper grounding than the con-
sensus. It is an act of faith,4 8 "a social convention which owes its very
existence to the mutual acceptance of what from one point of view is a
fiction."49 If the nature of money is too closely questioned, the con-
sensus may unravel. Walter Bagehot was discussing banks, but could
have been discussing money, in the following excerpt:
Queen Victoria is loyally obeyed-without doubt, and with-
out reasoning-by millions of human beings. If those mil-
lions began to argue, it would not be easy to persuade them
to obey Queen Victoria, or anything else. Effectual argu-
ments to convince the people who need convincing are want-
ing. Just so, an immense system of credit, founded on the
Bank of England as its pivot and its basis, now exists. The
47. It is important to note that, even though bank money and currency are different
payment systems, and therefore different monies, they may still employ a common unit of
account (e.g., the dollar). People adapt well to competing monies employing the same
unit of account, but appear to reject competing units of account spontaneously, perhaps
because competing units of account place unnecessary demands on limited rationality, or
destabilize the social consensus of money. Just try passing yen on the streets of Omaha.
You will break no law, but you will command no goods. (This rule has exceptions: banks,
tourist spots, political borders, and debauched local units of account.) See LAWRENCE H.
WHITE, COMPETITION AND CURRENCY. ESSAYS ON FREE BANKING AND MONEY 64 (1989) (com-
menting upon the "natural tendency of money users in a region to converge on a common
monetary unit"); id. at 72 ("[M]oney is a social convention that takes time to develop."); id.
at 100-01 ("Gold and silver emerged spontaneously as nearly universal monies because of
strong private incentives."); id. at 133-34 (discussing the convergence of the use of a single
metal as the general medium of exchange); Klein, supra note 31, at 441-42 (describing a
model of monetary arrangements in which multiple monies are convertible into a single
dominant money).
48. See FRANKEL, supra note 34, at 14 (discussing attitudes toward money in relation to
"moral ideology"); SIMMEL, supra note 32, at 178-79 (comparing trust in money to "reli-
gious faith").
49. FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 696.
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English people, and foreigners too, trust it implicitly. Every
banker knows that if he has to prove that he is worthy of
credit, however good may be his arguments, in fact his credit
is gone: but what we have requires no proof. The whole
rests on an instinctive confidence generated by use and
years.50
Money-as a social phenomenon-works best when the validity of the
underlying rules is beyond question, the transparency near-perfect,
the infinite regress ignored. It is tempting to quip: Money is a mira-
cle, its operations a mystery, and we had better not question too
closely its authority.5 ' Or another quip: Money is like the cartoon
characters who run over a cliff-they never fall until they look down.
If a law regarding a money is sufficiently contested, it will no
longer be the law of a money, because whatever the money was will
have ceased being a medium of exchange. The law of money, because
it is determinate and transparent, allows no questioning in the courts.
A well-ordered law of money is very seldom litigated.52 Law has tradi-
tionally been a powerful engine in preserving (or destabilizing)
shared social reality; money is just another sphere in which it does
so." A good commercial law of payments (and a good administrative
law of banking) helps us keep the faith that underlies money.
The reasons for transparency and certainty of law are not only
social; they are also rational. Transparency and certainty are required
both at the technological level of a payment system and at the social
50. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DEscRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 33 (re-
print 1962) (1873).
51. A more extended quotation: "There are three forces, only three, on this earth that
can overcome and capture once and for all the conscience of these feeble, undisciplined
creatures, so as to give them happiness. These forces are miracle, mystery, and authority."
FYODOR DosTOEvsKY, THE BROTHERS KARAmAzov 307 (Andrew H. MacAndrew trans., Ban-
tam Books 1970) (1880) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. "Money constitutes the most vital part of the substructure of the entire legal system,
but when its stability is taken for granted, monetary questions rarely come before the
courts and no analysis of underlying legal theories becomes necessary." Phanor J. Eder,
Legal Theories of Money, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 52, 52 (1935).
53. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHL L. REv. 943 (1995).
Professor Lessig developed several mechanisms through which law regulates social mean-
ing. In his framework, social meanings can be created or destabilized by tying the mean-
ings to other social meanings, "ambiguating" preexisting social meanings, or inhibiting or
inducing behavior associated with the formation or destruction of a particular social mean-
ing. Id. at 1009-14. In Professor Lessig's framework, the law of money is a sort of negative
ambiguation. Id. at 1010. The law of money, being determinate and transparent, deprives
the users of money of alternative social meanings. It therefore helps ensure that the social
practice of money remains unquestioned, at least in the courts. Cf Robert Cover, Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 11 (1983) (stating that law kills competing social
meanings).
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level of money. There are at least two rational reasons why the law of
money must be transparent and certain.
The first rational reason for certain and transparent rules is that
bank money is nothing but a license to sue a bank and collect ajudg-
ment. The only "ultimate" value of this license is its ability to get a
judgment against a bank executed. Generally, a cause of action is the
worst possible kind of asset, but the law of bank payment ensures that
it is one of the best. Banks (almost) always settle on a payment claim,
because they know precisely what the court will say and that their
counterparty knows the same. Banks, therefore, have nothing to gain
from fighting; they prefer preserving their reputation to paying litiga-
tion costs.54 The stability of money is predicated on the unquestiona-
ble validity and transparency of the underlying legal rules, and the
evidentiary simplicity of the facts upon which these rules operate.
Trillions of dollars change hands every day because of a shared per-
ception of the probable outcome of litigation.
A second rational reason for certain and transparent rules is that
they need not be questioned by the users of the system. As long as the
internal rules remain unquestioned-because of their undoubted va-
lidity-they need not really be known, if the users can avail themselves
of simple external rules. This is nothing but the notion of a "black
box." We do not have to know anything about electronics to use a
television set. We do not have to know civil engineering to drive a car
across a bridge. We do not need to know about interbank collections
to cut a check. As long as the underlying system operates reliably, and
the rules for external use of the system are separable from the internal
operating rules, a user of the payment system does not have to know
the operating details of the system at all.55 In such a case, the users'
rules appear as an emergent trait, built on the substratum of the oper-
ating rules and formally reducible to them, but conceptually
independent.
Payment law exists on two levels (apart from the social level): a
relatively simple users' level and an often complex operating level. To
keep the users' level simple, it must be kept as separate as possible
from the operating level. To keep the levels separate, the operating
level must be extremely reliable, from a user's perspective. If the op-
54. So strong is the incentive to pay that only recently has the U.C.C. thought it worth-
while to sanction those few banks that do not play by the rules. See supra note 21.
55. Cf HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFicALk 13 (1969) ("A bridge, under
its usual conditions of service, behaves simply as a relatively smooth level surface on which
vehicles can move. Only when it has been overloaded do we learn the physical properties
of the materials from which it is built.").
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erating level were not extremely reliable, users could not take it for
granted, and they would therefore have to know about the operations.
In other words, the legal underpinning of bank money-the law of
bank liabilities-must be extraordinarily reliable because of the lim-
ited rationality of users. We cannot afford to have payment lawyers
counsel every payment transaction. We cannot even afford to counsel
one payment transaction in a thousand. The users' rules for payments
must be simple, and the operating rules must be extraordinarily relia-
ble. We must have astounding confidence in the legal rules regarding
the creation and discharge of bank liabilities.56
The confidence we must have in the legal underpinnings of
money creates a paradox: The legal basis of bank money is almost
never tested. The users' rules, such as the ramified law of checks,
however, are frequently tested in court, and the vast majority of these
check cases involve fraud and forgery, which occur at the users'
level.57 Far fewer disputes involve the operational rules (e.g., a bank
suing a bank on a collection case). The users' rules for wire transfer
are simpler than those for checks, and litigation is correspondingly
sparser; such litigation mainly involves the law of mistakes by banks
and their customers.5" The difference between the volumes of check
and wire transfer litigation can be explained by the clearer users' rules
of wire transfers, and the smaller chance of operational error in the
56. This argument does not apply to bank assets, which are not the basis of money.
The law governing bank assets often tolerates considerable delay and uncertainty. Con-
sider, for example, the difficulty a bank has in foreclosing on a mortgage, and contrast it to
the ease with which the mortgagee paid the proceeds of the mortgage to the previous
owner. Assets can be tangible things, unlike the communications with legal consequences
that we call bank liabilities. The house securing a mortgage is not solely a social construct.
57. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems,
82 VA. L. REv. 181 (1996) (examining the fraud and forgery law of consumer payment
systems, including the law of checks).
58. See, e.g., General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Central Bank, 49 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that a beneficiary bank was liable to a creditor when the bank mistakenly
placed a wire transfer in an escrow account); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Sanati,
14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615, 621 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a bank was entitled to seek restitu-
tion for the unjust enrichment resulting from a mistaken transfer); Banque Worms v.
BankAmerica Int'l, 570 N.E.2d 189, 198 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that the "discharge for value"
rule applied to a mistaken wire transfer). Only one case under U.C.C. Article 4A has in-
volved any issue more fundamental than erroneous instructions. See Sheerbonnet, Ltd. v.
American Express Bank, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y.) (mem.) (dealing with a tort
action against an intermediary bank in connection with a wire transfer to a frozen account
of an insolvent bank), amended by 951 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), modified, 1996 WL
221829 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The Sheerbonnet court had to go outside Article 4A to address the
issue. See id. at 130 (looking instead at the plaintiffs common-law grounds for relief and
finding them cognizable).
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wire transfer business. And almost no disputes ever involve the bed-
rock facts: how a bank obligation can be created or extinguished.
Very seldom do cases emerge that test the nature of the bank
liabilities underpinning the payment system. Such cases only emerge
in three contexts: insolvency law, consumer law, and international
law. The insolvency cases tend to test when and how a bank liability is
established."° The consumer cases are similar, although they usually
involve simpler questions, such as whether the books and records of a
bank are trumped by evidence of appropriate communications be-
tween the bank and its counterparties. 60 The international law of
banking-particularly the private international law of banking-raises
similar questions, and also raises questions about the localization of
bank liabilities. It is these cases that have become far more common
over the last fifteen years.6 1
59. See Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assocs. (In re Koreag), 961 F.2d
341, 356 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing whether an interbank foreign exchange payment sub-
ject to U.C.C. § 2-702 (2) has a right to reclamation); FDIC v. Holders of Yellow Certificates,
No. 85 Civ. 8164 (VLB), slip op. at 13-17 (S.D.N.Y. March 4, 1987) (mem.) (holding, in a
very rare case where a bank denied liability, that communications between depositors and
a bank established such liability); Cable & Wireless, Ltd. v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., 79
N.Y.S.2d 597, 604 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (discussing precisely which acts transferred liability to
the books of a United States branch of a Japanese bank placed in liquidation by the New
York Superintendent of Banking because of World War I1), modified mem. sub nom. Cable &
Wireless, Ltd. v. Lyon, 103 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (App. Div. 1951), affd, 107 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y.
1952).
60. The abstract answer to this question is certain: "yes." See In re Ruskay, 5 F.2d 143,
147 (2d Cir. 1925) (finding that the issuance of a deposit slip by a bank constituted an
admission by the bank that a creditor-debtor relationship had been created). In noncon-
sumer cases, banks only deny the existence of a liability if the liability is purportedly cre-
ated by a person claiming to be an agent acting without apparent authority. This fact
pattern is not uncommon in letter-of-credit cases, but it is extraordinarily rare otherwise.
See Masek Distrib., Inc. v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 908 F. Supp. 856, 858 (D. Kan.
1995) (mem.) (considering a case where a seller sued to enforce a letter of credit allegedly
requested by a buyer and issued by a loan officer for a bank); FDIC v. Records, 34 F. Supp.
600, 602 (W.D. Mo. 1940) (holding that a clerk who embezzled and did not record cash
deposits created liability). Consumer cases involve the books and records of a bank versus
other evidence, such as deposit slips. See Barbaro v. Citibank, N.A., 474 N.Y.S.2d 251, 252
(Civ. Ct. 1984) (holding that a deposit slip is prima facie evidence that a bank received the
sum stated thereon); Jiang v. First Nat'l City Bank, 317 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (Civ. Ct. 1970)
(holding that a customer is not chargeable with knowledge of a transaction appearing on a
teller's copy of a deposit slip); Lancelotti v. Bank of N.Y., 463 N.Y.S.2d 995, 997 (J. Ct.
1983) (finding that a bank's deposit slip is prima facie evidence of a transaction recited
therein). Perhaps the most common recent line of such cases involves unauthorized with-
drawals from ATMs. See, e.g., Porter v. Citibank, N.A., 472 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583 (Civ. Ct. 1984)
(finding that the word of a plaintiff beat a bank's records); Judd v. Citibank, 435 N.Y.S.2d
210, 212 (Civ. Ct. 1980) (concluding that a holder of an electronic fund transfer account
had produced sufficient credible evidence to show that withdrawals from "cash machines"
were erroneously charged to her account).
61. See, e.g., infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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C. Localized Liabilities
To recapitulate the previous two subsections: A bank liability is a
license to sue and collect judgment, and payments are largely a trade
in these licenses. The rules governing this trade in licenses must be
clear, both to assure the smooth technical function of the payment
system, and to assure that bank liabilities are the social stuff of money.
Where does localization of liabilities fit into this picture? The follow-
ing discussion advances a logical-not a legal-answer to the
question.
If a liability is a license to a judgment, localization of a liability
must somehow mean localization of this license. Because a liability is
a communication with legal consequences, localization of the liability
must be either localization of the communication or localization of
the contents of the communication.
The first alternative can be excluded: Communications cannot
be localized in a legally satisfactory fashion. Therefore, localization of
a bank liability cannot mean localization of the communication creat-
ing the liability. The difficulty of "locating" a communication is not a
necessary consequence of the physics of telecommunications. It is
fairly easy to locate a magnetic domain on a computer disk, or at least
to locate a computer disk. The problems are not in the physics;
rather, they are in the usage of communications.
There are several reasons that support this characterization of the
problem. First, a telecommunication, unlike negotiable paper, is
neither spatially unique nor temporally persistent. A message comes
into a wire room and leaves nothing but a record of the message in its
wake. The record of this message reifies nothing; it is only evidence of
the communication that established the legal right. There is nothing
necessarily unique about this record; a teletransmission may result in
a message written into electronic memory and stored in magnetic and
paper media. None of these multiple records is better than any other;
photocopies of the paper media may evidence the communication no
worse than the first printout.62 The "original" is evanescent, the same
transmission can be received (or originated) in several wire rooms,
and all records have useful evidentiary value. Therefore, the location
of a communication does not have the same indisputably unique loca-
tion as a piece of commercial paper. Ten good checks for $1000 are
62. As of this writing, there has been talk about the creation of electronic "originals,"
via a date-stamped double dual-key technology. Such technology, whether or not practica-
ble, has not yet been put into commercial use.
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worth $10,000; ten true printouts of a wire transfer may evidence any-
where from one to ten communications.
Second, the interaction between human decisionmaking and au-
tomated information-processing is often complex and indirect. The
physical location of the communications hardware or of the stored
records bears no necessary relationship to the transaction communi-
cated through the hardware and evidenced by the records. Equipped
with little more than a telephone, a screen, and a taste for late local
hours, a person living in Istanbul can easily trade United States gov-
ernment securities "in" the New York market. A Malaysian bank can
easily issue a letter of credit to a San Francisco beneficiary, financing
an exportation of Malaysian teak. A New York loan syndicate can un-
derwrite a loan whose proceeds are to be used exclusively in Costa
Rica. (If this latter example sounds too easy, perhaps the loan negoti-
ations were conducted in Miami.) Very quickly, the hypotheticals
multiply. Without noncommunicative physical action, geography be-
comes blurry. Bank money is nothing but communicative.
If communications cannot be meaningfully localized through
their mode of transmission, they can only be localized through their
content. The medium is not the message; only the message is the
message. Article 4A of the U.C.C. is very clear-the medium of com-
munications is irrelevant:
Most payments covered by Article 4A are commonly referred
to as wire transfers and usually involve some kind of elec-
tronic transmission, but the applicability of Article 4A does
not depend upon the means used to transmit the instruction
of the sender. Transmission may be by letter or other writ-
ten communication, oral communication or electronic
communication.63
The content of a payment communication is pure legal consequence:
There is no other reason for such communications. If only the con-
tent is relevant to location, only the legal consequences of the com-
munication can be localized.
We now have a conclusion. If a geographically localized liability has
any meaning at all, it must mean localization of the law or court governing the
liability. If it is at all meaningful to talk about an account kept in, say,
Ruritania, this account must be governed by Ruritanian law, heard by
a Ruritanian court, or both. Otherwise, a bank liability can have no
legally meaningful location at all.
To recapitulate the steps of this logical argument:
63. U.C.C. § 4A-104 cmt. 6 (1995).
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1. We define a bank liability, in essence, as a license to
sue a bank and obtain a judgment. These liabilities are cre-
ated by appropriate communications invested with legal
effect.
2. We assume that there is some sense in which a bank
liability can be meaningfully said to be localized, even in a
global bank.64
3. Although communications create bank liabilities, it is
operationally meaningless to localize a telecommunication.
This statement is empirical, based on the evanescence and
multiplicity of contemporary telecommunications technolo-
gies, and the increasing irrelevance of specific locations to
communicative aspects of modern transactions.
4. Therefore, if the location of a license to a judgment
is assumed to be meaningful, but cannot refer to the commu-
nications that established the license, it must refer to some-
thing else.
5. The only "something else" imaginable is the identity
of the sovereign that will define or enforce the license. This
statement relies on the legal identification of sovereignty with
territory.65 It also relies on the author's inability to imagine
anything else that can be said to "localize" a license to ajudg-
ment, apart from the location of a physical license (i.e., ne-
gotiable paper) or the identity of the sovereign who will
define or enforce the license.
6. Therefore, if it means anything to say that bank liabil-
ities are localized, it means that the "location" of a bank lia-
bility is the outcome of a conflict-of-law analysis. This
conclusion inverts the more usual legal assumption that the
outcome of a conflict-of-law analysis is predicated on finding
the location of a liability: the "account situs."6 6
64. For a discussion of this assumption, see infra Part III.
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 cmt. c (1987) ("The territorial principle is by far the most common basis for the
exercise of [the state's] jurisdiction to prescribe.").
66. See, e.g., Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259,
270 (Q.B. 1987) (LAFB) ("As a general rule the contract between a bank and its customer
is governed by the law of the place where the account is kept, in the absence of agreement
to the contrary."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 195 cmt. b (explaining
that in a choice-of-law analysis, it is important to know where the contract requires repay-
ment to be made).
For criticism of this usual legal assumption, see Tahyar, supra note 1, at 610, which
calls for the view that a sovereign can assert physical power over intangible property a
"pretense." See also Herring & Kftbler, supra note 1, at 983-86 (arguing that the situs of
intangibles cannot be determined by traditional rules of territoriality without falling into a
tautology); P.J. Rogerson, The Situs of Debts in the Conflict of Laws: Illogical, Unnecessary and
Misleading, 49 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 441, 453-54 (1990) (arguing that, as an intangible, a debt has
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QED. A further conclusion is possible, albeit more tentatively,
that the law governing a bank liability resides only in the content of
the communication that established the liability. This takes two more
steps.
7. The "locale" of the law governing a bank liability can-
not be determined by the communicative media that pro-
duced the liability. (This statement is true only for non-
paper communications, which possess a definite location at
any particular time.) This empirical statement must be ac-
cepted if the third statement is accepted: The "location" of a
telecommunication has no operational significance.
8. Therefore, unless an extracommunicative fact is con-
sidered, the law governing a bank liability resides in the con-
tent of the telecommunication that established the liability.
6 7
In other words, the location of a liability is a choice of law (and/or fo-
rum). The law (and/or forum) is chosen by the symbolic content of a communi-
cation, or perhaps the status of the parties. It is meaningless to say that a
deposit account is "located" in Ruritania but governed by New York
law with New York jurisdiction. Accounts governed by New York law/
forum are New York accounts, even if the relevant documents were
drafted in Ruritania by Ruritanian nationals in the Ruritanian lan-
guage, promising payment in Ruritanian doubloons.'
We now believe that the bank liability-the money-is "in"
Ruritania because the relevant communication of the parties said so.
Our task, therefore, is not physically locating the money, but rather
assigning legal meaning to the location of a bank liability. Parts III
and IV below perform this task. Part II is an intermezzo-impeding
the progress of the plot, but tidying up the loose ends. So far, this
no situs that could serve as a basis for choice of law and that choice of law for intangibles
need not be determined by the same rules governing tangible property).
67. About the only plausible extracommunicative status would be the parties' domi-
ciles. However, Rogerson points out correctly that a debtor (or for that matter, creditor)
may have multiple residences and dispersed assets. Rogerson, supra note 66, at 455. Domi-
cile is therefore difficult to determine for many commercial parties. Domiciliary status
might still be useful for consumers, who can only be in one place at one time, and who
tend to be geographically localized over reasonable periods of time. Consumer choice-of-
law rules can therefore look very different than commercial choice-of-law rules. Because
this Article is not concerned with consumer law, domicile is not further discussed.
68. It is important to note that this Article is not yet advancing a legal argument. It
does not yet suggest whether a New York account situs implies both New York law and a New
York forum, or merely implies one of the two. Nor does it suggest, for example, that a
contract drafted in Ruritania can or should result in a New York situs. These are all legal
points that are contestable on their legal merits. At this stage, this discussion is grounded
in legal epistemology, not legal doctrine. It only asserts that if the location of an account
has any meaning to a lawyer, that meaning must relate to conflict of laws.
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Article has only argued that the location of a liability must sound in
conflict of law. It has not yet argued that a bank liability needs a loca-
tion, that conflict-of-law rules are worth devising.
II. WHY Do WE LOCALIZE LIABILITIES?
Readers who already see the need for a conflicts law of bank ac-
counts should simply go to the next Part. This Part is for those trou-
bled because this Article has not yet made an explicit case for why a
conflicts law of banking should exist. This Part makes two arguments.
It first argues the main point-that some kind of conflicts law of inter-
national banking is needed. It then argues against possible objections
to this main point-that the traditional alternatives to conflicts law
(e.g., party autonomy, arbitration, and harmonization) somehow dis-
place the need for conflicts law.
A. Why Conflicts Law in Banking?
This subpart raises four arguments for a conflicts law of banking.
It first elaborates on the earlier discussion of the certainty demanded
in payment law. It then discusses the role of conflicts law in three
specific roles: attachments of bank accounts, sovereign risk, and pres-
ervation of legal diversity.
1. Payments Law Demands Certainty.-We have already discussed
the first reason banking law needs a well-defined law of conflicts. Any
successful payment medium must be undisputable. Coin would make
a poor payment medium, for example, if the value of each coin trans-
ferred were the subject of dispute.69 A modern payment system de-
mands an extraordinary degree of legal certainty, because a bank
payment is nothing but a transfer of a license to a judgment.70 A legal
claim would seem to be the worst possible asset, and most practical
lawyers would likely counsel their clients to go far to find a substitute.
Yet, bank credit-a mere legal claim-is the most reliable of assets.
People transfer these particular assets freely, and rely on the validity of
these transfers enough to treat them as money.
69. Indeed, coin supplanted bullion as a medium of exchange precisely because its
value was less disputed than that of bullion. See WHITE, supra note 47, at 178 ("Coined
metal enjoys greater acceptability than uncoined metal (for example, gold dust) due to the
lower cost of determining its true bullion content."). But see ALBERT FFAvERYFiaR, THE
POUND STERLING (2d ed. 1963) (recounting the long and sorry history of debased and
clipped coinage).
70. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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If the legal consequences of the communications underpinning
bank liabilities become uncertain, payment litigation will develop. Re-
ceipt of value in an uncertain medium is not receipt of money.
Enough uncertainty will destroy confidence in the ability of bank com-
munications to effect payment and therefore destroy the bank-medi-
ated payment system. This argument, although difficult to deny, is
vulnerable to a sensible objection: A little bit of uncertainty is no big
deal. Most people happily accept dollar bills, although some of them
might be counterfeit. Checks sometimes bounce. Would uncertain
conflicts law engender enough uncertainty to make a difference? On
a day-to-day basis, the answer is "no." Payment laws usually do not
conflict. The average large-value payment complies with the law of all
affected countries, at least when all parties are solvent.71 This was true
before the payment harmonization movement,72 and is even more
true now.
But although legal uncertainty in conflicts law is no factor in the
average payment, it is likely to be an important factor in the average
litigated payment, especially in litigation involving the operating rules
of the system. Most of the operating rules are clean and engender
very little litigation. The conflicts law of banking is confused and
leads to a grossly disproportionate share of payments litigation, espe-
cially litigation concerning the operating rules.
Legal uncertainty causes two kinds of problems. In individual
cases, legal uncertainty of the parties may lead to "systemic" or "conta-
gion" risk. Judicial legal uncertainty also creates doctrinal mischief
that may spill over into general payment law. Each of these two
problems warrants separate discussion.
International bank insolvency law best illustrates the effect of
legal uncertainty on systemic risk, although the same reasoning ap-
plies to conflicts uncertainty. Several medium-sized banks have be-
come insolvent in the last twenty years. The contrast between the first
and most recent of these insolvencies is striking. Herstatt Bank be-
came insolvent in 1974,7' Barings Bank in 1995. TM Both insolvencies
71. See Herring & Kfibler, supra note 1, at 985 ("In most countries, the parties in an
international banking transaction are free to determine by explicit agreement which na-
tional law should govern their relationship. But since bank deposits are mostly routine
transactions, it is not surprising that an express choice of law clause can rarely be found.").
72. See infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
73. For an account of the Herstatt insolvency, see Kurt H. Nadelmann, Rehabilitating
International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt & Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1-11
(1977).
74. For an account of the Barings insolvency, see generally Sheila C. Bair, Lessons from
the Barings Collapse, 64 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1 (1995).
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surprised sophisticated market participants, creating the necessary
precondition for market disruption. 75 But, although both insolven-
cies surprised the market, the results of these insolvencies were spec-
tacularly different: Herstatt was an earthquake, Barings barely a
tremor.
Herstatt was a medium-sized bank in Germany that actively specu-
lated in the interbank foreign-exchange market. Because of its feck-
less dealings in a volatile market, it lost its capital and thereafter its
license. The German banking authorities chose not to bail it out.
This led to a global insolvency proceeding involving creditors world-
wide, even money-center banks.76 Because the Herstatt insolvency
trapped sophisticated counterparties, the banking system was caught
in fear and uncertainty:
Because of the direct linkages of banks through ... markets
and because of the intangible but very real indirect linkage
of bank confidence throughout the system, problems in one
bank can spread in a domino fashion throughout the system.
A crisis in one bank-whether that crisis arises from interna-
tional or domestic problems and whether that bank is large
or small-can lead to a chain reaction of deposit withdraw-
als, exclusion from exchange markets, or interest rate and
exchange rate discrimination which affects institutions
throughout the international banking system.77
Hundreds of millions of dollars were immobilized for months, as
banks sorted out their unresolved legal questions. This immobiliza-
tion affected more than just the estate and Herstatt's immediate
counterparties. Especially in the early stages of the insolvency, parties
withheld payment from each other and cut back their lines of credit,
for fear that they would not receive payments from third parties who
might be exposed to Herstatt. If this fear ("contagion" or "systemic"
risk) propagates sufficiently, the entire payment system is in danger of
collapse. Legal uncertainty can engender enough fear to dry the li-
75. Surprise is a necessary but not sufficient condition for market disruption. Antici-
pated insolvencies create no serious problems to the interbank market, because sophisti-
cated participants can protect themselves in advance. For example, BCCI (the Bank of
Credit & Commerce International) had few bank creditors. See Peter Truell, Luxembourg
Court Rejects Plan to Settle Claims Related to BCCI, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1993, at 2,
available in 1993 WL-WSJA 2006307 ("The defunct rogue bank has some 250,000 creditors,
most of whom are small depositors in Europe and the Middle East.").
76. See Nadelmann, supra note 73, at 1-11.
77. JOAN EDELMAN SPERO, THE FAILURE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK: CHALLENGE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM 181 (1980) (pointing out that the international
banking system is inherently fragile because it lacks the safeguards to control "crises of
confidence").
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quidity fueling the payment system. Fortunately, contagion risk did
not quite materialize in the Herstatt case, although matters were tense
for a while.
78
The Barings insolvency was equally unexpected, and equally af-
fected sophisticated bank counterparties. But this insolvency created
remarkably little fuss or panic, largely due to the successful payment
harmonization movement and the shrewd crisis management at the
clearing houses.79 When Barings became insolvent, most of its
counterparties knew the size of their exposure to Barings and knew
that contracts limiting these exposures would be enforceable. There
was no fear, for example, that a bank could not exercise its setoff
rights, netting two enormous offsetting debts into one manageable po-
sition. Barings's counterparties felt confident in their legal position
and knew that they could net their exposures into manageable num-
bers. They also felt confident that their still-solvent counterparties
were able to net their exposures into manageable numbers as well.
Because all survivors felt confident in their positions and their
counterparties' positions, the payments stream flowed without inter-
ruption, without even the need for central-bank intervention. Just as
importantly, the eventual purchaser of Barings did not have to worry
about a huge volume of unresolved payment liabilities and concomi-
tant litigation.
8 0
Barings and Herstatt show that legal certainty engenders confi-
dence, protecting the payment system in times of stress. The Barings
situation was smooth because, inter alia, the harmonization move-
ment engendered enough transnational confidence in the law. A
working international law of bank liabilities is necessary in times of
crisis. But harmonization-by definition-does not work in sover-
eign-risk cases, when a country changes the law. Legal uncertainty re-
mains in sovereign risk cases, which are not amenable to the
harmonization movement.
Sovereign risk has not yet had a Herstatt situation, where the in-
ability of one party to settle endangered all parties. Nevertheless, a
Herstatt-type immobilization of liabilities is conceivable. A major in-
ternational bank could become the subject of a purported worldwide
liability freeze imposed by a major country. Counterparties would
78. See Nadelmann, supra note 73, at 3-11.
79. Most of the Barings literature has concentrated on derivatives. See, e.g., Bair, supra
note 74, at 5 (discussing unsupervised "significant derivatives trading" as the source of the
Barings collapse).
80. The author based this account of the Barings insolvency on his conversations with
bankers.
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doubt the legal enforceability of such a freeze, payments would be
frozen, and the freeze litigated."1 If the target of the freeze had major
worldwide payment obligations," contagion risk might result.
Damage can take forms other than contagion risk. A court with
no understanding of conflicts law can inadvertently subvert the basic
doctrinal structure of payment law. The key case here is Wells Fargo
Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A. 3 Because the facts of Wells Fargo have been
described elsewhere, 4 they only need a sketchy description here.
Wells Fargo involved an interbank deposit that appeared to have been
frozen by the Philippine government. The first dispositive district
court opinion held that Philippine law governed and was favorable to
the plaintiff bank.85 Upon remand, the same court held that United
States law really governed but that such law was still favorable to the
plaintiff bank.8 6 Although there was no United States contractual lia-
bility, the defendant bank had committed a tort overseas: the tort of
not exerting sufficient effort to have the foreign restrictions lifted.8"
The appellate court affirmed on a different ground.88 The dis-
trict court had found on remand that the debt was "repayable" in New
York (i.e., that the payment transmission chain from Manila ended in
81. Such litigation has, in fact, occurred. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers
Trust Co., [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259 (Q.B. 1987) (LAFB) (considering a New York bank's
refusal to honor a Libyan bank's request to transfer funds on the day President Reagan
froze all Libyan assets in the United States); see also Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note
1, at 753-54 (discussing Libyan Arab Foreign Bank's application for summary judgment on
the ground that the United States' freeze did not constitute a defense against Bankers
Trust Co.'s obligation to meet a payment demand).
82. In LAFB, Bankers Trust Co. did not have such obligations. See Smedresman &
Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 751-61 (discussing the surrounding facts of the Libyan case).
83. 660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (mem.), mot. for summ. j. denied, 612 F. Supp. 351
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), remanded without opinion, 847 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.), remanded to 695 F. Supp.
1450 (S.D.N.Y.), afrd, 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988), vacated, 495 U.S. 660 (1990), remanded to
936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1204 (1992).
84. See KwAw, supra note 1, at 133-40; Herring & Kfibler, supra note 1, at 965-67 n.51;
Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 762-74; Jote Kassa, Note, A Safety Net for the
Eurodollar Market?: Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 126, 126-32 (1990).
85. Wells Fargo, 660 F. Supp. at 947.
86. Wells Fargo, 695 F. Supp. at 1450, 1454.
87. Id. at 1455 ("When the 'government or other restraint does not render perform-
ance absolutely impossible, it is the duty of the promisor to make a bona fide effort to
dissolve and be relieved of the restraint which operates to prevent his performance.'"
(quoting Brown v. J.P. Morgan & Co., 31 N.Y.S.2d 323, 334 (Sup. Ct. 1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 40 N.Y.S.2d 229 (App. Div. 1943), affrd, 67 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1946))). Note that
only United States tort law was cited as authority defining this overseas tort. See id. at 1454-
55.
88. Wells Fargo, 852 F.2d at 657, 661.
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New York).so The district court then concluded that the parties failed
to come to an agreement on the issue of "collectibility" (i.e., the debt
situs)." ° The Second Circuit, however, equated "collectibility" with
"payability," and thus found a New York agreement. 1 In other words,
use of the New York payment system effectively domesticated the obli-
gation and rendered the Philippine decree irrelevant. The Second
Circuit viewed payment through New York as a specific term negoti-
ated between the parties:
Finally, we note that the gist of the concerns expressed by
the amici is their "policy interest in the principle that, in the
absence of agreement to the contrary, a U.S. bank should not bear
the risk that a foreign government will impose restrictions on
the deposits of its foreign branches." (Letter of the United
States to this Court, dated June 14, 1988; emphasis added).
Our affirmance in the present case is based on the district
court's finding of just such an agreement. 2
The court seemed unaware that banks route almost all international
dollar payments through New York for reasons having little to do with
the choice or specific intent of their customers.93 More ominously, it
refused to acknowledge that a payment is a shifting of a liability that
must exist in the first place, and that the case involved Philippine
power over accounts in Manila, not the status of a subsequent pay-
ment from the account.94 This error is akin to saying that a bank must
pay on a check, even though there is no money in the checking ac-
count. The Second Circuit reached its result by failing to compre-
hend what payments are about.
Needless to say, the numerous financial institutions who routed
their dollar transactions through New York were discomfited, and the
89. Wells Fargo, 695 F. Supp. at 1450, 1452 ("Thus the [telex] confirmations [between
Citibank and Wells Fargo] establish an agreement that repayment was to occur in [Wells
Fargo's correspondent bank in] New York.").
90. Id. at 1453 ("In summary, since the deposit contracts do not reflect any agreement
on the issue of where the deposits could be collected, and since no term can be implied
based on custom or usage in the Eurodollar market, we find that the parties failed to come
to an agreement on this question.").
91. Wells Fargo, 852 F.2d at 661 ("[A] debt may be collected wherever it is repayable,
unless the parties have agreed otherwise.... [Wle conclude that [Wells Fargo] was enti-
tled to collect the deposits out of Citibank assets in New York.").
92. Id.
93. United States dollar settlement is a technological imperative, not a meaningful
choice by parties. See infra notes 159-163 and accompanying text.
94. Wells Fargo, 852 F.2d at 659 ("[T]his decree [by the Philippine government] pre-
vented Citibank/Manila ... from repaying the [Wells Fargo] deposits with its Philippine
assets . .. ").
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Supreme Court granted certiorari in response to amicus briefs.95 The
Supreme Court remanded because the appellate court had assumed
facts not established by the district court, namely that "collection" was
to occur through (or in) New York.96 Upon remand, the appellate
court then adopted the earlier decision of the district court, holding
in favor of the plaintiff because of the tort committed abroad.9 7 Fi-
nally, Congress joined the action, passing a statute whose meaning,
although obscure, effectively overruled the Second Circuit's final Wells
Fargo holding. 8
The Wells Fargo court created severe doctrinal distortion in gen-
eral payment law in order to resolve a conflicts issue. The Second
Circuit went so far as to abandon the idea that payment law is based
on predeterminate communicative liabilities. Wells Fargo ended up be-
ing a tort case.99 Through the various levels of litigation and appeal,
the case was adjudicated under multiple legal theories, which were
predicated on different key facts. Some of these facts were not at all
communicative in nature. The plasticity of the key facts is as worri-
some as the multiplicity of the relevant doctrines. Cases like this have
95. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 495 U.S. 660, 662 (1990) (listing amicus
briefs by the United States, the New York Clearing House Association et al., and the Bank
of Montreal), remanded to 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1204 (1992).
96. See id. at 669. The Supreme Court noted:
The Court of Appeals appears to have relied upon the first theory we have noted,
adopting the premise that the parties did contract to permit recovery from the
general assets of Citibank in New York. Yet the District Court had made it clear
that there is a distinction between an agreement on "repayment," which refers to
the physical location for transacting discharge of the debt, and an agreement
respecting "collection," which refers to the location where assets may be taken to
satisfy it, and in quite specific terms, it found that the only agreement the parties
made referred to repayment.
Id.
97. Wells Fargo, 936 F.2d at 728 ("Citibank's acknowledged ability to obtain Philippine
Central Bank approval of transfers to it of moneys as profits appears to support the district
court's finding, if further support were needed, that Citibank in fact did not satisfy its good
faith obligation to seek that government's approval of repayment of [Wells Fargo's] depos-
its to [Wells Fargo].").
98. See 12 U.S.C. § 633 (1994). This statute reads, in relevant part:
A member bank shall not be required to repay any deposit made at a foreign
branch of the bank if the branch cannot repay the deposit due to-
(1) an act of war, insurrection, or civil strife; or
(2) an action by a foreign government or instrumentality (whether dejure or
de facto) in the country in which the branch is located;
unless the member bank has expressly agreed in writing to repay the deposit
under those circumstances.
Id. § 633(a). This same provision applies to insured banks as well. See id. § 18 28(q).
99. See supra notes 87, 97 and accompanying text.
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precedential value, both for conflict of law and for substantive pay-
ment law. Such precedents endanger both bodies of law.
2. Multiple Liability.--Conflicts law can protect a bank from mul-
tiple liability. A hypothetical case illustrates what multiple liability
means, and how conflicts law can eliminate it.
Assume that Polonius has borrowed money in many jurisdictions
and that he has total debts of over $1,000,000. Polonius is also a credi-
tor, having an account for $100,000 with the Bank of Denmark. The
Bank of Denmark has branches in every jurisdiction in the world.
One morning, ten of Polonius's creditors, located in ten differentju-
risdictions, all seek to attach Polonius's account at the Bank of Den-
mark. Each creditor has a legitimate cause of action against Polonius
in its own jurisdiction. Each branch of the Bank of Denmark is sub-
ject to the full jurisdiction of the courts in which Polonius's creditors
seek their writ of attachment. Ten creditors, in ten different jurisdic-
tions, are all making the same assertion: "Polonius owes me $100,000.
I have a right to an attachment of his account." Without any conflicts
law, these creditors are all correct, and their claims are all equal. Be-
cause no court is likely to stiff its own local creditors, the creditors may
all win in full. The bank is out $1,000,000 for having received a de-
posit of $100,000.
Such a result is an intolerable burden on the bank. This state-
ment is intuitively obvious, but remains equally true after analysis.
Multiple liability means that a bank is assuming the credit risk of its
creditor. This would make a deposit riskier than a loan in some ways,
because the amount of the loan usually caps the potential loss. With-
out a conflicts rule preventing multiple liability, the potential loss on a
deposit is much greater. Specifically, the potential loss is the amount
of the deposit multiplied by the number of legal systems in which the
bank does business, minus one. (The original liability is a loss to the
depositor, while the additional liability is a loss to the bank.)
The potential multiple liability is not, itself, economically ineffi-
cient; it is just a wealth transfer. The inefficiency enters when the
bank seeks to protect itself from the possibility of multiple liability.
Such a bank must monitor the credit and behavior of its creditors in
much the same way as it monitors the credit and behavior of its debt-
ors. Prevention of multiple liability therefore eliminates any monitor-
ing costs of being a debtor. Because there are no discernible benefits
of monitoring creditors, elimination of multiple liability provides real
1998]
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economic efficiency gains. It is no surprise that elimination of possi-
ble multiple liability is a theme seen elsewhere in payment law.100
Reducing monitoring costs through eliminating multiple liability
has distributional, as well as efficiency, consequences. Banks subject
to multiple liability would have to assess the creditworthiness of their
creditors (i.e., their depositors). This could limit bank payment ser-
vices to their more creditworthy customers and would make depositor
privacy far more difficult.
3. Sovereign Risk.-The case law of international banking is
more concerned with allocation of sovereign risk than any other issue
of private international law. A conflicts law of banking is needed to
sensibly allocate sovereign risk.
Although the term is easy to intuit, "sovereign risk" is an analyti-
cally murky term, associated with murky case law. For an easy intuitive
example, an oil company suffers sovereign risk when its oil wells are
expropriated. However, sovereign risk is more difficult to analyze.
Sovereign risk is usually viewed as the risk of a multinational enter-
prise suffering a loss because of a legal transition in one of the coun-
tries in which it does business.0 1 This definition, although perhaps
useful to the business community, is legally inadequate. Within the
borders of this foreign country, sovereign risk is a non-concept. All
that has occurred is a straightforward legal transition that can pose no
interesting problems of private international law.'0 2 There is nothing
100. For the best known example of eliminating multiple liability within payment law,
see U.C.C. § 4-303 (1995), which allows any timely claim of a bank to defeat almost any
other claim asserted in the check-collection process.
Limited corporate liability is a response to a similar problem. In a world of unlimited
joint and several liability, all shareholders would be responsible for a corporation's debt,
and they would pay more than their share if other shareholders were judgment-proof. See
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1891, 1906 (1991) (noting the excessive costs under a joint and
several liability rule of each shareholder monitoring the personal assets of each other
shareholder). By contrast, in a limited liability corporation, shareholders are not con-
cerned about the creditworthiness of other shareholders, and they therefore need not
monitor each other's creditworthiness. See id. at 1891 (noting that "the valuations [of risk
or other kinds of liability] of heterogeneous shareholders diverge more sharply under un-
limited liability than under limited liability"). Without this monitoring burden, anony-
mous securities markets become possible.
101. See, e.g., Herring & Kfibler, supra note 1, at 947-48 (discussing the various types of
losses and legal transitions that can occur in sovereign risk cases).
102. A "legal transition" may be viewed as any change in legal rules that have not been
completely anticipated by the parties affected by the change. Cf Louis Kaplow, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 H-v. L. REv. 511, 517 (1986) (noting that "[a]lmost
any change in legal rules or market conditions that is not fully anticipated will affect the
value of firms, assets, or other investments").
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internationally interesting, for example, about a new environmental
or tax law. The new environmental law may be truly unexpected, and
it may defeat investment-backed expectations. In some legal systems,
it may even rise to the dignity of a "taking" meriting compensation.
1 0 3
But within the borders of the sovereign prescribing the law, the envi-
ronmental, tax, or other law, or even flat-out expropriation, is just an-
other exercise of sovereign power. Within these borders, such a law
cannot be distinguished from any other decree that may deprive an
international business of an expected profit.
The concept of sovereign risk as something that can be "allo-
cated" or "adjudicated" requires an external perspective. A mere tak-
ing (or legal transition) cannot assume the status of adjudicable
"sovereign risk" until some second sovereign, in considering its juris-
diction to adjudicate or enforce, takes note of the original sovereign's
jurisdiction to prescribe. If the second sovereign shows no interest in
accepting or questioning the first sovereign's prescription or adjudica-
tion, there is no sovereign risk to adjudicate. When we say "allocation
of sovereign risk," we mean a contested application of conflict-of-laws
rules triggered by a foreign legal transition. The concept of sovereign
risk-if we are to invest it with any legal meaning at all-must sound
in conflict of law.
4. Diversity.-A conflicts law of banking might be needed even
in an ideal world in which sovereign risk did not exist, multiple liabil-
ity were not a problem, and all nations' laws were perfectly harmo-
nized. Elimination of sovereign risk and multiple liability would
certainly be good, but harmonization is a mixed blessing. Distinctive
local law is sometimes worth preserving. If distinctive local law re-
mains, conflicts law is needed to prevent inadvertent importation of
foreign policies and exportation of domestic policies.
Harmonization is generally the watchword in payment law.
104
Payment law is intensely instrumental, with excellent agreement on
goals and little empirical disagreement on the effectuation of these
shared goals. It is not surprising that the payment-harmonization
movement has been a relative success.1 °5 As a general matter, the case
for diversity in payment law is weak.
103. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-32 (1992)
(discussing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
in reference to a state environmental law).
104. See Peter A. Alces, A Jurisprudential Perspective for the True Codification of Payments Law,
53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 83, 87-88 (1984) (discussing the drafting of the Uniform New Pay-
ments Code as an effort to render existing payments law consistent).
105. See infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
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However, consumer payment law may not lend itself to this ap-
proach. Both ends and means are disputable, and courts sometimes
act deontologically. Therefore, local distinctions are often considered
desirable in consumer payment law. 106 Conflicts law is needed to en-
sure that each jurisdiction is free to protect its consumers in ways it
considers best, without interfering with the ability of other jurisdic-
tions to do the same. Although the law of wholesale payments is well
harmonized, the law of retail payments can be quite territorial. This
can even be seen in United States law. Article 4A of the U.C.C., for
example, expressly excludes from its scope all consumer wire trans-
fers, and has been adopted with a fairly high degree of uniformity. 7
In contrast, Article 4, a consumer flashpoint, often varies from state to
state.
108
B. Are There Good Alternatives to Conflicts Law?
Our discussion so far shows that something like conflicts law is
needed to address several problems in the law of international bank-
ing. It has not yet shown that other legal techniques might not serve
in the place of conflicts law. This possibility, although comparatively
easy to answer, is not otiose. It is possible to argue that an exogenous
body of conflicts law is not necessary for international commercial dis-
putes, specifically international banking law. There are several bases
for this argument: party autonomy, arbitration, harmonization, and
uniformity. First, one could argue that conflicts law is unnecessary
because courts recognize party autonomy in choice of law and fo-
rum.0 9 This argument asserts that banking law is contractual and
that the combination of contract and party autonomy obviates the
106. See, e.g., Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., The UCC Thrives in the Law of Commercial Payment, 28
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 113, 127 (1994) (arguing for a "continuing role of state law in matters of
commerce").
107. Specifically, it excludes all wire transfers governed by the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act. U.C.C. § 4A-108 (1995). Article 4A is not perfectly uniform, but most of the state
nonuniformities are stylistic and do not substantially affect the statute. See U.C.C. art. 4A,
2B U.L.A. 455-549 (1991) & 94-110 (Supp. 1997). Revised Article 5 has not yet been as
widely adopted as Article 4A, but has been even more uniform. See U.C.C. art. 5, 2B U.L.A.
111-49 (Supp. 1997).
108. See U.C.C. art. 4, 2B U.L.A. 5-73 (1991) & 3-27 (Supp. 1997). The most amended
section appears to be 4-406, describing a customer's duty to report account discrepancies.
U.C.C. § 4-406, 2B U.L.A. 23-26 (Supp. 1997).
109. Recognition of party autonomy itself is a conflicts rule. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. RicH-
MAN & WitLiAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 202 (2d ed. 1993) (noting
the development of "the proposition that the proper choice of law in a contract case was
the law that conformed with the parties' intentions"). It is therefore formally improper to
say that party autonomy is an "alternative" tb conflicts law. However, party autonomy,
when expressed and recognized, is certainly a preferable alternative to a complicated body
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need for a separate body of conflicts law. After all, bankers are sophis-
ticated parties who can appropriately structure their transactions.
The argument would go that banks do not really need the default
rules provided by private international law.
This argument founders on at least three grounds. First, even
among bankers, contracting tends to be imperfect, and forum- and
law-selection clauses are often omitted or incomplete. For example,
many forum-selection clauses do not confer exclusive jurisdiction on
the chosen forum."1 Many old framework agreements, such as corre-
spondent agreements, are seldom renegotiated, although they may
have been originally negotiated in an era when forum- and law-selec-
tion clauses were not worth the trouble. Second, many international
banking cases are not contractual. For example, the attachment of a
bank account may be the result of a criminal, tort, or bankruptcy case
to which the bank is not a party.111 Finally, courts often do not recog-
nize party autonomy. To some extent, this is the result of a lingering
judicial hostility to the principle." 2 But disregard for party autonomy
is often a matter of nonjudicial policy; rather, it is the decree of a state
that purports to negate an agreement between a bank and its cus-
tomer. For example, when the Office of Foreign Assets Control de-
cides to block a trade transaction on grounds of national security, the
desire of the parties to complete the transaction is not only legally
irrelevant, it is contrary to United States policy.1 1
3
of conflicts rules. See infra Part III.A for discussion of the trend toward increasing recogni-
tion of party autonomy.
110. See, e.g., MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST Co. OF NEW YORK, TERMS AND CONDITIONS Gov-
ERNING USE OF EUROCLEAR: THE CLEARANCE SYSTEM FOR INTERNATIONALLY TRADED SECURI-
TIES § 22 (rev. ed. Dec. 1, 1982) ("Each Participant submits to the nonexclusive jurisdiction
of the competent courts of Brussels for the purposes of any dispute arising hereunder.").
Euroclear is a privately-operated international securities clearance system. Several jurisdic-
tions, such as the Second Circuit, demand that a prorogation clause be extremely specific
to be enforceable. See John Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Importers &
Distribs., Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The general rule in cases containing forum
selection clauses is that '[w] hen only jurisdiction is specified the clause will generally not
be enforced without some further language indicating the parties' intent to make jurisdic-
tion exclusive.'" (quoting Docksider, Ltd. v. Sea Tech., Ltd., 875 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir.
1989))).
111. See, e.g., supra note 97 and accompanying text.
112. See infta notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Message to the Congress on Iraq, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 230 (Feb. 9,
1996) (discussing the role of the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control in "lawsuits seeking the prevent the unauthorized transfer of blocked Iraqi
assets").
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Arbitration is a special case of party autonomy, and it suffers from
the same problems of residual judicial hostility," t4 nonconsensual
transactions, and sovereign decrees. Other problems with arbitration
are unique to banking. Although arbitration is common in interna-
tional contractual disputes, it has been notoriously unpopular in
banking. Several good general reasons have been articulated for this
unpopularity,'1 5 but two others should be noted here. First, arbitra-
tion is oriented toward dispute resolution, not public articulation of
norms. Many lawyers therefore think that arbitration is less doctrinal
than litigation: Arbitrators split the baby. As discussed above, rule
integrity is unusually important in the law of bank liabilities. '16
Judges, unlike arbitrators, know that they are making rules of future
applicability, and courts are known to issue harsh opinions in protec-
tion of the payment system. '1 7 In other words, many bank lawyers see
bank liabilities as better suited to adjudication by litigation. Second,
large-scale bank payment liabilities are seldom disputed, except in
cases of bank insolvency and conflict of laws. Arbitration may be of
114. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1301 (9th Cir. 1994) (refus-
ing to uphold an arbitration clause incorporated in the Standard Applications for Securi-
ties Industry Regulation because plaintiffs did not knowingly enter into any agreement to
arbitrate employment disputes);Jones v. Sea Tow Servs. Freeport NY, Inc., 30 F.3d 360, 361
(2d Cir. 1994) (refusing to uphold a Lloyd's Standard Form of Salvage Agreement requir-
ing arbitration in London because the parties, both being U.S. citizens, lacked sufficient
relation with the foreign state to invoke the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354,
355 (Ala. 1993) (denying a motion to compel arbitration because under Alabama law,
predispute arbitration agreements are unenforceable), rev'd, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
115. See S. Isabella Chung, Developing a Documentary Credit Dispute Resolution: An ICC Per-
spective, 19 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1349, 1361-62 (1996) (noting as one reason for reluctance
to enter arbitration the view that "which party has greater access to arbitrators with the
requisite experience may be outcome determinative"); William W. Park, When the Borrower
and the Banker Are at Odds: The Interaction of Judge and Arbitrator in Trans-Border Finance, 65
TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1323-25 (1991) (observing that banks usually have the negotiating
strength to insist on a hometown forum and that litigation provides summary procedures
and interim relief not available in arbitration, especially with the collection of debt).
116. See supra Part II.A.1.
117. See, e.g., General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Central Bank, 49 F.3d 280, 286 (7th Cir.
1995) (applying the discharge-for-value rule to a mistaken wire transfer, so that "[o] n read-
ing this conclusion, the president of Central Bank may be tempted to tear out his hair in
exasperation"); Tucker v. Meredith, 232 F.2d 347, 350-51 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ("[T]he maker
of a negotiable instrument may suffer hardship because he is unable to assert against a
holder in due course valid defenses he might have against the payee or any subsequent
holder not a holder in due course.... [T]he law regards the security of negotiable instru-
ments in the hands of holders who took for value before maturity without notice of infirmi-
ties or defects as of far greater importance."); Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 396
N.Y.S.2d 414, 417 (App. Div. 1977) (characterizing as "harsh" its holding that a depositor
cannot stop his bank from making payment on his cashier's check, except by a court order
or an indemnification bond), affd, 377 N.E.2d 474 (N.Y. 1978).
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some aid in conflict-of-law cases, but is inherently inapplicable to a
bank insolvency case.
Another possible argument against the need for a private interna-
tional law of banking comes from movements for harmonized munici-
pal law. One could argue that harmonized laws are making conflict of
law irrelevant. Certainly, commercial and banking laws are becoming
increasingly harmonized. For example, as a condition of admission to
the club of sophisticated international banks, supervisors are demand-
ing some degree of payment-law harmonization." 8 The United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has
developed a sophisticated model law on international wire transfers,
among many other subjects.' 19 But harmonized laws are not necessar-
ily uniform laws. Even uniform commercial laws are of little help in
noncommercial contexts, or when the decrees of a government pur-
port to disturb preexisting legal relations. Furthermore, the harmoni-
zation movement will probably never be universal. Some conflicts law
118. See, e.g., BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, DELIVERY VERSUS PAYMENT IN SE-
CURrrIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS: REPORT PREPARED BY THE COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND SET-
TLEMENT SYSTEMS OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES § 5.5 (Sept.
1992) (demanding that the legal enforceability of the system's rules and procedures in all
relevant jurisdictions should be established for international securities transfers); BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERBANK NETTING SCHEMES
OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES § 3.2 (Nov. 1990) (requiring that
"[n]etting schemes should have a well-founded legal basis under all relevant
jurisdictions").
This harmonization effort has been successful. Bilateral and multibranch close-out
netting agreements are enforceable in all G-10 countries, except Italy, and most additional
important jurisdictions, except Spain and Portugal. See DANIEL P. CUNNINGHAM & CRAG T.
ABRUZZO, MULTIBRANCH NETTING: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF CROSS-BORDER BANK
INSOLVENCIES 43-44 (Capital Mkts. Forum, Int'l Bar Ass'n Discussion Paper 1995).
There are several key United States laws implementing this harmonization effort. 11
U.S.C. §§ 556-557, 559-560 (1994) (allowing a contractual right in bankruptcy to liquidate
or terminate various types of contracts); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8) (1994) (permitting the
netting-out of the termination value in certain qualified financial contracts entered into
before the appointment of a conservator or receiver); Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, §§ 401-407, 105 Stat. 2236, 2371-75
(1991) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4407 (1994)) (setting forth netting ar-
rangements for the efficient processing of transactions between financial institutions); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 618 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1997) (authorizing netting in procedures for
the liquidation and conservation of assets by the state superintendent).
119. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Model Law on International
Credit Transfers, 32 I.L.M. 587 (1993) [hereinafter UNCITRAL]. See generally Amelia H.
Boss & Patricia B. Fry, Divergent or Parallel Tracks: International and Domestic Codification of
Commercial Law, 47 Bus. LAW. 1505, 1506 (1992) (discussing steps "currently under way on
the international level leading to the creation of what might be called an 'International
Uniform Commercial Code'"); Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code, Commentary No. 13: The Place of Article 4A in a World of Electronic Funds Trans-
fers, 31 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 2 D (Callaghan) 2, 11 (1994) (noting that Article 4A and UNCI-
TRAL's model law cover the same type of transaction but sometimes conflict).
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must exist so that courts of the harmonized jurisdictions can resolve
disputes involving the nonharmonized jurisdictions.
Finally, one could argue that the laws of international trade are
part of the law of nations and that there is no such thing as national
authority, and thus conflict of laws. This argument may sound quaint
to modern ears accustomed to an ever-expanding sphere of sover-
eignty. It is, however, still encountered in the case law on occasion. 120
At least one private supranational body-the International Chamber
of Commerce-is in the business of creating rules of practice treated
like international law merchant.12 ' Law merchant is also arguably a
de facto norm of international arbitration, although arbitration is un-
popular in the banking business.12 2 But despite its sporadic support
and possible normative appeal, international law merchant is not par-
ticularly convincing in a world economy in which trade relations are a
continuation of diplomacy by other means. 121
III. PRINCIPLES TO LoCALIZE LIABILITIES
It is time to regroup. We now know that the location of a bank
account can have only a legal meaning, if it has any meaning at all. A
bank liability has no location, except the location of the relevant
courthouse. 124 The previous Part has shown that there is much to be
gained by associating a bank liability with a courthouse; therefore, a
conflicts law of international banking is needed. We have not yet dis-
cussed the substantive content of such a conflicts law.
This Part will not yet concentrate on substantive conflicts law.
Rather, it discusses the principles that must underlie the conflicts law
120. See, e.g., Power Curber Int'l Ltd. v. National Bank of Kuwait S.A.KI, [1981] 1 W.L.R.
1233, 1243 (C.A.) (determining that English law should govern because "the approach of
the Kuwaiti court appears to be so out of step with that of our own courts and the courts of
other trading nations that I fear we cannot recognise it").
121. For a brief account of the international law merchant, see Susie A. Malloy, Note,
The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts: Another Piece of
the Puzzle of the Law Applicable to International Contracts, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 662, 690-92
(1995).
122. Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Merchant, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 492-94 (1995). Professor Juenger's conclusion would be at
best weakly applicable to banking law even if arbitration became a more popular form of
dispute resolution, because large-scale bank payment liabilities are usually only litigated in
bank insolvency proceedings, which are not subject to arbitration.
123. See KWAW, supra note 1, at 121 (citing trade embargoes, freezing of assets and other
economic policies used by the United States "as a means of demonstrating its opinion of
what it considers to be unacceptable acts by other states"); Smedresman & Lowenfeld,
supra note 1, at 747 (describing the United States' freeze of Iranian assets during the 1979
hostage crisis).
124. See supra Part I.
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of banking. Contemporary United States conflicts law is predicated
on two principles: party autonomy and legal realism. As discussed
below, party autonomy is uncontroversial (apart perhaps from con-
sumer cases) but limited in scope. 125 The key question addressed by
this Part is whether the other bedrock principle of conflicts law-legal
realism-is up to the task. This Part concludes that it is not. Legal
realism implies a relevant reality apart from the communications that
create bank liabilities. 126 It is difficult to understand or even imagine
such a reality. These difficulties are best appreciated through parsing
individual cases.
This Part discusses two such cases in detail. One New York case is
a model of clumsy and disingenuous legal realism, adopted uncriti-
cally by subsequent courts.1 2 ' The other case, an English opinion, is a
judicial tour deforce dependent upon realism. 128 But even the English
realistic choice-of-law approach, although applied as intelligently as
possible, leads to ambiguities and contradictions. The realistic Eng-
lish conflicts law does not accord with the nominalistic substantive law
of bank liabilities.
This suggests another possible approach to the conflicts law of
banking: a nominalistic approach that tracks the substantive law of
bank liabilities. This Part concludes with a discussion of nominalistic
law that elaborates on the discussion in Part I and hints at the applica-
bility of legal nominalism to the private international law of banking.
Part IV, which follows, discusses a nominalistic doctrinal basis for the
conflicts law of international banking-a basis that already permeates
the Uniform Commercial Code and much of the case law.
A. Party Autonomy
Although party autonomy used to be suspect, 129 it is now the least
controversial of conflicts rules. Most courts will respect an explicit
125. See infra Part III.A.
126. See infra Part III.B.
127. See infra notes 147, 149-163 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 165-196 and accompanying text.
129. Some traces of this old suspicion of party autonomy can still be found. U.C.C.
§ 1-105 (1) (1995) only countenances party autonomy as a choice-of-law principle if there is
some "reasonable relation to this state." See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 187(2) (1971) (listing exceptions to the application of a contractual choice of law).
Some states are still skeptical about forum-selection clauses. See Francis M. Dougherty,
Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be
Brought, 31 A.L.R.4TH 404, 409-14 (1984) (citing cases invalidating forum-selection clauses
as contrary to public policy); cf William W. Park, Illusion and Reality in International Forum
Selection, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135, 151 (1995) ("While many states have held court selection
clauses valid, others have not." (footnote omitted)).
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choice-of-law agreement, especially in commercial cases.1"' A forum-
selection clause receives comparable judicial deference. 3 '
Unfortunately, many transactions do not receive the benefit of an
explicit conflicts agreement.13 2 This is just as true for transactions
among sophisticated financial parties as it is for other transactions. 13
3
Although documentation is becoming increasingly prevalent, a large
number of trades are still evidenced by nothing more formal than a
confirmation slip. In addition, many courts will find ways of refusing
to honor explicit conflicts agreements they do not like,1 34 even in the
law of international banking.3 5 Even at best, party autonomy is inher-
ently inadequate. As discussed above, party autonomy can be irrele-
130. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
949, 962-65 (1994) (discussing the resolution of choice-of-law problems through accept-
ance of party autonomy). Particularly noteworthy has been the recent widespread statu-
tory abolition of the "reasonable relationship" requirement. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1646.5 (West Supp. 1997) (allowing parties to a contract to choose the law of California
to govern their rights and duties, whether or not the contract bears a reasonable relation-
ship to California); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw §§ 5-1401 to -1402 (McKinney 1989) (allowing
parties to a contract to choose the law of New York to govern their rights and duties,
whether or not the contract bears a reasonable relationship to New York). Several of the
new U.C.C. banking articles also abolish this "reasonable relation" requirement, notwith-
standing section 1-105. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-507(b), 5-116(a).
131. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541
(1995) (holding that federal law did not invalidate a foreign arbitration clause in a mari-
time bill of lading); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (uphold-
ing a forum-selection clause in a consumer contract of adhesion); Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972) (upholding a forum-selection clause in an admiralty
contract).
132. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
133. Cf Dougherty, supra note 129, at 409-14 (citing cases invalidating forum-selection
clauses).
134. See, e.g., Leslie v. Lloyd's of London, No. CIV.A.H-90-1907, 1995 WL 661090, at *17-
23 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 1995) (refusing to honor a choice-of-law and forum-selection clause
in a contract of adhesion where the chosen English forum and law would deny an Ameri-
can investor substantive rights); cf. Donald B. Brenner, There Is a Developing Trend Among
Courts of Making Choice of Forum Clauses in Franchise Agreements Presumptively Invalid, 102
COM. L.J. 94, 95 (1997) (arguing that courts invalidate choice-of-forum clauses in franchise
agreements due to the unequal bargaining power between franchisors and franchisees);
Park, supra note 129, at 151 n.82 (listing states that are chary of forum-selection clauses).
135. See, e.g., Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1168 (6th Cir. 1988) (refusing to
uphold Citibank's disclaimer of liability to depositors for losses resulting from acts of the
Vietnamese government); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854,
863-64 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that the defendant bank might have successfully defended
against the plaintiff depositors' claims if there had been a waiver of the depositors' rights
to proceed against the American home office). In its holding, the Vishipco court ignored
the force majeure clause explicitly cited in the district court's opinion. The district court was
unequivocal:
"In accepting this deposit, the Bank assumes no responsibility or liability for any
losses to the depositor arising out of delays in or interruptions of the Bank's busi-
ness due to Acts of God, acts of governmental authority, acts of a public enemy or
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vant in sovereign risk cases, in which the force of the state trumps the
will of the parties.' 36 Furthermore, party autonomy is generally
subordinated to other norms in the law of insolvency, because general
creditors are not parties to any agreement between the debtor and a
specific creditor."' Finally, party autonomy is not even relevant in
some cases, such as those involving the law of attachments.
Party autonomy is not enough. Some kind of exogenous conflicts
law must govern the law of bank liabilities, at least for cases in which
all relevant parties have not consented. Realism of some kind is the
usual mode of analysis in contemporary United States conflicts law. 138
However, nominalism, although now rare in conflicts law, is the usual
mode of analysis in payment law.139 Can a realistic conflicts law of
bank liabilities coexist with a nominalistic substantive law? This is the
topic of the next subpart.
B. Realism
1. Realism and Conflicts Doctrine. -Most of this subpart parses in-
dividual cases. But, before discussing the application of modern con-
flicts doctrine to the law of bank liabilities, the realistic structure of
modern conflicts doctrine should be noted.
In finding an applicable law, modern courts, steeped in realism,
use something called "interest analysis." Most courts do so, although
often through congeners, such as "center of gravity," "comparative im-
pairment," "better law," or the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws. 4 ° Because interest analysis comes in so many varieties (each
due to war, riots, . . . civil commotions, insurrections ... or causes beyond the
Bank's control."
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 77 Civ. 1251 (RLC), 1980 WL 13801, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1980) (quoting a bank deposit slip), rev'd, 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.
1981).
136. See supra Part II.A.3.
137. See, e.g., In re High-Line Aviation, Inc., 149 B.R. 730, 734-35 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992)
(holding that choice-of-law provision in a consignment agreement was not binding on the
consignee's secured creditors because they were not parties to the agreement).
138. "[R]eactions to modem conflicts theory vary according to one's attitude toward
judicial realism." Gene R. Shreve, Conflicts Law: State or Federal?, 68 IND. L.J. 907, 912
(1993); see also Harold G. Maier, Baseball and Chicken Salad: A Realistic Look at Choice of Law,
44 VAND. L. REv. 827, 841-43 (1991) (reviewing LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAws, FOUN-
DATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (1991)) (arguing that until an authoritative deci-
sionmaker has decided the outcome, there is no law, only abstract arguments about what
the law ought to be).
139. See infra Part III.C.
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971). For a discussion of these
various analytic devices, see LEA BRiLMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 2.1 to 2.2.3 (2d ed. 1995)
and RICHMAN & REYNoLDS, supra note 109, at 193-248.
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with its own differing exponents), it may be unfair to lump them to-
gether. However, this Article requires only a brief sketch, and the au-
thor will risk unfairness for the sake of clarity.
Interest analysis calls for careful examination of the facts of cases
and the relevant policies to be applied by various states in deciding
these cases on their facts. 141 Courts should not hide behind concep-
tual categorizations, but rather should concentrate on the policies
presented by the fact pattern of the case. Most of these relevant poli-
cies are expressed in section 6 of the Restatement
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied.' 42
For our purposes, the key to interest analysis is not so much that it
relies on ascertaining "state interests" or "relevant policies," whatever
they may be. More important to us is that interest analysis, as a species
of legal realism, uses these criteria to seek optimal decisions. Interest
analysis seeks the best decision for each case, rather than an optimal
rule that will yield the best decision rule for a class of cases. 4 ' All of
the section 6 criteria are therefore applied to each case in which they
are relevant. Each policy-weighing is purely contextual, and it is con-
ducted on the facts of a specific case alone.
The generic weaknesses of this case-specific multifactor approach
have been thoroughly discussed in the literature. 4' Even some pro-
ponents of this approach admit that their method does not lead to a
high degree of certainty in adjudication, especially in international
141. BRILMAYER, supra note 140, § 2.1.1, at 50-51.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2). "It is not suggested that this
list of factors is exclusive." Id. § 6 cmt. c.
143. See id. § 6 cmt. f (stating that the forum should achieve the best possible accommo-
dation of the relevant policies and appraise the interests of the states involved in the deter-
mination of a particular issue).
144. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 7-16 (1991) (discussing the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws and problems with choice of laws in general); Larry Kramer, Rethinking
Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 321 (1990) (criticizing the case-by-case approach to
conflicts resolution).
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banking law.1 45 Of course, realism has its strengths 'in conflicts law,
but these strengths do not impress international bankers.146 Rather
than describe realism's weaknesses and its lack of compensating
strengths, this Article now discusses two cases that use a realistic ap-
proach in international banking law.
2. Realism and the Case Law of International Banking.-Two cases
warn of different perils of realism in international banking law: J
Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd.14 7 and Libyan Arab
Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. (LAFB). 14 Zeevi warns of the perils of
bad legal realism; LAFB shows that even the best legal realism may not
be good enough for payment law. We start with Zeevi.
Zeevi involved a letter of credit issued by a Ugandan branch (or
perhaps bank), to be paid in dollars through a New York correspon-
dent account upon presentment of drafts in Kampala. Idi Amin, the
dictator of Uganda, let the bank officers know that paying the Israeli
beneficiaries would not be good for their health. The beneficiaries, as
prudent as their Ugandan bankers, avoided Kampala. They presented
their drafts at the New York correspondent of the Ugandan bank,
which was supposed to pay the drafts after they had been honored in
Kampala. After denial of their demand for honor and payment, the
beneficiaries brought suit against the correspondent account.149
The Zeevi court asserted quasi in rem jurisdiction over the corre-
spondent account and dismissed several statutory defenses.150 It then
proceeded to its choice-of-law analysis:
145. See H. Thomas Byron III, Comment, A Conflict of Laws Model for Foreign Branch De-
posit Cases, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 701 (1991) ("[C]ourts engaged in the balancing re-
quired by interest analysis could reach different outcomes.").
146. See EUROCLEAR OPERATIONS CENTER OF MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK,
CROSS-BORDER CLEARANCE, SETrLEMENT, AND CUSTODY- BEYOND THE G30 RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 24 (1993) ("In practice, [interest analysis] rules are sometimes skewed in favor of
local law; if the balance is unclear, courts may apply what they consider to be the 'best' law
under the circumstances-which may all-too-regularly turn out to be local law."). To ad-
dress this problem, Euroclear recommended the adoption of "categorical" choice-of-law
rules. Id. at xx-xxi.
147. 333 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1975).
148. [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259 (Q.B. 1987) (LAFB).
149. Zeevi, 333 N.E.2d at 170-71. This arrangement is reminiscent of Wells Fargo, in
which the obligor branch was supposed to pay the obligee through an account at a New
York office. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text. Such correspondent payments
are quite common in banking, whether the correspondent is a branch of the obligor, e.g.,
Wells Fargo, or an independent entity, e.g., Zeevi.
150. Zeevi, 333 N.E.2d at 171, 174. These defenses included the following: the Act of
State Doctrine; N.Y. BANKING LAw § 200-b (McKinney 1990); and Articles of Agreement of
the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. VIII, § 2(b), 60 Stat. 1401, 1411, 2
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New York has an overriding and paramount interest in the
outcome of this litigation. It is a financial capital of the
world, serving as an international clearinghouse and market
place for a plethora of international transactions, such as to
be so recognized by our decisional law. A vast amount of
international letter of credit business is customarily handled
by certain New York banks whose facilities and foreign con-
nections are particularly adaptable to this field of operation.
The parties, by listing United States dollars as the form of
payment, impliedly accepted these facts and set up proce-
dures to implement their trust in our policies. In order to
maintain its pre-eminent financial position, it is important
that the justified expectations of the parties to the contract
be protected. Since New York has the greatest interest and is
most intimately concerned with the outcome of this litiga-
tion, its laws should be accorded paramount control over the
legal issues presented."'
The choice-of-law analysis contains two arguments. Its equation of
United States dollars with United States choice of law, obvious ipse
dixit, has been ignored by most other courts. 152 But the instrumental-
ist argument that a choice of New York law would maintain New
York's position as a financial center has been quite persuasive in the
case law.1" 3 It reads like a good example of legal realism in action:
law implementing state policy. Although this argument looks good, it
relies on a non sequitur: What is the connection between adopting
New York law and preserving New York's preeminent financial status?
U.N.T.S. 39, 66-68 (incorporated in part into United Staies law through 22 U.S.C. § 286h
(1994)).
151. Zeevi, 333 N.E.2d at 172-73 (citations omitted).
152. But see World Point Trading Pte. Ltd. v. Credito Italiano, 622 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863-64
(Sup. Ct. 1994) (suggesting that United States dollars imply United States law), rev'd, 649
N.Y.S.2d 689 (App. Div. 1996).
153. Several courts have inferred New York law from New York's place as financial capi-
tal. E.g., A.I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1993);
Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 1991), affid, 504 U.S.
607 (1992); Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723, 726 (2d Cir. 1991); Allied
Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir. 1985); Manela
v. Garantia Banking Ltd., 940 F. Supp. 584, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (mem.); Pravin Banker
Assocs. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 895 F. Supp. 660, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 109 F.3d
850 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Allstate Ins. Co., 613 N.E.2d 936, 939 (N.Y. 1993); cf Ehrlich-
Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726, 730 (N.Y. 1980) (discussing ajuris-
dictional rather than a choice-of-law problem). Against this flood of authority is one mildly
skeptical rejoinder in Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618, which questioned the inference of New
York law in order to meet Congress's supposed desire to preserve New York City's status as
a financial capital.
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Perhaps the Zeevi court thought that this connection was obvious,
but the putative beneficiary of the court's decision-the New York in-
ternational banking community-did not. In Zeevi, the New York
Clearing House Association ("Clearing House") commissioned an
amicus brief siding with the bank defendant.1 5 4 Amicus briefs have a
built-in credibility that party briefs do not. A lawyer, trying to win a
case, might be willing to sacrifice the long-term interests of the client's
industry, or even the long-term interests of the client.1 55 But amicus
parties do not pay the cost of adverse judgments out of their pockets,
and they need not be shortsighted. Real bankers, when they commis-
sion expensive amicus briefs, are voicing their real interests.
The Clearing House has filed numerous amicus briefs in interna-
tional conflict-of-law cases. 56 In all but one of these cases, the Clear-
ing House has argued that foreign law should apply. 57 It is difficult
to believe that the bankers' fear of New York law is unrelated to their
bottom line: the prosperity of New York as a financial center.
The opposition of the New York banks to New York law is rooted,
in large part, on an important technical consideration. International
payments of dollar-denominated bank money must be settled in New
York, even for wire transfers between two parties located on opposite
sides of the Champs llys~es. A typical overseas payment transaction is
154. Zeevi 333 N.E.2d at 170.
155. For a good example in the banking industry, see United Equities Co. v. First National
City Bank, 383 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 1976), affd mern., 363 N.E.2d 1385 (N.Y. 1977), where
the defendant, First National City Bank, prevented the plaintiff from winning a $59,400
judgment by arguing that a foreign exchange agreement drafted by the defendant should
not have been interpreted according to its language.
156. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Trinh, 496 U.S. 912, 912 (1990); Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A. v. Vishipco Line, 459 U.S. 976, 976 (1982); Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d
695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.2d 657, 658 (2d
Cir. 1988), vacated, 495 U.S. 660 (1990); Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d
645, 646 (2d Cir. 1984); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5, 6 (N.Y. 1984);
supra note 154 and accompanying text; see alsoJoseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine
Without a Cause?, 59 FoDH.AM L. REV. 227, 272 n.171 (1990) (identifying the appeal of SEC
v. Wang, 699 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (mem.), as another case in which Clearing House
filed an amicus brief and discussing the government's frequent participation in such ami-
cus briefs); cf Reibor Int'l Ltd. v. Cargo Carriers (KACZ-CO.), 759 F.2d 262, 263-64 (2d
Cir. 1985) (involving Clearing House's electronic payment system). In addition to the New
York Clearing House, the Institute of International Bankers, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the United States
Comptroller of Currency, and the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury participated
in amicus briefs in Wells Fargo; the Federal Reserve and United States Departments of State,
Justice and Treasury participated in amicus briefs filed in Allied Bank; and the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and the British government submitted amicus briefs in Wang.
SeeSommer, supra, at 272 n.171. The author was of counsel in the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York's brief in Wang.
157. The exceptional case was Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 518.
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shown in Figure 2.158 Several variations of this theme are commonly
encountered. For example, banks, rather than their customers, may
initiate the payment order, or the correspondent bank may be a New
York branch of the French bank, rather than an unaffiliated corre-
spondent. But what is invariable (unless A and B banks are one and
the same French bank) is that the settlement of dollar payments in-
volves New York. The New York component of the settlement is
neither a conscious decision nor a meaningful contingency: It is sim-
ply the way things happen.15 9 This is not a matter of tradition either:
It is economically more efficient. 60 Parties use New York settlement
for their dollar payment chain the same way they use silicon in their
computers. They have little practical choice, they do not notice, and
(provided the courts leave matters alone) they do not care. In Figure
2, Monsieur A and Madame B are probably unaware that New York is
involved in their dollar payment.
158. See also Mark Sneddon, The Effect of Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A on the Law of
International Credit Transfers, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1107, 1111 (1996) (diagramming an inter-
national credit transfer).
159. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 278
(Q.B. 1987) (LAFB) (acknowledging that Eurodollar transactions, unless involving a trans-
fer within the same bank, must be cleared in the United States); KwAw, supra note 1, at 169
(explaining the necessity of using the clearing system of the country of issue for the repay-
ment of eurocurrencies); Richard Hooley & John C. Taylor, Payment by Funds Transfer, in
LAW OF BANK PAYMENTS 25, 31-37 (Michael Brindle & Raymond Cox eds., 1996) (also dis-
cussing variations common in London). For a more detailed discussion of a hypothetical
international wire transfer, see KwAw, supra note 1, at 46-71.
160. More specifically, it is efficient to concentrate high-value settlement of a currency
in a single process. Aggregation of all settlements means that banks need only have one
correspondent for high-value settlements. If there is only one correspondent, random
fluctuations in correspondent balances are at a minimum. This implies that the amount of
capital committed to the correspondent balances (intended in part to protect the corre-
spondent bank against these fluctuations) is also at a minimum. Therefore, concentrated
settlement reduces the amount of costly bank capital required to safely operate the pay-
ment system. The most sensible place to concentrate settlements is in the country of the
central bank of issue. This central bank serves as a settlement counterparty of perfect
creditworthiness. Consequently, it is technically-but not legally-difficult to settle over-
seas. (Low-value overseas settlement systems are occasionally seen because they use little
capital and can enjoy higher profit margins.)
Overseas clearing, unlike overseas settlement, is fairly common. E.g., LAFB, [1988] 1
Lloyd's Rep. at 275. (For the purposes of this Article, "clearing" is the process of netting
out interbank obligations among counterparties; "settlement" is the discharge of these ob-
ligations.) Clearing, however, does not require capital. Overseas clearing is usually fol-
lowed by a settlement process in the country of issue. See id.
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FIGuRE 2
Given these technical details, New York banks naturally oppose
the routine imposition of New York law based only on a New York
dollar clearing-and-settlement nexus. They wish to keep New York in-
sulated from foreign transactions that are routed through New York
solely for technical reasons. It makes no more sense to apply New
York law to a dollar-denominated wire transfer between two foreign
parties than it does to apply Singapore law to a slander suit between
two Americans just because the slanderous letter was drafted in Kansas
on a personal computer manufactured in Singapore. The drafters of
U.C.C. Article 4A were well aware of this problem when they drafted
section 4A-503:
For proper cause and in compliance with applicable law, a
court may restrain (i) a person from issuing a payment order
to initiate a funds transfer, (ii) an originator's bank from ex-
ecuting the payment order of the originator, or (iii) the ben-
eficiary's bank from releasing funds to the beneficiary or the
beneficiary from withdrawing the funds. A court may not
otherwise restrain a person from issuing a payment order,
paying or receiving payment of a payment order, or other-
wise acting with respect to a funds transfer.'6 1
The drafters intended this section to keep intermediary banks (e.g.,
New York correspondent banks) uninvolved in any possible litigation
among the end-parties. 6 2
161. U.C.C. § 4A-503 (1995).
162. See U.C.C. § 4A-503 cmt. (noting that the section is "designed to prevent interrup-
tion of a funds transfer after it has been set in motion," and that "[i] n particular, interme-
diary banks are protected [against injunctions]"). This section works together with U.C.C.
§ 4A-502(d), which states:
Creditor process with respect to a payment by the originator to the beneficiary
pursuant to a funds transfer may be served only on the beneficiary's bank with
respect to the debt owed by that bank to the beneficiary. Any other bank served
with the creditor process is not obliged to act with respect to the process.
Id. § 4A-502(d); see also U.C.C. § 4A-502 cmt. 4 (discussing a creditor's ability to impose a
levy on funds being transferred through an intermediary bank). Section 4A-502 is pre-
empted by federal asset-forfeiture law. See Manufacturas Int'l LTDA v. Manufacturers Han-
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If courts choose to construe the technical necessity of New York
dollar clearing as a mandatory insurance policy against unfavorable
foreign law, banks will pass the cost of the policy on to their custom-
ers. Customers may then seek cheaper alternatives. Alternatives to
New York clearing, such as payment in foreign currency or offshore
dollar clearing, are not difficult to find. These alternatives will not
help the international competitiveness of "certain New York banks
whose facilities and foreign connections are particularly adaptable" to
correspondent operations.
163
Zeevi, for a number of reasons, serves as a warning about the use
of realism in choice-of-law analysis. First, the court's "realistic" reason-
ing was counterproductive in terms of the court's own normative
scheme. Second, Zeevi hints that a realistic style is often a smoke-
screen for other concerns. No court primarily concerned with the
well-being of the New York financial community would ignore without
careful analysis a New York Clearing House brief. Finally, and more to
the point, it is easy for generalist courts to be misled by a "realistic"
analysis of a highly technical field. Many courts subsequently cited
Zeevi in good faith for the proposition that New York choice of law
over Trust Co., 792 F. Supp. 180, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[Elven if the U.C.C. were
applicable, under the Supremacy Clause a state could not in its regulation of commercial
activity inhibit federal law enforcement agencies in applying federal drug laws."), affd with-
out opinion, 47 F.3d 1159 (2d Cir. 1995).
Arguably, the role of the New York bank in Zeevi was not purely an intermediary role.
After all, the payment to the beneficiary was actually to be made in New York. J. Zeevi &
Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333 N.E.2d 168, 170-71 (N.Y. 1975). Even if
this distinction has merit, it was not drawn by the Court of Appeals. In any event, this
distinction is not supported in letter-of-credit law. See infra notes 271-274 and accompany-
ing text.
163. Zeevi, 333 N.E.2d at 172-73. Some courts are occasionally concerned about the
effect of poor domestic law on the New York banking business, and these courts support
their concerns with reasoned argument. An example is in Sigmoil Resources, NV v. Pan
Ocean Oil Corp., 650 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 1996), where the court noted:
Great care must be taken to avoid impeding the role of correspondent accounts
in the facilitation of international transactions. "Domestic and foreign banks
should not become embroiled in controversies surrounding underlying transac-
tions of which they have no knowledge or connection * * * If New York permits
correspondent bank accounts to be regularly subject to attachment after a credit
has been made by a foreign bank to its local customers, the entire system of corre-
spondent banking, in which New York banks play an important role, will be
disrupted."
Id. at 727 (quoting Sidwell & Co. v. Kamchatimpex, 632 N.Y.S.2d 455, 459 (Sup. Ct. 1995));
accord Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1989) ("We are
particularly concerned that if we found no duty requiring New York banks to keep account
information confidential, some customers might be inclined to transfer their business
from institutions in this jurisdiction, home to one of the world's financial capitals, to banks
in 'confidential' jurisdictions.").
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benefitted New York's international banking primacy.164 These courts
seemed unaware that the truth is often the opposite.
Do Zeevi and its progeny show that there is anything wrong with
realism in the private law of international banking? Not necessarily.
One could argue that the problem is not with the approach, but only
with the courts that apply this approach. This argument has its weak-
nesses, as shown by the large number of courts that have followed
Zeevi. Even if realism is applied with great contextual sensitivity, the
result can be disappointing.
Justice Staughton's opinion in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers
Trust Co. (LAFB)165 is as well reasoned and sensitive to facts and policy
as is possible. All that can be criticized is the realistic law that Justice
Staughton had to apply, a law that included currency fundamentalism.
This may absolve Justice Staughton, but it leaves wide room for criti-
cizing legal doctrine.
For our purposes, the facts of LAFB are straightforward.166 Lib-
yan Arab Foreign Bank (Libyan Bank) kept two accounts with Bankers
Trust Company (BT): one in New York and one in London. The New
York account was mainly used for United States payments. Any excess
in the New York account over $500,000 was swept into the London
branch of BT every day. (BT was compensated because this minimum
balance bore no interest.) The sweep from New York to London oc-
curred each day at 2:00 p.m., as per the agreement between Libyan
Bank and BT. During the day of January 8, 1986, United States gov-
ernment officials jawboned BT not to make its daily transfer, and BT
complied.167 At 4:10 p.m., President Reagan issued an immediately
effective proclamation blocking all transfers of Libyan funds, includ-
ing funds held at foreign branches of United States banks. Libyan
Bank had about $160 million in the New York sweep account and
$130 million in the London branch. Libyan Bank issued a demand to
BT's London branch for both the $160 and $130 million accounts to
be paid in London. BT, complying with President Reagan's order,
refused to pay in London. After formal demand, the litigation
commenced. 168
164. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
165. [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259 (Q.B. 1987).
166. A more detailed account, including a procedural history, can be found in KwAw,
supra note 1, at 123-32.
167. LAFB, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 261-66. BT had refused to make its daily transfer
the previous day as well. However, most of the excess money was used the next day for
payments to United States parties. Id. at 265-66. Although Libyan Bank also sued for this
money, this discussion will not address that issue.
168. Id. at 261-68.
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The court's analysis invoked two English conflicts principles: Per-
formance is excused if either (1) performance becomes illegal by the
proper law of the contract or (2) performance necessarily involves do-
ing an act in a place where performance of the act has become ille-
gal.'69 The court recited the traditional rule for locating the "proper
law of the contract":
As a general rule the contract between a bank and its
customer is governed by the law of the place where the ac-
count is kept, in the ibsence of agreement to the
contrary....
That rule accords with the principle, to be found in the
judgment of Lord Justice Atkin in N. Joachimson v. Swiss Bank
Corporation, [1921] 3 KB. 110 at p. 127, and other authori-
ties, that a bank's promise to repay is to repay at the branch
of the bank where the account is kept.170
As discussed above, this traditional rule employs circular reasoning.
The only meaningful way to determine where an account is kept is to
determine its proper law. 171 The LAFB court, forced by the traditional
rule to reason backwards, seemed confused:
In the age of the computer it may not be strictly accurate to
speak of the branch where the account is kept. Banks no
longer have books in which they write entries; they have ter-
minals by which they give instructions; and the computer it-
self with its magnetic tape, floppy disc or some other device
may be physically located elsewhere. Nevertheless it should
not be difficult to decide where an account is kept for this
purpose, and is not in the present case. The actual entries
on the London account were, as I understand it, made in
London, albeit on instructions from New York .... At all
events I have no doubt that the London account was at all
material times "kept" in London. 172
Any search for debt situs that is not a search for "proper law" is a
search for real books made out of paper, doubtless kept by a real clerk
who made entries in these books with a real quill pen. There is not
enough reality in modern banking practice to support such a search.
Fortunately, the court's knowledge of banking was better than the
doctrine it was dealt. It knew which facts were relevant, even if there
was no doctrine into which these facts could be fitted. The court ana-
169. Id. at 268.
170. Id. at 270.
171. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
172. LAB, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 270.
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lyzed the negotiations between BT and Libyan Bank at some length.
During these negotiations, Libyan Bank had discussed United States
"political risk" as a factor making a London account more
favorable.173 Without articulating that the London account was "kept"
in London because the parties had negotiated for English law, the
court nevertheless found that English law applied. 174
The LAFB court then turned to the New York account, whose lo-
cation was apparently not disputed. The court decided that two ac-
counts held by one depositor amounted to a single contract governed
by two proper laws (i.e., that of England and that of New York) with
the rights to each account governed by local law.'17 New York law
required that the New York account be paid. Justice Staughton came
to this conclusion because the New York office had an obligation to
transfer the funds at 2:00 p.m. (while transfer was still mandatory ac-
cording to New York law) and had not done so before the account was
frozen at 4:10 p.m. This was a breach of the proper law of the con-
tract-New York law. 
176
Here was another analytical weakness injustice Staughton's opin-
ion. Although BT had breached its New York contractual obligations
between 2:00 and 4:10, it appeared unlikely that BT was in breach
after that time. According to the usual nonconsequential measure of
damages in commercial law, Libyan Bank's remedy for the breach
should have been the interest on two hours of delay, rather than the
total amount of the deposit. The New York branch-governed by
New York law-could not have been in breach after 4:10; therefore,
the frozen funds were a consequence of the breach, not the breach
itself. The court, in effect, awarded consequential damages in a com-
mercial case, without articulating why it had chosen such an unusual
measure of damages.
The major portion of the LAFB court's opinion was not spent on
proper law and breach, but rather on the illegality of performance
defense. 77 The court viewed payment as involving some kind of real
performance by a bank. If performance of the payment would neces-
sarily involve an act illegal in the United States, BT would be excused.
This belief is not congruent with the definition of payment provided
earlier in this Article that "payment" is a settlement of a license to
judgment against a bank by replacing the license with another license
173. Id at 264.
174. Id. at 271.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 284.
177. See id. at 270-71, 283-88.
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to judgment. 178 Rather, it views payment as some kind of real act by
the bank. The difference between these positions seems subtle, but it
was of great consequence in the LAFB case. If payment is simply
novating a license to a judgment, a bank that refuses to novate the
license can be sued, and a judgment can be collected from the bank.
Impossibility of performance should be irrelevant, however, as long as
enough bank assets are in the jurisdiction of the court. In contrast,
the LAFB court had to conduct a searching inquiry into modes of
payment.'
79
As the court viewed English law, BT would be excused from per-
formance if payment necessarily had to involve actions in the United
States after 4:10 p.m.180 The court seemed to be thinking of a pay-
ment from BT's London branch to some London bank with whom
Libyan Bank had an account. Such a payment would normally be
routed through BT's New York head office, into the New York Clear-
ing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS), and thence out to the
New York correspondent (or branch) of Libyan Bank's London
bank.181 CHIPS transfers were indisputably through New York, and
would indisputably have been illegal. BT argued that CHIPS was an
implied term of any large-value payment contract, a theory properly
rejected by the court.' 82
The court then carefully and accurately reviewed possible forms
of payment from BT-London to Libyan Bank: an on-us transfer to a
debtor of Libyan Bank who had an account with BT-London, a corre-
spondent-bank transfer involving no United States bank, a bankers
draft, a bankers payment, a London dollar clearing, other foreign dol-
lar clearing systems, certificates of deposit, dollar bills, and sterling
notes. It reviewed them for three characteristics: feasibility, depen-
dence on New York, and whether Libyan Bank had a right to demand
that particular means of payment. After this exhaustive analysis, the
178. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
179. See LAFB, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 271-76.
180. See id. at 285.
181. Such a payment would have followed the route described in Figure 2, with London
replacing Paris.
182. See LAFB, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 277-78. The beneficiary of a payment simply
wants its account timely credited. It may specify a certain payment medium to assure time-
liness and safety, but it has very little legal complaint if another medium is nevertheless
used successfully. See U.C.C. § 4A-406(b) (1995) (enforcing payments made by means pro-
hibited by the beneficiary unless the beneficiary notifies the originator of its refusal of the
payment within a reasonable time, does not touch the money, and would have suffered an
avoidable loss if the originator had complied with the contract). Conversely, if the origina-
tor does not specify the payment system intermediaries, it suffers no loss from its bank's
choices. U.C.C. § 4A-305(b).
[VOL. 57:1
WHERE IS A BANK AccouNT?
court found that most forms of payment were impossible, involved
New York, or were not Libyan Bank's entitlements. However, pay-
ments by tender of dollar bills (or sterling) could be made in Eng-
land, without necessarily requiring an illegal act in New York.183 The
court continued:
Of course it is highly unlikely that anyone would want to
receive a sum as large as $131m. in dollar bills, at all events
unless they were engaged in laundering the proceeds of
crime. [An expert witness] said in his report:
As to the demand for payment in cash, I regard this
simply as the assertion of a customer's inalienable
right. In practice, of course, where such a large
sum is demanded in this manner, fulfilment of the
theoretical right is unlikely, in my experience, to be
achieved. A sensible banker will seek to persuade
his customer to accept payment in some more con-
venient form, and I have yet to encounter an inci-
dent of this nature where an acceptable
compromise was not reached, even where the sum
was demanded in sterling.
I would substitute "fundamental" for "inalienable"; but in all
other respects that passage accords with what, in my judg-
ment, is the law. One can compare operations in futures in
the commodity markets: everybody knows that contracts will
be settled by the payment of differences, and not by the de-
livery of copper, wheat or sugar as the case may be; but an
obligation to deliver and accept the appropriate commodity,
in the absence of settlement by some other means, remains
the legal basis of these transactions. So in my view every obli-
gation in monetary terms is to be fulfilled, either by the deliv-
ery of cash, or by some other operation which the creditor
demands and which the debtor is either obliged to, or is con-
tent to, perform. 184
183. LAFB, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 274-83.
184. Id. at 281. This is a false analogy. As discussed above, there is no reason in pay-
ment law why an obligation to deliver currency must underlie all payment transactions. See
supra notes 24-47 and accompanying text. However, the underlying right to physical deliv-
ery of physical-commodities contracts prevents manipulation. The spot market for physical
delivery is generally far thinner than the market for the futures contract. If there were no
delivery requirement at expiry date, contracts could only be settled by reference to the spot
price of the commodity. But, because of the relative illiquidity of the physical commodity,
this spot price is generally easy to manipulate. A physical-delivery requirement guarantees
that manipulations of the spot-market price around the expiry date of the future will cause
few effects in the futures settlement process. Those financial futures markets with deep
markets in the underlying commodities are frequently cash-settled on the exchange on
expiry date. See generally Kenneth D. Garbade & William L. Silber, Cash Settlement of Futures
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The holding seems clear. Currency fundamentalism is the law. All
payments are substitutes for the ur-payment, a physical transfer of cur-
rency. Tender of currency is a real act, in a real location, against
which all legal entitlements can be measured. This seems to be an
accurate statement of English law."85 It is, however, also fraught with
at least three problems.
The first problem is technical. The transaction was denominated
in United States dollars, which are legal tender in the United States.
Justice Staughton referred to the mutual consent of the parties to a
noncurrency medium of payment, but did not require consent for
tender of dollars or sterling.'8 6 This would be defensible if English
law recognized dollars as legal tender in England, but it does not.18 7
Second, this view of the law results in a schizophrenic opinion.
Elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Staughton veered away from cur-
rency fundamentalism:
The credit balance of the Libyan bank with Bankers
Trust constituted a personal right, a chose in action. At bot-
tom there are only two means by which the fruits of that
right could have been made available to the Libyan bank.
The first is by delivery of cash, whether dollar bills or any
other currency .... The second is the procuring of an ac-
count transfer. (I leave out of account the delivery of chat-
tels, such as gold, silver or works of art, since nobody has
suggested that Bankers Trust were [sic] obliged to adopt that
method. The same applies to other kinds of property, such
as land.)' 88
This characterization of Libyan Bank's legal rights is virtually the same
as that in Part I of this Article. Libyan Bank was not entitled to cur-
rency (or money); it only had a license to a judgment against BT. 8 9
The judgment could be satisfied by BT's tendering articles of value
that would satisfy Libyan Bank, either directly or indirectly. Libyan
Bank would be directly satisfied if it could be induced to sign a release
of claim, and it would be indirectly satisfied if the articles of value
Contracts: An Economic Analysis, 3 J. FUTURES MARKETS 451 (1983) (explaining how liqui-
dated transactions have replaced physical settlements of futures contracts).
185. See KwAw, supra note 1, at 85, 89-90 (explaining the necessity of localized repay-
ment at common law); MANN, supra note 13, at 81-85 (discussing place and time of pay-
ment under English law). It is also a limited statement. See infra note 194.
186. LAFB, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 283.
187. See MANN, supra note 13, at 192 (stating the general rule that foreign money is not
legal tender).
188. LAFB, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 273.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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were auctioned for more units of account than BT's debt to Libyan
Bank. (Justice Staughton should not have omitted chattels or land,
because these assets would have also been available in a sheriffs auc-
tion, and Libyan Bank might have accepted them in accord and satis-
faction of the debt.)
Finally, it is simply not practical to view the "ultimate" right of a
payment recipient as a right to currency. This much was admitted-as
a matter of practice-by the expert witness. It is also the law. United
States law is extremely practical about inappropriate tenders of-or
demands for-money. As early as 1821, a New England bank tried to
avoid an interbank payment by slowly counting small coin, rather than
tendering large amounts of bullion. 19 Justice Story viewed this as a
default, and assessed the bank statutory punitive damages."' One
hundred years later, Justice Holmes suggested that a bank demanding
a large interbank payment with the intent of destabilizing the paying
bank would be a tortfeasor. 19 2 In 1988, a New York court ruled that a
New York City bus could refuse dollar bills. Convenience trumped the
legal-tender status of the dollar bills: New York could not afford to
accept paper currency in its fare machines.19 3 English law may not be
very different. 19 4 French law goes further. It forces certain kinds of
payments to be made via bank money, rather than currency. For such
classes of payments, currency is illegal tender!'9 5
This discussion has not been an effort to establish that Justice
Staughton's opinion was inadequate. To the contrary, LAFB is one of
the better judicial opinions in payment law. The flaws in the opinion
resulted from attempted realism, an attempt mostly demanded by the
case law with which Justice Staughton had to contend. The clumsy
determination of debt situs was an attempt to find a "real" location for
190. See Suffolk Bank v. Lincoln Bank, 23 F. Cas. 346, 347 (C.C.D. Me. 1821) (No.
13,590) (Story, J.).
191. Id. at 348. What would happen if Bankers Trust started tendering $1 bills in New
York at 2:00 and was stopped by the 4:10 p.m. decree?
192. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921).
193. Nemser v. New York City Transit Auth., 530 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
194. See MANN, supra note 13, at 77 ("Where large amounts [of money] are involved
(and as a result of inflation they are becoming increasingly larger) payment by legal tender
is frequendy unthinkable and in many contexts cannot possibly be within the contempla-
tion of the parties, so that a robust process of construction ought to displace the legal
[tender] principle in most cases." (citing Tenax S.S. Co. v. Reinante Transoceanica Nave-
gacion S.A., The Brimnes, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 386, 400 (Q.B. 1972), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Tenax S.S. Co. v. The Brimnes (Owners), [1975] 1 Q.B. 929 (C.A. 1974))). In light of this
opinion, it is not surprising that Mann does not approve of Justice Staughton's reasoning
in LAFB. See id. at 201-02. Nevertheless, Mann purports to be a chartalist, advocating that a
tender of currency is the only legally cognizable form of money. See id. at 272.
195. See id. at 79 n.79.
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something that could only be determined by the content of communi-
cations. The tacit choice of consequential damages came about be-
cause BT had done nothing "real" to transfer the funds to England.
The ultimate right to payment in currency-although it contradicted
law that Justice Staughton knew well-was required by a doctrine that
referred to "real" actions undertaken in New York. Wire transfers are
not spatially localized; they are communications whose locations can
be determined only by their data content.
As discussed in Part I, banking is mostly a trade in symbols. But a
realistic approach is chary of purely symbolic events:
[U] sing references in telexes as indications of the governing
law, trivializes the whole choice of law process and is unreal-
istic. Furthermore, the reliance by courts on references
made in the telexes, is bound to make the court neglect
other circumstances, such as the location of the bank and
other parties, which, although not appearing in the telex,
may be more important indicators of the governing law.
Thus, although the only documentation from which courts
may infer the governing law are the confirmations ex-
changed, it is arguable that the mere references to locations
in such confirmations ought not to be taken as indications of
the governing law. All the circumstances of the case need to
be examined.
196
Why look for reality underneath the exchanged symbols? Why not let
the symbols constitute the relevant reality?
C. Nominalism
"Nominalism" is the usual term ascribed to treating symbols as if
they were reality. 19 7 It can be particularly powerful in social contexts,
in which shared symbols are social reality. Nominalism can be viewed
as the antithesis of realism, and it is the characteristic intellectual de-
vice of payment law. Before discussing nominalistic law, one should
first consider "formalism," which usually is taken as the antithesis of
legal realism.
Formalism can be viewed as the belief that legal doctrine is some-
how determinative of a case and independent of an adjudicator's view
of the "correct" result. 9 8 A more thorough exponent of formalism
realizes that legal doctrine does not exist in a vacuum: Legal doctrine
is applied to facts. A formalistic decisionmaker takes these facts and
196. KWAW, supra note 1, at 232.
197. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
198. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 531 (1988).
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fits them into some categorical pattern. It is this categorical pattern,
rather than the naked facts, upon which formal doctrine acts. For
formalistic doctrine to succeed on its own terms, the "decisionmakers
in the system [must] perceive [the facts] as being members of the
same category perceived by the addressees and will be seen as so per-
ceiving by those affected."199
If all parties categorize facts the same way, formalism provides
predictability, a quality dear to the hearts of payment lawyers.
Although formalism sacrifices the possible increase in accuracy that
may inhere in contextual decisionmaking, it does not make realism's
demand that generalist judges be omniscient decisionmakers, 20 0 or
even that they be as good as Justice Staughton. 20 1 Similarly, nonjudi-
cial actors are aided by formalism, because they too are spared the
burden of comprehending reality-or the even greater burden of try-
ing to anticipate the judge's version of reality. Formal doctrine per-
mits a legal division of labor, separating the formation of rules from
the adjudication of disputes.
Formalism is not enough for payment law. Formalism still in-
volves fact-finding and the fitting of facts into patterns. Facts can be
disputed, and the fit of a fact pattern to a doctrine can involve discre-
tion. As discussed above, payment law is predicated on an outrageous
idea-making a mere cause of action not only a reliable asset, but the
very basis of money.2 °2 An outrageous idea demands outrageous law.
Payment law must dispense with facts whenever possible.
Payment law transcends facts through nominalism, the treating of
symbols as reality. 20 The world of nominalistic payment law is a world
of pure communicative events-a world of "courier[s] without lug-
gage."20 4 It is no accident that this quotation derives from an old ne-
gotiable instruments case. Nominalism is an old technique of banking
commercial law, especially payment law. Negotiability, for example, is
199. Id. at 540. In other words, "people perceive pelicans as birds; decisionmakers per-
ceive pelicans as birds; and people know that decisionmakers will perceive pelicans as
birds." Id.
200. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis,
65 CHi.-KEN'T L. REv. 93, 95 (1989) (discussing fundamental values of the legal process and
providing judges with useful decisionmaking rules). These rationality constraints are cen-
tral to Professor Kramer's preference for choice-of-law rules over ad hoc choice-of-law prin-
ciples. See Kramer, supra note 144, at 321 n.148 (arguing that ad hoc decisionmakers offer
proposals that are too general and analyses that are too complex to be useful).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 166-195.
202. See supra Part I.
203. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
204. Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846) (holding that a "payable to bearer" note
that contained additional legal language was not a negotiable note).
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almost purely a question of magic words, not external facts. The
words "to order" or "to bearer" are all-important; anything else is
irrelevant:
Total exclusion from [U.C.C.] Article 3 of other
promises or orders that are not payable to bearer or to order
serves a useful purpose. It provides a simple device to clearly
exclude a writing that does not fit the pattern of typical ne-
gotiable instruments and which is not intended to be a nego-
tiable instrument. If a writing could be an instrument
despite the absence of "to order" or "to bearer" language
and a dispute arises with respect to the writing, it might be
argued that the writing is a negotiable instrument because
the other requirements of subsection (a) are somehow met.
Even if the argument is eventually found to be without merit
it can be used as a litigation ploy. 20 5
Imagine that! The law dismisses an inquiry into the true intent of the
parties as a "litigation ploy." Form governs all.
This nominalistic technique goes beyond Article 3 and pervades
all of the U.C.C. banking articles. The subject matter of Article 4A,
for example, is "payment orders," defined as "instructions" (i.e., com-
munications) .206 After assuring the authenticity and accuracy of these
communications, 2 7 Article 4A turns them into the stuff of payments.
The independence principle at the core of letters of credit transforms
a very real commercial transaction into a nominalistic document-
checking exercise: "If... a letter of credit.., contains nondocumen-
tary conditions, an issuer shall disregard the nondocumentary condi-
tions and treat them as if they were not stated. '20 "Nondocumentary"
conditions, such as whether goods financed by a letter of credit are
acceptable to the buyer, are very real conditions. Reality is to be
ignored.
The facts in a payment case are symbols. To the extent that pay-
ment-system participants can assure the authenticity of these symbols,
the nominalistic doctrines of payment law can produce an unambigu-
ous answer to almost all potential disputes. To the extent that the law
unambiguously and noncontextually operates on certain symbols, the
symbols are something real. This reification of symbols should not be
a surprise. Nominalism must underpin almost any notion of money.
205. U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2 (1995).
206. See id. § 4A-103 (providing definitions regarding payment orders).
207. See id. §§ 4A-201 to -208.
208. Id. § 5-10 8 (g) (regarding issuer's rights and obligations).
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"Money" is a constructed social meaning, not a physical fact.20 9 Any
law of money must be sensitive to the social construction of money
and must rely strongly on a nominalistic underpinning.
Social construction is not, of course, limited to money. Law has
long served to construct and regulate social meaning in many spheres
far removed from commercial law.210 It should be no surprise that
commercial transactions require shared social meaning provided by
law and that this requirement is particularly prominent in the law of
money. After all, nothing is a medium of exchange unless we all think
of it as a medium of exchange and treat it as a medium of exchange.
The law of money is different primarily in its use of an explicitly nomi-
nalistic approach to construct social meaning. Nominalistic law is a
subset of formalism, and formalism is more generally viewed as de-
stroying rather than constructing social solidarity.211 Nominalism
works in the law of money not because it interprets social relations but
because it directly constructs them.
This nominalistic approach to bank-liability money has been
highly successful. Because of a nominalistic law of money, we enjoy a
reliable monetary system based on the most improbable store of
value-traded rights to sue and obtain judgment.
Let us place the argument in perspective. Part II argued that the
substantive law of money requires an adjective set of conflicts rules.
This Part and Part I argue that the law of money must be nominalistic.
By implication, the conflicts law of money must be nominalistic. The
only meaningful facts on which the conflicts law operates are commu-
nications without physical locations. The output of the conflicts law is
something that can have only a socially shared meaning-the location
of a promise. A promise is nowhere, especially a disembodied prom-
ise made in a world of high-speed telecommunications. Without the
strong consensus that can only be created by nominalism, the promise
effectively can have no location.
Can nominalistic conflicts law work as well as nominalistic sub-
stantive law? To give a hint, imagine how quickly Justice Staughton
could have decided the LAFB case2 1 2 if he had taken a nominalistic
approach, looking merely at the content of communications establish-
ing the liabilities. Some communications clearly established a liability
209. See supra Part I.
210. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 53, at 962-90 (describing the social constructivism of law
in many contexts, including motorcycle-helmet laws in Russia, civil rights and dueling in
the American South, language laws, smoking, and homosexuals in the military).
211. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIETY 206-09 (1976).
212. See supra notes 165-189 and accompanying text.
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in London, some in New York. BT had clearly promised Libyan Bank
that, as of 2:00 p.m., New York time, all deposits over $500,000 would
be sent to London. 213 There was no need to decide whether the
funds were "really" sent to London, and no need to suppress a discus-
sion of why consequential damages were assessed for not sending the
money before the 4:10 p.m. currency freeze. 214 The funds had been sent
to London because BT told Libyan Bank that they would be sent there.2 15
BT's debt to Libyan Bank was therefore all in London, except the
$500,000 retained by the agreement and any monies sent to the New
York account after 2:00 p.m. 2 16 The LAFB court's long discussion
about impossibility of payment through New York is irrelevant. BT is
liable in London, whatever the details of novating the liability to an-
other bank. Libyan Bank could execute ajudgment against BT's Eng-
lish assets, if the judgment could not be otherwise satisfied.
IV. A RULE TO LOCALIZE LIABILITIES
A quick recapitulation may be in order. Bank money consists of
traded licenses to sue banks for judgment. The law governing these
licenses must be very clear for operational reasons, and it must also be
a firm basis for the shared social construct that is money. A nominalis-
tic law, referring only to communications, is the clearest law possible.
In order to retain its clarity in a world of multiple sovereigns, "money"
requires some location. The location of money-the location of a li-
cense to judgment-must be a conflict-of-law rule. This rule should
be nominalistic for the same reason that the rules governing the con-
tent of the licenses are nominalistic. There is no reality but the com-
munications themselves. Unfortunately, the rules governing the
location of a license to a judgment derive from modern choice-of-law
theory, which is highly realistic. The result has been the recent explo-
sion of case law and the even greater explosion of scholarship on the
subject.
A rule is needed. The first subpart will discuss some criteria for a
good nominalistic conflicts rule, the second will introduce such a rule,
and the third will show this rule in operation.
213. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 265
(Q.B. 1987) (LAFB).
214. See id. at 285.
215. This is not the only possible resolution of LAFB. For a more detailed doctrinal
discussion, see infrd notes 285-292 and accompanying text.
216. LAFB, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 265.
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A. Criteria for a Good Nominalistic Conflicts Rule
As discussed above, the realistic approach of interest analysis does
not fit the law of bank liabilities, which demands nominalism. How-
ever, there is considerable wisdom in some techniques of interest anal-
ysis, if not in its realistic methodology. Specifically, the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws factors for arriving at optimal conflicts deci-
sions can also be viewed as a set of criteria for optimal conflicts rules,
independent of the decisions that create these rules.2 17
If viewed as a set of criteria for rules rather than as factors for
decisions, the seven Restatement factors become far more useful.2 1 s
Three of these factors seek the "best" conflicts rule for a given fact
pattern;2 19 three seek the rule yielding the most predictable result;
2 2 °
and one factor warns courts of different jurisdictions that they must
cooperate with each other.2 2 1 This grouping implies that the essential
tension in conflicts law is between conflicts rules that yield determi-
nate results and those that yield sensible results.2 2 2 Determinacy and
sensibility are both good, but somewhat inconsistent. A determinate
(i.e., mechanical) rule can often lead to silly results.
The argument that sensible conflicts rules are good is, of course,
tautological. The argument for determinacy is somewhat more com-
plex. As discussed above, a conflicts rule for bank liabilities must be
determinate because bank liabilities are the stuff of money, and
money, by its nature, cannot be questioned. 223 Furthermore, it is diffi-
cult to imagine an indeterminate law of bank liabilities when bank
liabilities are the product of standardized communications. Given
217. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. This distinction was made in Perry
Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1245 (1987).
218. For the text of the seven Restatement factors, see supra text accompanying note 142.
219. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (b) (1971) (forum poli-
cies); id. § 6(2) (c) (nonforum policies); id. § 6(2) (e) (legal policies).
220. See id. § 6(2)(d) (justified expectations); id. § 6(2)(f) (certainty); id. § 6(2)(g)
(ease in determination).
221. See id. § 6(2) (a) (needs of the interstate and multinational systems).
222. This tension is subject to the constraint of international acceptability. See Sommer,
supra note 156, at 248 (discussing the tension between the "uniqueness" of a result derived
from a fact pattern and the "optimality" of the same); Hessel E. Yntema, The Objectives of
Private International Law, 35 CAN. B. REv. 721, 735 (1957) (discussing the need for compara-
tive investigation of typical international-commerce transactions in which there are con-
flict-of-law problems). "Determinate" conflicts rules are conceptually a bit tricky. See
Sommer, supra note 156, at 254-55 (discussing the effect of forum shopping on the infor-
mation available to parties to a contract); see also William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 9 (1963) (discussing how choice-of-law rules affect pre-
dictability in the forum-shopping context).
223. See supra note 53.
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these standardized inputs, an indeterminate law would have to be
based on judicial caprice, not factual contextuality.
These arguments are specific to payments law. A more general
argument for determinacy is based on the problems of forum shop-
ping 224 and associated problems such as double liability. The evils of
forum shopping are straightforward. First, if forum shopping flour-
ishes, the most pro-plaintiff rules reign, because the plaintiff chooses
the forum.225 Second, parties have a more difficult time predictably
structuring their transactions, and unintended breaches of contract
become easier. 226 Finally, forum shopping permits the effect of legal
transitions to spread outside the sovereign that initiates the transition,
upsetting more expectations than the transition otherwise would
have.
2 2 7
As a general matter, the tension between sensible and determi-
nate rules is difficult to resolve. However, the tension largely disap-
pears in commercial conflicts law. "In contract . . . the best
adjudicator or law is the one that the parties expect. With benign
circularity, an inflexible (and transparent) contractual conflicts re-
gime reinforces expectations, aligning the [sensibility] and [determi-
nacy] goals. '228 This is true a fortiori for the law of bank liabilities.
The most sensible rule governing bank liabilities is the most determi-
nate one-the best foundation for nominalistic doctrine.
B. The Separate Entity Doctrine
This subpart introduces a nominalistic conflicts rule for bank lia-
bilities-the separate entity doctrine. In some ways, this doctrine is
very old. It can be traced back to 1829.229 However, the modern sepa-
224. See Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 772,
782-83 (1983) (defining forum shopping and problems associated with it); see also Sommer,
supra note 156, at 253-59 (discussing costs of forum shopping).
225. The opposite-and equally undesirable-result exists in cases, such as those involv-
ing federal diversity jurisdiction, where the defendant chooses the forum. See Sommer,
supra note 156, at 255 (noting that forum shopping differs from other types of degraded
information that decrease predictability and possibly favor either party).
226. See id. at 254-56.
227. See id. at 256-59.
228. Id. at 250 (footnote omitted). The omitted footnote reads:
If a contractual conflicts rule runs counter to intuition, inflexibility is a vice,
rather than a virtue. The problem is that intuitions tend to be contextual, and an
intuitive, flexible rule runs counter to the [determinacy] goal and does little to
further the [sensibility] goal. The solution in contractual conflicts is to pick a
widely-held intuition, and stick by it.
Id. at 250 n.88.
229. See infra note 238.
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rate entity doctrine is young, owing its existence to the U.C.C. revision
movement of the 1980s and the 1990s.23°
The separate entity doctrine is straightforward in operation. This
doctrine deems all bank liabilities as liabilities of specific branches.231
The appropriate branch identity is decided according to the ordinary
nominalistic factors of commercial law, such as the place payable on a
negotiable instrument, the address on a letter of credit, or the name
of a branch on a payment-order instruction. Consequently, each
branch's obligations are under the jurisdiction of (or governed by the
laws of) the branch location. 32 The branch merges into the rest of
the bank only for enforcement of judgments (i.e., "ultimate liability"
remains with the bank as a whole).2sa It does not matter if the transac-
tion was "really" conducted at another branch. The nominalistic sepa-
rate entity doctrine only uses the content of communications to
determine the relevant branch location. Therefore, this doctrine,
which is consonant with bankers' intuition, successfully localizes the
liabilities of an international bank.
This subpart first discusses the separate entity doctrine in connec-
tion with the U.C.C., where it is the strongest today. It then examines
some relations between the separate entity doctrine and the doctrine
of the corporate veil.
1. The Separate Entity Doctrine and the U.C.C.-Probably the best
example of the separate entity doctrine appears in revised section
5-116 of the U.C.C.,234 which addresses the choice of law and forum in
230. See infta text accompanying notes 234-244.
231. Kassa, supra note 84, at 136.
232. Heininger, supra note 1, at 931-32.
233. The "ultimate liability" expression originated in Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 224
N.Y.S. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1927), affd, 227 N.Y.S. 907 (App. Div. 1928), affd, 164 N.E. 745 (N.Y.
1928), which held that a New York bank that opened an account in its Russian branch for a
depositor was liable to the depositor upon closing of the Russian branch. Id. at 114. The
expression was later refined in an attachment case, Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez,
249 N.Y.S. 319 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931), which noted that "[a]lthough the branch deposit be
the ultimate debt of the parent bank, the obligation to its customer... is localized so as to
be confined primarily to the branch where it originated." Id. at 322. There is no standard
definition of "ultimate liability," and some courts have taken it to mean very little. See, e.g.,
Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding a New York home
office of a bank to be liable to a Vietnamese depositor after the Vietnamese branch of the
bank was closed by force majeure). The author takes the "ultimate liability" rubric to refer to
a depositor's ability to enforce a valid judgment against any branch in the world, while assert-
ing that a depositor cannot obtain a judgment against any branch. Accord Herring &
Kfibler, supra note 1, at 977.
234. U.C.C. § 5-116 (1995). The author's admiration for section 5-116 doubtless owes
something to his familiarity with it; he was an Advisor to the Drafting Committee responsi-
ble for the text of the statute.
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letter-of-credit transactions. Section 5-116, particularly subsection
5-116(b), takes an explicitly nominalist approach:
(a) The liability of an issuer, nominated person, or ad-
viser [i.e., banks] for action or omission is governed by the
law of the jurisdiction chosen by an agreement in the form
of a record signed or otherwise authenticated by the affected
parties . . . or by a provision in the person's letter of credit,
confirmation, or other undertaking. The jurisdiction whose
law is chosen need not bear any relation to the transaction.
(b) Unless subsection (a) applies, the liability of an is-
suer, nominated person, or adviser for action or omission is
governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the person is
located. The person is considered to be located at the ad-
dress indicated in the person's undertaking.... For the pur-
pose of jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of
interbranch letters of credit, but not enforcement of a judg-
ment, [i] all branches of a bank are considered separate ju-
ridical entities and [ii] a bank is considered to be located at
the place where its relevant branch is considered to be lo-
cated under this subsection.
(e) The forum for settling disputes arising out of an un-
dertaking within this article may be chosen in the manner
and with the binding effect that governing law may be cho-
sen in accordance with subsection (a).235
Subsection 5-116(a) refers to an explicit agreement, and it is straight-
forward enough. This subsection requires an agreement, evidenced
by a record, to prevent subsequent allegations of oral understandings
from undermining the default rules of subsection 5-116(b).23 6
Subsection 5-116(b) is more interesting. The first sentence be-
gins with a bow to explicit agreement and then refers to a default rule.
The default rule seems realistic: A bank obligation is governed by the
location of a bank. The second sentence of subsection 5-116(b), how-
ever, states that a bank's location is only where the bank says it is-the
address on a letterhead. This two-step is logically unnecessary. The
choice of law could have been directly identified with the address on
the letterhead. Why take an unnecessary step, and call this address
the location of the branch? As discussed above, nominalism does best
235. Id. § 5-116(a), (b), (e).
236. See id. § 5-116(a)-(b). The author remembers suggesting the insertion of the word
"written" before "agreement" for exactly this reason. The Drafting Committee accepted
this suggestion, and the Reporter later generalized it to "record ... authenticated by the
affected parties." Id. § 5-116(a); cf id. § 5-104 (statute of frauds for Article 5).
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when it reifies shared social conventions (i.e., when it appears "real"
or "natural"). A "branch" with a "location" is a natural idea to a
banker. The first two sentences of this subsection establish the logical
rule-that a choice of law is a pure communicative event-but place
this logical rule in a shared social context.
The social context is rooted, as usual, in history. Before telecom-
munications, branches were necessarily unconnected with each other,
to the point where they were autonomous in governance.2a 7 The law
often treated antebellum branches as separate. 23 8 Throughout this
era and up to the middle of the twentieth century, physical location
had been an accurate guide to the "location" of the transaction. This
is true no more. However, the word "branch" provides some comfort
to old habits of thought, at no cost to the precision required by the
law of bank liabilities. Such comfort is key to nominalistic law: "For
an action to convey a social meaning ... it must do so without appear-
ing contingent or contested; it must do so in a way that feels natu-
ral.... [I] t must function with a sort of social magic. " 2 31 "Branch"
conveys the necessary magic to bankers and their customers. There-
237. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR 312-14 (1957).
238. Id. The branches of the Second Bank of the United States each had their own
boards of directors. Id. at 313. To prevent excessive independence of separate branches,
the cashier of each branch was appointed by the head office in Philadelphia. Id. As late as
1829, Daniel Webster argued for the Bank of the United States, emphasizing that "[t]he
different branches of the Bank of the United States, have no connexion with each other;
but treat each other as different institutions." Bank of the United States v. Goddard, 2 F.
Cas. 694, 696 (C.C.D. Mass. 1829) (No. 917) (holding that each branch of the Bank of the
United States should be treated as a separate bank). Albert Gallatin viewed the notes of
the Bank of the United States as "nominally of twenty-four currencies, each payable at a
distinct place," and which were merely collected, rather than paid, by other branches of
the Bank. ALBERT GALLATIN, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CURRENCY AND BANKING SYSTEM OF
THE UNITED STATES 88 (reprint 1968) (1831). Banks sued in the name of their branch
right up to the eve of the Civil War. See, e.g., Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1
Black) 436, 448-50 (1861) (holding that under the Charter of the State Bank of Ohio, the
Jefferson Branch bank was not liable for higher taxes upon the branch's property, as this
would violate the Contracts Clause of the Constitution); Piqua Branch of State Bank v.
Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 376-77 (1853) (stating that under Ohio law each branch of
the State Bank of Ohio was considered an independent banking association until 1866,
and thereafter unless its affairs wound up); cf Crawford v. Branch Bank, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
279, 281 (1849) (citing an Alabama statute providing that legal title to a promissory note
vested in the branch in which it was negotiated). Through at least the first third of the
twentieth century, Georgia and North Carolina both had separate boards of directors for
their branches, Fordham, supra note 1, at 980, as do Federal Reserve Banks to this day. See
12 U.S.C. § 521 (1994) (providing for establishment of boards of directors at Federal Re-
serve bank branches).
239. Lessig, supra note 53, at 959 (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed
above, contractual conflicts rules must be "intuitive" to be fully successful. See supra note
228.
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fore, all of the revised banking Articles of the U.C.C. associate
"branch" with choice of law or jurisdiction.
We return to U.C.C. Article 5. The third quoted sentence of sub-
section 5-116(b) deals with international banks-those that conduct
business in many jurisdictions. This terse sentence could bear restate-
ment. When unpacked, this sentence means that each branch's liabil-
ities are separate from those of other branches, but a judgment
obtained against the appropriate branch can be enforced against the
bank as a whole.24 ° This sentence implies that each branch is gov-
erned by local law. Furthermore, judgment cannot be obtained against
an inappropriate branch, although a judgment can be enforced against
any branch. In other words, bank liabilities are compartmentalized by
branch (i.e.,jurisdiction), but bank assets are unitary worldwide. The
reference to "interbranch letters of credit" refers to situations where a
bank plays several roles and refers to different jurisdictions that gov-
ern the different roles. For example, if one branch of a bank issues a
credit, and another branch is the paying bank, a lawsuit for wrongful
dishonor can only be brought against the issuing bank.24
Thus, the separate entity doctrine consists of three components.
First, it contains a rule of identification of a liability with a branch. This
rule is purely nominalistic, referring only to communications that
identify the branch with the liability. The second component is a for-
malistic rule of separateness- Branches are treated separately for all ju-
ridical purposes, particularly choice of law and jurisdiction. If two
branches of the same bank in different jurisdictions act in different
roles in the same transaction, they will be adjudged according to dif-
ferent laws. The final component is an equally formalistic rule of
unity: All branches draw on the same asset pool, belonging to the
institution as a whole.
The two formalistic rules-separateness on the liability side and
unity on the asset side-both draw on the nominalistic fact of branch
240. Cf Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 271
(Q.B. 1987) (LAFB) ("That notion [i.e., branch separateness], of course, has its limits. A
judgment lawfully obtained in respect of the obligation of a branch would be enforceable
in England against the assets of the head office."). This idea can be traced back to Sokoloff
v. National City Bank, 145 N.E. 917 (N.Y. 1924). "The intangible chose in action, at least
when it is the result of a deposit in a bank, has for some purposes a situs at the residence or
place of business of the debtor, though the creditor be far away." Id. at 920.
241. This rule predated Revised Article 5 of the U.C.C. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l
Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Philippine law governed where Ma-
nila was the sole place of performance of a letter of credit); cf Pan-American Bank & Trust
Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762, 766-67 (2d Cir. 1925) (holding that the bank that
procured a letter of credit by another bank must reimburse the latter bank for the amount
paid).
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identity. The precision of formalistic rules is no better than the facts
upon which these rules operate. Because these formalistic rules refer
to nothing but the nominalistic fact of branch identity, they both en-
joy the same precision as the nominalistic rule of identification.
This approach is replicated elsewhere in the U.C.C. Consider Ar-
ticle 4A, governing wire transfers. Section 4A-105(a)(2) defines
"Bank" and states: "A branch or separate office of a bank is a separate
bank for purposes of this Article." 2 4 2 This section interacts with sec-
tion 4A-507, a choice of law provision establishing the rule of
separateness:
(a) The following rules apply unless the affected parties
otherwise agree ... :
(1) The rights and obligations between the sender of
a payment order and the receiving bank are governed by the
law of the jurisdiction in which the receiving bank is located.
(2) The rights and obligations between the benefici-
ary's bank and the beneficiary are governed by the law of the
jurisdiction in which the beneficiary's bank is located.
(3) The issue of when payment is made pursuant to a
funds transfer by the originator to the beneficiary is gov-
erned by the law of the jurisdiction in which the beneficiary's
bank is located.
(b) If the parties described in each paragraph of subsec-
tion (a) have made an agreement selecting the law of a par-
ticular jurisdiction to govern rights and obligations between
each other, the law of that jurisdiction governs those rights
and obligations, whether or not the payment order or the
funds transfer bears a reasonable relation to that
jurisdiction. 24
The result of Article 4A is similar to that of Article 5, although
Article 4A sounds only in choice of law, and not also in jurisdiction.
Like Article 5, it clearly states rules of identification and separateness.
Unlike Article 5, it has no explicit rule of unity stating that branch
judgments can be enforced elsewhere. (This may be inferred from
general principles of corporate law, however.) Furthermore, Article
4A is less explicit than Article 5 about the nominalism inherent in
branch location, and it does not operationally define a branch in
terms of communicative content. However, the drafters of Article 4A
were clearly contemplating a nominalistic concept of the bank
242. U.C.C. § 4A-105(a) (2) (1995). This language is a variation of U.C.C. § 5-116(b) (i)-
(ii), which establishes branch identification.
243. Id. § 4A-507(a)-(b).
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branch. Comment 2 to section 4A-507 shows that the Reporters
thought that the branch location is a comparatively simple idea:
"Since it is difficult in many cases to determine where a beneficiary is
located, the location of the beneficiary's bank [i.e., branch] provides a
more certain rule."'2 ' As any lawyer coping with the arcane regulatory
law of bank branches can attest, a realistic concept of branch location
is not a simple one.24 5 Only a nominalistic concept of bank branches
is simple.
The separate entity doctrine, illustrated by Articles 4A and 5, is an
old warhorse of international banking law.24 6 This doctrine perme-
ates banking insolvency law, 247 the U.C.C., 24 8 and other domestic and
244. Id. § 4A-507 cmt. 2.
245. The regulatory law of bank-branching has been characterized as "at the same time
highly plastic and very rigid." Douglas H. Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1133, 1220 (1981).
246. The modern separate entity doctrine can be found in embryonic form in Pan-Amer-
ican Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762, 766-67 (2d Cir. 1925), which held
that the issuing bank was liable to the paying bank for reimbursement upon a letter of
credit. The doctrine was later refined in two cases: Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez,
249 N.Y.S. 319, 323 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931), which held that a bank's debt on deposit on its
Puerto Rican branch could not be reached by an attachment proceeding in New York,
because the situs of the debt was in Puerto Rico, and Dougherty v. National City Bank, 285
N.Y.S. 491, 505 (Sup. Ct. 1935), which held that the Soviet government's closure of Russian
branches of a New York bank excused the home bank from liability to Russian branch
depositors. The early history of this doctrine can be traced back to Bank of the United States
v. Goddard, 2 F. Cas. 694, 696 (C.C.D. Mass. 1829) (No. 917), which held that each branch
of the Bank of the United States should be treated as a separate bank.
247. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3102(j)(2) (1994) (treating United States branches of foreign
banks as separate entities for the purposes of insolvency and unpaid judgments); CAL. FIN.
CODE §§ 1781-1785 (West Supp. 1997) (treating foreign branches of banks as separate enti-
ties for the purposes of suspension or revocation of banking licenses); 205 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 645/12 (West 1993) (regarding bank branches or offices as separate entities for the
purposes of deposits); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 606(4) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1996) (treat-
ing branches and agencies as separate and independent legal entities for insolvency
purposes).
248. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-102(b) (determining liability of bank branch for purposes of
presentment, payment, or collection); id. § 4-107 (providing that branch is a separate bank
for purposes of deadlines and locations of actions to be taken); id. § 4A-105(a) (2) (defin-
ing branch or separate office of bank as separate bank for purposes of fund transfers); id.
§ 5-116(b) (applying separate entity doctrine for purposes of jurisdiction, choice of law,
and letters of credit, but not for enforcement ofjudgments); id. § 8-110 (applying separate
entity doctrine in context of investment securities); U.C.C. § 9-304 (Draft October 1997)
(governing security interests in deposit liabilities). It is noteworthy that the securities liabil-
ities of a financial intermediary are localized in exactly the same fashion as their general
liabilities. See U.C.C. § 8-110 (1995). For discussions regarding choice-of-law considera-
tions for securities transfers, see RANDALL D. GUYNN, MODERNIZING SECURITIES OWNERSHIP,
TRANSFER AND PLEDGING LAWS 35-41 (1996); EtROCLEAR OPERATIONS CENTER, supra note
146.
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international banking statutes as well. 249 The nominalistic separate
entity doctrine dominated the case law from the 1930s until about
1960, but has since receded into relative insignificance in the case
law. 250 The current vigor of the separate entity doctrine may be found
in the statutory law, whose recent development seems responsive to
the desuetude in the case law.
2. Varieties of the Separate Entity Doctrine.-The separate entity
doctrine imposed by the U.C.C. (and the old case law) comes in four
varieties: jurisdictional, choice-of-law, informational, and agency.
The discussion thus far has mainly concentrated on the choice-of-law
249. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 604 (1994) (requiring as a regulatory matter separate accounts
for foreign branches); UNCITRAL, supra note 119, art. Y(3) (b), at 589 ("[B]ranches and
separate offices of a bank in different States are separate banks."). The I.C.C.'s rules are of
international scope. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND
PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITs art. 2 (ICC No. 500 LF, 1993) (treating foreign
branches of banks as independent banks for the purposes of credit rules); INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM RuLES FOR BANK-TO-BANK REIMBURSEMENTS UNDER DOCU-
MENTARY CREDITS art. 2(i) (ICC No. 525 LF, 1995) (considering foreign branches of a bank
to be separate banks for the purposes of banking rules).
250. It is probably safe to say that the common-law separate entity doctrine remains
intact for international attachments. See, e.g., Reibor Int'l Ltd. v. Cargo Carriers (KACZ-
CO.), 759 F.2d 262, 264 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating in dictum that bank branches are autono-
mous for purposes of maritime attachment); McCloskey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 183
N.E.2d 227, 227 (N.Y. 1962) (no opinion) (denying attachment in New York of funds on
deposit in a German branch bank). It is probably not good law for intrastate attachments,
at least in banks with good computer systems. See Digitrex, Inc. v. Johnson, 491 F. Supp.
66, 68-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (mem.) (holding that the service of a restraining notice at a
bank's home office is effective against a branch account when the main office centrally
monitors the accounts at all branches); Therm-X-Chemical & Oil Corp. v. Extebank, 444
N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (App. Div. 1981) (mem.) (acknowledging the Digitrex rationale, but ruling
that the respondent bank did not possess sufficient computer equipment to void the sepa-
rate entity rule in the instant case). The McCloskey line was distinguished from the Digitrex
line in Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp., 921 F. Supp.
1113, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), which characterized the New York branch and the Philippine
main office of a bank as separate entities for the purposes of attachment and execution. It
is uncertain whether the separate entity doctrine is still applicable to interstate
attachments.
The doctrine has otherwise been abjured as federal law in the Second Circuit. See First
Nat'l Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 900 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[Flederal law
regards a national bank and its branches as a single entity."). However, it continues to
retain some vitality in courts outside the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder,
Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 207 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting "some authority" for the abroga-
tion of the separate entity doctrine but assuming the doctrine probably to be correct);
Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 576 F. Supp. 107, 162 n.80
(D. Del. 1983) (favorably noting old case law), affd without opinion, 740 F.2d 958 (3d Cir.
1984). Still other courts, although acknowledging the separate entity doctrine, read it nar-
rowly. See, e.g., Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that
although branch banks are separate entities, home offices are ultimately liable for obliga-
tions on deposits).
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approach, but has briefly touched on the jurisdictional approach re-
garding Article 5. These two approaches will be discussed in greater
detail below, especially the jurisdictional approach. For the time be-
ing, we shall leave jurisdiction and choice of law alone, and concen-
trate on the agency and informational varieties of the separate entity
doctrine.
The jurisdictional approach is adopted by U.C.C. Revised Article
5251 and by many old cases 25 2-a court has no jurisdiction of a foreign
branch simply because a domestic branch is within the jurisdiction of
the court. Other statutes, such as Article 4A of the U.C.C. or section
138 of the New York Banking Law, are not jurisdictional in nature, but
only choose the law of the relevant branch.25
Many of the old cases and a few of the statutes are rooted in
agency law. This was originally a muddled kind of corporate law, 254
but had settled down to a coherent agency doctrine in the middle of
the twentieth century. To understand the agency-law rationale for the
separate entity doctrine, consider multiple simultaneous demands for
payment at different locations. Before the advent of modem telecom-
munications, this kind of fraud could have been disastrous for a bank.
The case law made clear that a bank could protect itself by insisting
that demand be made at a specified physical location.255 Today, of
course, banks keep their books on centralized computers. A multiple
251. U.C.C. § 5-116(a).
252. See, e.g., In re Harris, 27 F. Supp. 480, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (stating that the jurisdic-
tional test regards a bank's control, not merely its location), overruled by First Nat'l City
Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959); Walsh v. Bustos, 46 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1943) (holding that the jurisdiction of a New York court did not extend to a Mexican
branch of a bank despite the existence of a New York branch); Bluebird Undergarment
Corp. v. Gomez, 249 N.Y.S. 319, 322 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931) (holding that a debt owed by a
Puerto Rican bank could not be reached by an attachment proceeding in New York be-
cause the attachment was limited to property in the jurisdiction).
253. See N.Y. BANKING LAw § 138 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1997) (designating that
branches located in foreign countries are governed by the laws of those foreign countries);
U.C.C. § 4A-507(a) (designating the law of the jurisdiction to govern the funds transfer).
254. For a particularly confusing case, see Citizens' & Southern Bank v. Taggart, 138 S.E.
898, 902 (Ga. 1927), which determined that the Atlanta branch of a bank was not an agent
of the parent bank, but rather its own principal.
255. The leading United States case for this may still be Chrzanowska v. Corn Exchange
Bank, 159 N.Y.S. 385, 388 (App. Div. 1916), affd, 122 N.E. 877 (N.Y. 1919), which stated
that New York banking law requires a bank's business to be conducted at a place specified
in the certificate of incorporation, emphasizing the distinctness of bank branches. See also
Idah-Best, Inc. v. First Sec. Bank, N.A., 584 P.2d 1242, 1248-52 (Idaho 1978) (holding that
the receipt of a dishonored check by the data-processing center of the payor bank's branch
did not constitute "receipt by" the payor bank for the purposes of determining whether the
payor bank failed to give timely notice of dishonor); Dean v. Eastern Shore Trust Co., 150
A. 797, 799-800 (Md. 1930) (holding that the bank cashing a check was a separate entity
from the branch bank acting as the drawee); Fordham, supra note 1, at 984-95 (arguing
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simultaneous demand for payment will elicit only one payment (or if
fraud is suspected, maybe none).
The problem of imperfectly informed bank agents still emerges
in some specialized contexts, such as offers of accord and satisfaction
made in offices unequipped for dispute resolution. This problem, ad-
equately addressed by special statutory solutions, 256 is no longer signif-
icant. This Article does not further discuss the use of the separate
entity doctrine to remedy problems of bank agency, except to point
out one irony. Modern telecommunications technology has super-
seded most of the agency version of the separate entity doctrine. 57
This Article has argued that it is precisely these telecommunications
technologies that have rendered the realistic approaches to conflict of
laws meaningless. As luck, necessity, and the U.C.C. drafters would
have it, the modern separate entity doctrine is the cure for the same
telecommunications technology that superseded the old separate en-
tity doctrine.
The informational cases were another staple of the old doctrine.
These cases involved an informational demand made on a domestic
branch for a deposit account booked abroad. Before 1959, the case
law forbade extraterritorial enforcement of such requests. 58 After
1959, courts became increasingly hostile to limited international dis-
that the only legitimate role for the separate entity doctrine is to protect a bank from fraud
by requiring demand to be made at a uniquely specified physical location).
256. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(1) (providing that accord and satisfaction statements
must be delivered to designated offices); id. § 4-107 (establishing branches as separate
banks "for the purpose of computing the time within which and determining the place at
or to which action may be taken or notices or orders shall be given under this Article and
under Article 3").
257. See, e.g., Digitrex, Inc. v. Johnson, 491 F. Supp. 66, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (mem.)
(holding that a main office may be liable for a branch account where a centralized com-
puter monitors all branches).
258. See In re Harris, 27 F. Supp. 480, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) ("[T]he records of a deposi-
tor's account with a foreign branch, not kept here, are not so within the control of the
main office here as to be subject to production by subpoena duces tecum served here."),
overru/d by First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959); Clinton Trust Co. v.
Compania Azucarera Cent. Mabay S.A., 14 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (holding that
the examination of the respondent banks could not extend to an inquiry about deposit
accounts, because the deposit in the Cuban branch could not be reached by the attach-
ment served on the New York agency of the Canadian bank, which lacked control over the
Cuban branch), aff'd, 15 N.Y.S.2d 721 (App. Div. 1939); accord United States v. Kyle, 21
F.R.D. 163, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (denying a motion directing a branch bank to produce
records located in a Canadian branch, because the branch was considered a separate entity
that controlled its own records); Walsh v. Bustos, 46 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943)
(holding that the jurisdiction of a New York court did not extend to a Mexican branch of a
bank despite the existence of a New York branch of the same bank).
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covery, 259 and the separate entity doctrine soon ceased to be a barrier
to extraterritorial discovery. Whatever the policies involved in extra-
territorial discovery, they are not relevant to the localization of branch
liabilities, and they do not require further discussion in this Article.
3. The Separate Entity Doctrine and the Corporate Veil. -We now re-
turn to the jurisdictional version of the separate entity doctrine. This
version is reminiscent of the familiar law of corporate veil-piercing.
These two bodies of law deserve comparison.26 °
The corporate veil is dual: It is ajurisdictional veil on the liability
side of the balance sheet, and an enforcement veil on the asset side.
The jurisdictional veil prevents a plaintiff from suing a corporation for
the misdeeds of its affiliate, and the enforcement veil prevents a plain-
tiff from collecting from the assets of an affiliate who is not a defend-
ant. The jurisdictional corporate veil is identical to that provided by
the jurisdictional separate entity doctrine. Both the jurisdictional cor-
porate veil and the jurisdictional separate entity doctrine work only on
the liability side of the balance sheet. The corporation differs only in
having the additional layer of insulation on the asset side.
The liability-side corporate veil is provided by something called
the Cannon doctrine. 61 Cannon stands for the proposition that, by
itself, jurisdiction over one corporate affiliate is insufficient to provide
jurisdiction over another affiliate.262 Like the separate entity doc-
trine, the Cannon veil serves as an effective conflicts device, neatly
compartmentalizing the liabilities of any organization whose business
affiliates do not overlap jurisdictionally.
259. The first case in this sequence was First National City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 620
(2d Cir. 1959), which held that a bank could not defeat the Internal Revenue Service's
summons for production of a foreign branch's records just because Panamanian law pro-
hibited such production. It was followed by United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d
897, 901-05 (2d Cir. 1968), which required a bank to comply with a subpoena to produce
documents in the possession of its German branch.
260. For a discussion of corporate veil-piercing and the separate entity doctrine, see
Sommer, supra note 156, at 238-41, 243-44.
261. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336-38 (1925) (holding
that defendant's Alabama subsidiary was a separate entity despite the concentration of the
Alabama corporation's stock in defendant's ownership). Although Cannon is an old case, it
retains its vitality in the courts. See Sommer, supra note 156, at 265-70 (discussing the Can-
non doctrine's relationship to enterprise and entity theories); Robert B. Thompson, Pierc-
ing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1036, 1044-70 (1991)
(presenting a study that addresses the structure and contextual nature of the piercing-the-
corporate-veil question). Cannon is not without its critics. See Sommer, supra note 156, at
266 n.145 (listing commentators and noting that "[o]nly one recent commentator seems
to like Cannon, more because the doctrine comports with judicial precedent rather than
because of any independent policy rationale").
262. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 336-38.
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Figure 3 explains the differences and similarities between branch
organizations and associations composed of affiliated corporations.
This figure denotes both interbranch and interaffiliate liabilities as
distinct: the separate entity doctrine and Cannon. The real difference
between the branch and the affiliated organization is on the asset side.
Interbranch assets are pooled; hence, a judgment against any branch
is enforceable against the entire organization. In contrast, intercorpo-
rate assets are distinct, and they can only be applied to corresponding
liabilities. (The assets of parent corporations include the net worth-
but not the assets-of their subsidiaries.) This asset-side veil is the
one usually referred to in discussions of the corporate veil, but the
corporate veil is really a dual structure. The conjoint corporate veil is
only occasionally rent asunder, typically in conditional forum non
conveniens cases. In these cases, dismissal from a United States court
is allowed on the condition that any subsequent foreign judgment will
be enforced in the United States against the domestic parent corpora-
tion.263 When used this way, the forum non conveniens doctrine per-
mits courts to compartmentalize the legal liabilities of a multinational
organization, while retaining unitary assets from which to satisfy
worldwide judgments. This kind of application of forum non con-
veniens is a pure application of Cannon, as it separates the jurisdic-
tional veil from the asset veil. In such a situation, the corporate veil
becomes identical to the jurisdictional separate entity doctrine. But,
as a general matter, nonfinancial organizations expect that the con-
joint corporate veil will compartmentalize both the assets and liabili-
ties of their international operations.
FIGURE 3
Branch Affiliated
Organization Organization
L - Liabilities Li
A -Assets Al,
L2l
Dotted Line indicates connection A1-4
between assets and liabilities L3
L4 
-:
.L A42
263. See Sommer, supra note 156, at 273-74 & n.176 (discussing problems with the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens); Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Validity and Propriety of Condi-
tions Imposed upon Proceeding in Foreign Forum by Federal Court in Dismissing Action Under Forum
Non Conveniens, 89 A.L.R. FED. 238, 241 (1988) (listing federal cases that considered the
validity of conditions in court orders that dismissed disputes under forum non
conveniens).
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The separate entity doctrine is nearly unique to banking because
international banks are unusual business organizations. Most multina-
tional business organizations compartmentalize their activities by na-
tional subsidiaries. 264 Banks are among the few firms that retain the
branch structure in their international operations, although they do
so with good reason.26 5 Branched business organizations-which
place all of a firm's assets at the disposal of all of its creditors-are
inherently more creditworthy than organizations composed of
affiliates.
To simplify a more complex argument, an organization com-
posed of subsidiaries will have an incentive to behave opportunisti-
cally. It can load bad assets onto weak subsidiaries and then abandon
them, relying on the difficulties of a fraudulent conveyance action and
the corporate veil. A branched organization cannot do this, because
the insolvency of one branch is the insolvency of the entire organiza-
tion.2 66 Banks-which are in the business of credit-therefore cannot
afford the subsidiary.267 Furthermore, as a practical matter, a solvent
bank would probably feel compelled to bail out an insolvent affiliate,
if its regulators permitted.26" The bank subsidiary, therefore, has no
ex post advantages to overcome its weak ex ante credit.
For ordinary multinational business corporations, the subsidiary
helps ensure that all jurisdictions do not govern at once. They do not
need the extra credit advantages of the branch organization, or they
264. See generally 2 RALPH H. FoLsoM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANsAcrIONS ch. 21 (1995) (explaining that subsidiaries are more suitable than branches
for multinational corporations because of liability, economic, organizational, operational,
and termination considerations).
265. See Herring & Kfibler, supra note 1, at 973-74 (explaining why banks prefer to oper-
ate through foreign branches); Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 741 ("Unlike
other multinational enterprises, which almost invariably operate through subsidiaries
• . .banks generally operate in countries other than their home base through branches,
without separate incorporation in the countries in which they are established.").
266. See Sommer, supra note 156, at 230-38 (arguing that risk-shifting provided by lim-
ited subsidiary liability bears few economic advantages); id. at 241-44 (discussing special
liability needs of banks under the source-of-strength doctrine and the separate entity
doctrine).
267. Every rule has an exception. A few banking activities-such as running a deriva-
tives book-require more creditworthiness than inheres in the organization as a whole.
The bank might therefore establish a special-purpose derivatives vehicle, carefully insu-
lated from the rest of the business. This creditworthy special-purpose vehicle weakens the
credit of the organization as a whole, but it can be justified if the derivatives business is
sufficiently lucrative. But apart from such special cases, "[the existence of subsidiaries in
banking has to be explained by considerations other than insulation from liability." Gun-
ther Dufey & Ian H. Giddy, Eurocurrency Deposit Risk, 8J. BANKING & FIN. 567, 575 (1984).
268. See id. at 574-75 (providing examples in which parent banks accepted responsibility
for their affiliates' liabilities).
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can selectively obtain it by appropriate interaffiliate cross-guaran-
tees. 269 However, ordinary multinational business organizations badly
need the jurisdictional compartmentalization wrought on their affili-
ate structure by the Cannon doctrine. Banks have similar (or
stronger) reasons forjurisdictional compartmentalization, but they do
not have recourse to the subsidiary device. A bank, therefore, wants
the Cannon part of corporate separateness without limited interaf-
filiate liability for judgments against branches. The separate entity
doctrine may be viewed as a specialized analogue to the subsidiary
doctrine, applicable to the financial-services business.
C. The Separate Entity Doctrine in Operation
This subpart applies the separate entity doctrine to some of the
cases discussed above: Zeevi, Wells Fargo, and LAFB 7.2 " The only diffi-
cult question in any of these cases regards which branch had which
obligation to perform. This question is very easy to answer in Zeevi or
Wels Fargo, and the resolution of these cases according to the separate
entity doctrine is straightforward. Only the LAFB case would cause
any difficulty. Even in LAFB, the separate entity doctrine would
crisply frame the issues and ease the resolution of the case.
Zeevi involved a Ugandan issuer of a letter of credit that was to
pay through a United States correspondent bank.271 In letter-of-credit
law, only issuers or "confirming" banks are obliged to pay under a
presentment of conforming documents.2 72 The correspondent bank
in Zeevi had neither role.2 73 The United States correspondent had
essentially the same obligation as any bank on whom a check is
drawn-no obligation to the presenter, but an obligation to the
drawer only if the drawer can put the bank in funds.2 7 4 The underly-
ing obligation, therefore, was that of the foreign branch.
269. STUART W. ROBINSON, JR., MULTINATIONAL BANKING 31 (1972) (describing the use
of subsidiaries by multinational business corporations as a way to insulate the parent corpo-
ration from liability in foreign jurisdictions).
270. See supra notes 83-98, 148-159, 162-189 and accompanying text.
271. J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333 N.E.2d 168, 170-71 (N.Y.
1975). Because the issuer used a separate bank as its correspondent, we may infer that it
had no United States branch.
272. See U.C.C. § 5-107(a)-(b) (1995). This is also the case under the old U.C.C. See
Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 562 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
issuing and paying banks were branches of the same bank).
273. See Zeevi, 333 N.E.2d at 170-72.
274. See U.C.C. § 4-402.
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The plaintiff, then, could have no complaint against the New
York paying bank.2 75 Because there was no misdeed by a New York
entity, the jurisdictional version of the separate entity doctrine would
have stopped the lawsuit without more ado.2 76 A choice-of-law ap-
proach might have permitted the New York court to hear the suit, but
under Ugandan law.2 7 7 Ugandan law did not seem to encourage pay-
ment, to say the least.
2 78
LAFB involved two branches of the same bank, and a tricky prob-
lem of characterization. The question was whether the deposit, at the
time of suit, was located in New York or London.279 (After this ques-
tion has been answered, the separate entity doctrine works mechani-
cally.) The answer is not a simple one. Article 4A does not provide
for the standing sweep arrangement between BT and Libyan Bank,
and there was no case law on point.280 Justice Staughton solved this
problem by finding that the account was in New York, but that the
275. Indeed, the plaintiff was not suing the correspondent bank, but was suing the
Ugandan branch for wrongful dishonor in New York; the plaintiff was merely using the
New York correspondent account as a source ofjurisdiction and assets. Zeevi, 333 N.E.2d at
170-72.
276. See supra notes 251-252.
277. See supra note 253.
278. See Zeevi, 333 N.E.2d at 171. Idi Amin's actions were arguably inconsistent with
Ugandan law, but such an approach is more common in human rights litigation than in
commercial litigation. See Galu v. Swissair, 873 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that
the behavior of officials clothed in state power does not necessarily constitute state action);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that torture and murder
perpetrated by a Paraguayan individual acting under the color of official authority violated
Paraguayan law, and conferring United States jurisdiction based .on statute). But see Grupo
Protexa, S.A. v. All Am. Marine Slip, 20 F.3d 1224, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1994) (employing, in
the context of a commercial case, reasoning similar to that adopted in Galu).
The Russian revolution taught commercial courts not to be choosy about the legiti-
macy of the acts associated with a foreign sovereign. Compare Sokoloff v. National City
Bank, 145 N.E. 917, 920 (N.Y. 1924) (Cardozo, J.) (noting that "no power short of sover-
eignty in all its plenitude has a competence so high" as to justify the expropriation of a
foreign liability) with M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 186 N.E. 679, 681 (N.Y. 1933)
(finding that the diplomatic nonrecognition of the Soviet regime was irrelevant to the
judicial recognition of Soviet law) and N.Y. BANKING LAW § 138 (McKinney 1990 & Supp.
1997) (following the Salimoff approach).
279. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 261-
62 (Q.B. 1987) (LAFB); see also supra notes 165-189 and accompanying text.
280. One recent case comes close to, but does not coincide exactly with, the LAFB fact
pattern. See Centre-Point Merchant Bank Ltd. v. American Express Bank Ltd., 913 F. Supp.
202, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (mem.) (involving instructions to roll-over a time deposit
rather than making it available for payment). Article 4A had not been drafted at the time
of the LAFB litigation, but it would have at least represented a good baseline for normative
analysis of old wire-transfer law. See U.C.C. § 4A-103(a) (1) (containing no condition for a
"payment order" except time of payment). The sweep arrangement at issue in LAFB was
conditioned on the size of the Libyan Bank's New York account. LAFB, [1988] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. at 264-66.
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New York contract had been breached by the 2:00 p.m. failure to
transfer, which led to damages in England.281 However, this approach
seems to concede the continuing validity of New York law, which
would make payment illegal. Justice Staughton, of course, evaded this
issue through his sub silentio choice of consequential damages. 28 2
The nominalistic separate entity doctrine suggests, but does not
quite compel a solution. Nominalism holds that the location of a
branch is solely determined by the contents of communications
among parties. 28 3 Libyan Bank and BT had initially agreed that the
deposit would be swept from New York to London by 2:00 p.m. every
day.2 84 The nominalist approach to the law of liabilities would argue
that a communication between branches is meaningless because all
branches, in a computerized age, share the same information. The
lack of subsequent interbranch communication is therefore irrele-
vant.2 5 If no additional interbranch communication is required to
shift liabilities, the initial agreement becomes tantamount to the re-
sult. The money moved to London at 2:00 p.m. because the parties
agreed as such. As the freeze occurred after 4:00 p.m., the bulk of the
money was safely in London. A lawsuit in London for a London
branch liability should result in an easy victory for the plaintiff.
LAFB is a more difficult case than Zeevi, however. One could ar-
gue that an interbranch communication is necessary to shift money,
and that as no communication was forthcoming in LAFB, New York
law therefore should have governed. If this were the law, the plaintiff
would lose. The chief practical problem with this approach, however,
is that it can become bogged down in difficult issues of interbranch
"notice." "Notice" poses no problem for the stereotyped evidence of a
wire room, but it can become very contextual in an interbranch set-
ting. U.C.C. Article 4A states that a payment order is "received" when
the bank receiving the payment order (in this case, BT's London
branch) receives "notice."28 6 The U.C.C. defines "notice" as follows:
281. LAFB, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 283-85.
282. See id.
283. See supra notes 66-67, 211-215 and accompanying text.
284. LAFB, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 265.
285. The text of Article 4A clearly requires some kind of interbranch payment order to
create an interbranch funds transfer. However, this interbranch payment order need not
necessarily take the form of a discrete communication: " ' Payment order' means an in-
struction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally, electronically, or in writing, to
pay." U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1) (1995). Would such a definition be satisfied by possession of
a common central computer? If so, the requisite payment order would exist in the LAFB
fact pattern.
286. See U.C.C. § 4A-106.
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Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an
organization is effective for a particular transaction from the
time when it is brought to the attention of the individual
conducting that transaction, and in any event from the time
when it would have been brought to his attention if the or-
ganization had. exercised due diligence. An organization ex-
ercises due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for
communicating significant information to the person con-
ducting the transaction and there is reasonable compliance
with the routines.2 87
Should BT be treated as a single entity for informational purposes?
With modem telecommunications, why not?
Justice Staughton's preferred result appears correct. However,
the separate entity doctrine does not compel it, because there is no
accepted rule of identification for the circumstances under which an
interbranch sweep arrangement becomes effective. This should not
be viewed as a weakness in the structure of the separate entity doc-
trine, but as a weakness in Article 4A, which did not definitively han-
dle the special problems of standing orders and interbranch
communications. Perhaps the Permanent Editorial Board of the
U.C.C. should address this issue.
Wells Fargo is similar to LAFB, but much easier.2 88 The difference
between these two cases is one of timing: The deposit in Wells Fargo
did not leave Manila before the Philippine freeze became effective.
28 9
Because the timing in Wells Fargo is clear, there is no doubt that the
deposit remained in the Philippines after the freeze became effective.
The deposit contract therefore remained under Filipino jurisdiction,
and was involuntarily novated to an indefinite term by the govern-
ment. Remembering that separate branches are separate banks for
Article 4A purposes, the obligation of the New York head office was
only that of a beneficiary's bank in a payment order. A beneficiary's
bank is not obligated to pay unless it has received and "accepted" a
payment order, which was clearly not the case in Wells Fargo.29 0 Here,
the plaintiff would lose under either the jurisdictional or choice-of-law
version of the separate entity doctrine.
287. Id. § 1-201(27).
288. See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(mem.), mot. for summ. j. denied, 612 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), remanded without opinion,
847 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.), remanded to 695 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 852 F.2d 657 (2d
Cir. 1988), vacated, 495 U.S. 660 (1990), remanded to 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1204 (1992); see also supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
289. Wells Fargo, 660 F. Supp. at 947.
290. See id.; see also U.C.C. § 4A-404.
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Significantly, the Second Circuit decided Wells Fargo for the plain-
tiff on the basis of a tort theory (i.e., that the defendant bank had
committed a tort by not trying as hard as possible to lift the foreign
decree) .291 This tort theory could not have been heard if Wells Fargo
were decided based on the jurisdictional separate entity doctrine. If
the separate entity doctrine sounded in choice-of-law, Philippine tort
law-not the New York tort law used by the court-would probably
have been dispositive.292
The discussion of Zeevi and Wells Fargo shows that the jurisdic-
tional version of the separate entity doctrine forecloses arguments
that remain open with the choice-of-law version. Choice of law has
more wiggle-room than jurisdiction. The Wells Fargo court resolved
the case by equating Philippine tort law to United States tort law
(without analysis),293 something it could not have done if it declined
jurisdiction. The Zeevi court resolved the case by following the
Ugandan law on the books,29 4 ignoring that Idi Amin was the law in
Uganda.29 Again, this approach would have been foreclosed if the
court had simply denied its jurisdiction.
A jurisdictional approach does not let a court intervene in a dis-
pute involving a foreign branch, except perhaps to enforce a judg-
ment. A choice-of-law approach may point to foreign law, but invites a
domestic court to determine it.296 The choice-of-law approach to the
separate entity doctrine suffers from at least three weaknesses. First,
not all United States courts are willing to apply foreign law. Some of
these courts simply insist that United States law governs notwithstand-
ing any choice-of-law doctrine or agreement. Other courts purport to
apply foreign law, but force the foreign law to replicate United States
law. 297 Second, even the most careful application of foreign law is less
determinate than a jurisdictional approach, because a domestic court
is less likely to apply foreign law correctly than a foreign court apply-
291. Wells Fargo, 936 F.2d at 727.
292. See supra Part IV.B.2.; see also supra text accompanying note 277 (applying the
choice-of-law approach to]. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333 N.E.2d
168 (N.Y. 1975)).
293. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
294. Compare Wells Fargo, 660 F. Supp. at 947 (detailing Philippine governmental decree)
with Zeevi, 333 N.E.2d at 171 (describing the Exchange Control Act of Uganda).
295. See Byron F. Burmester, On Human Intervention: The New World Order and Wars to
Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAI-H L. REv. 269, 289.
296. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
297. Both variants of this unwillingness appeared in the same case. CompareWells Fargo
Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying New York law) with Wells
Fargo, 660 F. Supp. at 948-51 (applying Philippine law). See generally Roger J. Miner, The
Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S. Federal Courts, 43 AM.J. CoMP. L. 581 (1995).
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ing its own law. Finally, this indeterminacy is biased. The choice of
forum is up to the plaintiff in most litigation; all a court can do is
decline jurisdiction requested by the plaintiff.29 If a plaintiff chooses
a domestic court to hear a dispute arising in a foreign country, the
plaintiff is likely to have thought it would have lost in the foreign
court where the dispute arose.299 The domestic court, in applying for-
eign law, is attempting to replicate the foreign court's result. This is
better done by throwing the dispute back home.
But even the jurisdictional separate entity doctrine does not re-
solve all disputes of private international banking law. In some inter-
stitial cases, such as LAFB, it is difficult to determine precisely which
communication changes the location of a bank liability. Such cases
are fortunately rare because existing payment law does a good job of
associating communications with their consequences. More signifi-
candy, not all private international banking law disputes hinge on the
location of a predeterminate bank liability.
But even in these disputes, the separate entity doctrine can often
sharpen the issues. For example, the location of a bank liability may
be only one factor in a dispute that involves other elements of interna-
tional law. The separate entity doctrine ensures that the location of a
liability is not a disputed factor. In re Maxwell Communication Corp. 00
illustrates this point well. The court had to consider whether dollar
transfers made from a London account to other foreign accounts
were extraterritorial for purposes of United States bankruptcy law.
The record showed that dollar payments from London were-as
usual-routed through New York, and one of the parties tried to
make something of this fact. Fortunately, the Maxwell Communication
court had the sense to avoid this non-issue.2°
298. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b).
299. This statement is plausible because of modern telecommunications technologies.
Except perhaps for consumer and small business cases, no forum is truly "inconvenient"
any more in logistical terms. Even consumer claims of inconvenience appear to be getting
short shrift from the courts. See, e.g., Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc. 67 F.3d 7, 8-10 (2d
Cir. 1995) (holding cruise company's contractual choice of forum valid despite the chosen
forum's distance from the consumer plaintiff); Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-
Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 916 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding "inconvenience" a matter of language,
not geography). Although forum non conveniens has much to do with forum, it has little
to do with convenience. Rather, it should be viewed as a technique for ripping through
the asset side of the corporate veil, but preserving the liability side. See supra notes 261-263
and accompanying text.
300. 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
301. The Maxwell Communication court promptly disposed of the irrelevancy that pay-
ments were routed through New York:
As detailed by the bankruptcy court, MCC's initial transfer to Barclays was made
from an MCC Natwest account in London to Barclays' branch in New York,
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V. CONCLUSION
In the early 1980s, the courts had no idea where a bank account
was located, and statutory law offered little guidance."0 2 Today, the
statutes, at least, are fairly clear, although their rationale is not appar-
ent on their face. The courts have not yet had an adequate opportu-
nity to respond to the new statutes.3 03 This Article has sought to help
the courts understand the statutes, by providing the courts with a ra-
tionale based upon the law of money.
As is often the case, an old problem solved is a new question
posed. This Article has made some headway with the law of money,
but no comprehensive treatment has been provided. For example,
this Article has not addressed the fundamental issue of payment final-
ity, even though the courts have recently been destabilizing this field,
much as they destabilized the location of money in the 1980s. 30 4 Nor
has this Article discussed the location of bank assets. The location of
bank assets, like the location of bank liabilities, is an important topic
in international banking law. This concluding Part will briefly sketch
these problems, but does not attempt to resolve them.
A. Where Is a Bank Asset?
Bank assets, like bank liabilities, must have locations. To be sure,
the separate entity doctrine implies that the location of bank assets is
irrelevant: Bank assets anywhere can satisfy localized judgments.3 °5
But the separate entity doctrine is limited in scope. It assumes a sol-
vent bank, for example. When the bank is involved in an insolvency
proceeding, local assets are often applied to local liabilities. °6 Regu-
through which all payments made to Barclays in dollars are routed. However, the
funds were then immediately credited to the outstanding balance on MCC's
London overdraft account with Barclays.
Id. at 817 n.5.
302. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
303. For example, states only began adopting the 1995 revisions to Article 5 in early
1996. See U.C.C. art. 5, 2B U.L.A. 118-19 (Supp. 1997).
304. See, e.g., Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assocs. (In re Koreag), 961
F.2d 341, 356-59 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a currency exchange was not final because
currency is an Article 2 good, subject to the right of reclamation); Sheerbonnet, Ltd. v.
American Express Bank, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 127, 134-35 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that the receiv-
ing bank's acceptance of a payment order, although sanctioned by U.C.C. § 4A-209, sub-
jected the bank to common law tort liability), amended by 951 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1995),
modified, 1996 WL 221829 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
305. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3102(j) (2) (1994) (allowing Comptroller of the Treasury to
appoint a receiver for an insolvent United States branch of a foreign bank); N.Y. BANKING
LAw § 606(4) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1996) (allowing superintendent to take possession
of foreign bank's property located in New York when the bank is insolvent).
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lators need to locate bank assets, both to ensure that local operations
are safe, and to prevent banks from conducting activities that are pro-
hibited locally. Courts also need to locate bank assets when a foreign
sovereign has purported to expropriate the asset.30 7
Because asset location arises in different contexts, it can have dif-
ferent meanings. In commercial law, the location of an intangible as-
set is the same problem as the location of a liability, except from the
creditor's point of view-the choice of law concerning the existence
and ownership of the asset. (This statement can also be true of tangi-
ble assets, but is complicated by the physical reality of such an asset.)
In insolvency law, asset location is more likely to correspond to the
jurisdiction of the receiver who distributes the assets to creditors, irre-
spective of the ordinary choice-of-law rules applied outside of insol-
vency law. Asset location in regulatory law is more complex yet. To
regulators, an asset can be "booked" to a jurisdiction, irrespective of
choice of law or jurisdiction to enforce.3" 8
On top of this multiplicity of meanings, the law of bank assets is
difficult to formulate. The separate entity doctrine is easy, in large
part, because liabilities are promises and take well to a nominalistic
treatment. Bank assets need not be nominalistic promises, but may be
very tangible property. We cannot say that a bank asset has no loca-
tion other than the location we ascribe to it. Buildings and factories
can be sited on a map, regardless of how society construes their
location.
Even those bank assets that are promises are complex. Consider
a loan by a branch of a multinational bank to a Ruritanian corpora-
tion, specifying New York choice of law. This asset may be clearly "lo-
cated" in New York for choice-of-law purposes. However, if the bank
becomes insolvent, the Ruritanian branch receiver is likely to deter-
mine the relevant location, because only the Ruritanian receiver can
collect against the loan to the Ruritanian corporation.
No simple legal theory can easily localize all the assets of interna-
tional banks. Because of the power of nominalism to resolve the loca-
tion of intangible property, the situs of tangible property is far more
difficult to determine than the situs of intangibles.
307. See Herring & Kfibler, supra note 1, at 946-49 (describing the "central issue" of
political risk in cross-border deposit transactions).
308. See N.Y. BANKING LAw § 138(2) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1997) (allocating sover-
eign risk according to where assets are "booked"); N.Y. BANKING LAw § 606(4) (McKinney
1971 & Supp. 1996) (allowing superintendents to apply all assets to insolvency proceedings
whether the assets are in New York or booked to New York).
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B. The Finality Problem
One of the most difficult and fundamental problems in the law of
money is that of payment finality. Payment finality is fairly easy to
define for the majority of payments accomplished by the shifting of
bank liabilities. Such payments are final when the identity of the in-
termediary banks ceases to be relevant, the funds have been shifted,
and the original obligation between the end-parties has been dis-
charged. 30 9 A payment by currency is final when the recipient of cur-
rency can no longer reject the payment as counterfeit. 310
Phrased this way, payment finality seems like another technical
and fussy detail of payment law. However, finality is very fundamental
to the concept of money. Payment finality permits a shifting contract
right to be treated as property free of adverse claims: It is central to
the negotiability of money.3 11 Second, finality is the interface between
the extremely nominalistic law of payment systems and the very differ-
ent general law of commercial obligations. Before the moment of
payment finality, legal rights are determined by the unusual law of
money and payment systems, in which symbols are everything.
3 12
When a payment has become final (or before it has been initiated),
we are in the far more ordinary world of contract, in which symbolic
and non-symbolic facts compete. Finally, payment finality plays an ex-
tremely important role in the world of high-value payments. Large
financial institutions send and receive an enormous volume of money
every day, often far more than their capital, and sometimes more than
their assets!313 A very reliable law of payment finality allows these in-
stitutions to rely on the payments they have received, so that they may
make the payments they must transmit. A full treatment of the law of
money will not be possible until a full theory of payment finality is
developed.
309. William B. Davenport & Donald J. Rapson, Impact of Article 4A on Banks and Their
Customers, in THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 53 (A.L.I.-
A.B.A. Course of Study No. C965, 1994). The events do not necessarily coincide.
310. Bank of the United States v. Bank of Georgia, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 333, 343 (1825)
(StoryJ.) ("[R]eceipt by a bank of forged notes, purporting to be its own, must be deemed
an adoption of them.").
311. See Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758) (Mansfield, J.).
312. See supra Part III.C.
313. See Raj Bhala, The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 Ky. L.J. 347, 349 (1993)
(noting that every day, two trillion dollars are transferred by wire).
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APPENDIX B
A FEW WORDS ON E-MONEY AND PAPER CURRENCY
Although this Article focuses on international banking law, other
issues of monetary law bear heavily on the issue, "where is a bank ac-
count?" This short essay discusses currency monies, both traditional
paper money and new electronic systems under development: so-
called e-money.
Two definitions are key: "currency" and "e-money." A "currency"
is a kind of money in which payment finality occurs without the in-
volvement of the issuer of the currency."1 4 A transfer of dollar bills,
for example, discharges the obligation upon physical transfer, without
involving the United States Treasury or a Federal Reserve Bank. Simi-
larly, a cashier's or certified check-issued by a bank-discharges an
obligation when the obligee takes it.3 15 The cashier's check, in the
peculiar sense the term is used here, is a currency, even though the
holder of the bank's check must subsequently collect the check. The
payment is final before collection, and the first holder ceases to be an
obligee when it passes the check. 1 6 Although a cashier's check usu-
ally passes by endorsement, it can also be in bearer form and be le-
gally identical to a dollar bill (apart from the distractions of a transfer
warranty and legal tender status).3 1 7 Significantly, these cashiers'
checks do not pass hand-to-hand. They therefore meet this Article's
legal definition of a currency, but are not functionally currencies.
Unlike cashiers' checks, conventional checks are not currencies.
The payor's obligation to the payee is not discharged until the payee's
bank has decided to pay the check.3 18 Similarly, wire transfers are not
currencies. The originator cannot discharge an obligation to a bene-
ficiary without the action of at least one bank, and more often several
banks. 3 1
9
Most forms of e-money are electronic bank currencies.3 20 (Most
contemporary bank money, although electronic, is not currency in
314. Cf U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (1995) (defining "money" as "a medium of exchange au-
thorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government" as part of its currency).
315. Id. § 3-310(a).
316. Id. § 3-310.
317. See id. § 3-416.
318. Id. § 3-310(b).
319. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
320. The best current commercial law discussion of e-money is probably The Task Force
on Stored-Value Cards, A Commercial Lawyer's Take on the Electronic Purse: An Analysis of
Commercial Law Issues Associated with Stored-Value Cards and Electronic Money, 52 Bus. LAw. 653
(1997).
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the sense the term is used here.) To be a currency, the receipt of an
electronic communication by a nonbank payee must discharge the
payor's debt to the payee, without any bank action. The analogy to a
cashier's check is close, and most e-monies, like most cashiers' checks,
are collected shortly thereafter. A typical e-money scheme would look
like Figure B-1.
FIGURE B-1
1. Consumer gets e-cash from Issuer 2. Consumer makes purchase
[ onsumner Consumer[
Issuer Merchant _nMerchant's
4. Merchant's bank gets reimbursed 2 3. Merchant gets reimbursed
Issuer Merchant Merchant's Merchant's
Bank BankI ->i
First, the consumer's bank adds value to the consumer's card:
the bank acts as the "issuer." "' (Some forms of e-money rely on pure
cryptanalytic security and do not require cards.) The consumer then
pays for the merchandise through an electronic communication, with
payment finality discharging the consumer's debt to the merchant."' z
The merchant, equipped with secure information of a payment, then
receives a credit from its bank, which is, in turn, reimbursed by the
issuer through an account credit wire transfer.32 3
Because the consumer's bank debits the consumer's account
when it adds value to the card, payment finality is important only if
the issuer becomes insolvent. If the payment to the merchant is final,
the merchant (or its bank), rather than the consumer, will bear the
risk of issuer insolvency. 24 E-cash schemes can be either auditable
321. See id. at 677-89.
322. See id. at 689-700, 709-15.
323. See id. at 711-13.
324. See id. at 714-15.
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(like a cashier's check, with the names of all the parties available, at
least, to the issuing bank) or unauditable, like cash.325
Nobody knows, as of the time of this writing, the fate of e-money
in the marketplace. However, many banks are betting large amounts
of money on its success. But even if e-money is ultimately insignifi-
cant, it sharply illustrates two important issues in the law of money.
First, e-money is an excellent conceptual refutation of currency
fundamentalism. Most e-money schemes are designed as substitutes
for paper currency. E-money may be superior to currency in several
respects: It can bear interest; the auditable kinds of e-money provide
individual protection against loss or theft and social protection against
money laundering and counterfeiting; and e-money is well suited to
market schemes such as affinity cards. 26 Imagine that the promoters
of e-money succeed, as they might. Maybe e-money will prove supe-
rior to currency on the marketplace and supplant it! Maybe it will be
so superior that no one will choose to hold cash anymore.
This prospect threatens currency fundamentalism. If the funda-
mentalists are correct, all payments are mere substitutes for cash ten-
ders. What will happen on the day the final dollar bill is redeemed for
bank credit? There will be nothing to support the fundamentalists'
version of the law of money. Probably, the rest of us will not notice. If
a lawsuit is brought, a court might profess adherence to the old-time
religion, but will nevertheless find a way to decide the case in the in-
terests of commerce, as it usually does when confronted with the
"legal tender" mantra. 27
E-money also helps clarify a great source of confusion in the law
and economics of money: the origin of the state monopoly of paper
currency. No one is suggesting that the state monopolize e-money,
although it is also a currency. Commercial banks will issue e-money
competitively, and no one will mind. Does this mean that the state
has been wrong in monopolizing paper currency? Probably not. It is
easy to justify differential treatment without lapsing into currency
fundamentalism.
325. See Thomas P. Vartanian, Doing Business on the Internet: The Law of Electronic Com-
merce, in DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET, at 141, 152 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trade-
marks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3988, 1996).
326. See id. at 169-70 (describing how technological and financial advances, including
e-money, will bring social, business, and legal changes and may deter crime).
327. See supra notes 42, 190-195 and accompanying text; cf WHITE, supra note 47, at 169-
94 (arguing that the market will force the unit of account to correspond to a physical
medium of exchange, but assuming that manual transmission of currency will remain the
most cost-efficient means of accomplishing certain transactions).
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E-money and paper currency are both currencies, but they are
very different kinds of currency. Most e-money circulates once, on a
defined path: from the issuer to the customer to the merchant to the
collecting bank to the issuer.3 28 In this respect, it is like a cashier's
check (except more secure). Paper currency takes a long time before
returning to the issuer, and crosses many palms. These stylized facts
alone suggest a strong argument for a natural monopoly of paper cur-
rency, but not e-money.
Conceptually, the key instrument is the cashier's check. A bearer
cashier's check does not appear to be banned by law,129 and has pre-
cisely the same commercial law attributes as state currency. In other
words, the state's monopoly on circulating currency is not based on a
legal barrier to potential competition. Could monopolistic paper cur-
rency be a superior product to the competitive version? A very plausi-
ble argument for the superiority of government-monopoly paper
currency can be made in a few words.
Because any form of currency gives payment finality upon tender,
the recipient of currency has only one means of protecting itself from
currency issued by a bad bank: rejecting the currency. If it takes the
currency, it has no recourse against a nonfraudulent buyer. Rejection
of bad currency is easy enough, in some cases. Consider a car dealer
offered a cashier's check drawn on the Freeman's Bank of Justus,
Montana. A quick telephone call to the dealer's own bank will pro-
vide comfort. True, it might delay the transaction by a few minutes,
but the dealer and customer can afford a few minutes for a $20,000
retail transaction. However, nobody can afford a similar delay in sell-
ing a newspaper; they need currency reliable on its face. Credit infor-
mation is expensive in petty retail transactions. It must therefore be
rigorously economized."' 0 For a paper payment medium, only mo-
nopoly (or perhaps a small oligopoly) will do.
Although e-money legally resembles a cashier's check, it employs
a very different technology, one that greatly reduces the cost of infor-
mation. The merchant's terminal can be programmed with all the
328. See supra notes 317-323 and accompanying text; see also supra fig.B-1.
329. The 1865 tax on state bank notes has long been repealed by Congress. There is no
federal prohibition on state bank emissions. But see 18 U.S.C. § 491 (1994) (prohibiting
counterfeit currency, and perhaps coins intended to circulate as money). National banks
lost their vestigial power to issue notes in 1994. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 101-110 (repealed 1994).
But national banks may issue cashier's checks, even those made to bearer. In any event,
national banks may (and do) issue name cashier's checks.
330. See Klein, supra note 31, at 444. "The entry into the market of additional currencies
creates social information-transaction costs associated with detecting counterfeits and
therefore a single currency must be established." Id. at 450 (footnote omitted).
1998]
96 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 57:1
issuers acceptable to the system, eliminating all delays in ascertaining
issuer credit. In most systems, the terminal will be reprogrammed
when the merchant downloads to its bank for value. The merchant's
bank therefore has a day-to-day ability to judge the issuers with whom
it-and by extension, its merchant-will deal. Interestingly, the few
e-money systems which permit a meandering offline circulation em-
ploy only one issuer, albeit an issuer that is a cooperative of issuing
banks. The market endorses monopoly when appropriate.
